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Summary 
This study aims at diagnosing the dysfunctional water sector of Tinos and Syros, islands in 
the Cyclades island complex of Greece. At present, these islands suffer from insufficient 
water quantity, combined with poor quality and high cost. The research problem addressed in 
this thesis is the apparent inability of centrally planned technical and administrative-reform 
solutions that have been promoted to rectify the problems. This work explores the reasons for 
the inability to rectify the water sector and aims to answer the overarching research question: 
Why is the water sector in the Cyclades still dysfunctional, despite the attempted solutions? 
In answering this question, I have laid particular focus on the institutional rather than 
the physical dimensions of the problem, using an adbuctive research strategy to guide the 
research process. First, I investigate the main concepts employed here: water sector, Cyclades 
islands, dysfunction and responses. Building on institutionalist theory, I come to two 
conclusions, suggesting the existence of a vicious circle: i) institutions and policies have led 
to this chronic dysfunction, manifested as disrupted and insecure water provision and ii) the 
same dysfunction (scarcity) itself acts as a driver for those institutions to change.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Second, I address the question of how can such a vicious cycle be broken? At which 
point in the process should interventions occur that can positively alter outcomes? To this 
end, I explore potential theoretical foundations upon which to ground the analysis of possible 
rectification for the water sector in Tinos and Syros, resulting in the identification of several 
factors that could help us to explain the dysfunction. In this vein, I examine the effect of 
insularity on the ability of administrators to set up and implement policies safeguarding water 
resources in this type of environment. Then, I approach the question from the perspective of 
size. Can small local administrations deliver policies and intervene in a meaningful and 
effectual manner?  What happens if an administration is both insular and small?  
To explore these emergent questions related to policy making, I revisit existing legal 
rules and relations relevant to the context, viewed in parallel with aspects of human behaviour 
and transactions under the analytical lens classical institutional economics offers. The reasons 
for the water-supply dysfunction in the study islands are, thus, sought after in terms of 
transactions amongst actors, working rules regulating those transactions, and officials’ 
remedial power at all levels. Based on my analysis, I conclude that top-down structures and 
centrally planned policies have been hindering the meaningful change and rectification of the 
water sector and have, in fact, created and prolonged the dysfunction. Decentralising 
governance, granting local-level autonomy (institutional and financial) is a plausible way of 
rectifying the water sector, as local officials are knowledgeable about local conditions and 
feel liable to their fellow citizens, who would willingly cooperate with this level of 
government. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Das vorliegende Buch hat die Analyse des funktionsgestörten Wassersektors auf den beiden 
Zykladen Inseln Tinos und Syros in Griechenland zum Ziel. Die Bevölkerung dieser Inseln 
leidet unter einer Kombination aus mangelnder Wasserqualität, -quantität und hohen 
Wasserpreisen. Die Arbeit setzt sich mit Gründen der Ineffektivität zentral geplanter 
Maßnahmen (technische Lösungen und administrative Reformen) bei der Lösung solcher 
Probleme auseinander. Die übergeordnete Forschungsfrage hierbei lautet: Warum ist der 
Wassersektor angesichts einer Vielzahl von Lösungsversuchen immer noch dysfunktional? 
Um diese Frage zu beantworten, liegt der Fokus auf der institutionellen statt auf der 
physikalischen Dimension des Problems. Hierbei verfolgte ich eine abduktive Strategie 
innerhalb des Forschungsprozesses. Zu Beginn untersuche ich die zentralen Konzepte meiner 
Forschung: Wassersektor, Zykladen Inseln, Dysfunktion und Reaktion. Auf 
institutionentheoretischen Annahmen basierend, komme ich zu zwei Schlussfolgerungen, die 
einen Teufelskreis vermuten lassen: i) Institutionen und Politik haben zu einer chronischen 
Dysfunktionalität, die sich in einer unsteten und unsicheren Wasserversorgung äußert, 
geführt. ii) Diese Dysfunktionalität verhindert eine Veränderung der existierenden 
Institutionen. 
Aufbauend auf diesem Zwischenfazit setze ich mich mit den Fragen auseinander, wie ein 
solcher Teufelskreis durchbrochen werden kann, und an welchem Punkt zu intervenieren ist, 
um die ungewollten Konsequenzen zu vermeiden. Hierfür untersuche ich potentielle 
theoretische Grundlagen für die Entwicklung möglicher Verbesserungsansätze der Situation 
auf Tinos und Syros. Diese Herausforderung mündet in der Identifikation verschiedener 
Faktoren, die helfen können, die Dysfunktionalität zu erklären. Weiterhin untersuche ich die 
Auswirkung der Abgeschlossenheit dieser Inseln auf die Fähigkeit der öffentlichen 
Verwaltung, Regelungen zum Schutz von natürlichen Wasserressourcen zu entwickeln und zu 
implementieren. Darauffolgend nähere ich mich dem Problem aus der Perspektive der Größe: 
Kann eine kleine öffentliche Verwaltung Regelungen entwickeln und in einer zielführenden 
und effektiven Art intervenieren? Welche Auswirkungen hat es, wenn die Verwaltung 
abgeschlossen und klein ist? 
Um diesen sich neu ergebenden Fragen in Bezug auf die Politikgestaltung zu begegnen, setze 
ich mich zum einen mit Rechtsgrundsätzen und deren offizieller Regelung auseinander. Zum 
anderen beschäftige ich mich mit den Aspekten menschlichen Verhaltens und Transaktionen 
aus der Sicht der klassischen Institutionenökonomie. Die Gründe für die Funktionsstörungen 
werden somit im Bereich der Transaktionen zwischen Akteuren, deren Regularien und dem 
sie fördernden Einfluss von offizieller Seite auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen gesucht. 
Basierend auf meiner Analyse schlussfolgere ich, dass die Top-down-Strukturen und die 
zentral gesteuerten Regularien die Hauptursache sind, dass es zu keiner vernünftigen 
Veränderung oder gar einer Lösung der Probleme im Wassersektor kommt. Mehr noch, sie 
sind die eigentlichen Gründe für die Misere und deren Persistenz. Eine Dezentralisierung der 
Steuerung und eine Unabhängigkeit der lokalen politischen Ebene (institutionell und 
finanziell) stellen einen vielversprechenden Ansatz zur Verbesserung der Situation dar. 
Beamte vor Ort kennen die örtlichen Gegebenheiten und fühlen sich verantwortlich für die 
lokale Bevölkerung. Dies wiederum führt zu einer Steigerung der Kooperationsbereitschaft 
zwischen Bürgern und Regierungsbediensteten. 
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1 The Water Crisis in the Cyclades, Greece  
 
1.1 The Problem at Hand: Dysfunctions within the Cycladic Water Sector 
 
Recovering from the devastation of the Second World War, the ensuing four-year civil war 
that ended in 1949, and a seven-year military junta (1967-1974), Greece went through its 
golden years after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 and the abolition of the monarchy, in 
what is called the Metapolítefsi (regime change). Only seven years after the birth of the Third 
Hellenic Republic in 1974, Greece joined the European Economic Community in 1981, and 
Community funds were then channelled into its public treasury for infrastructural 
development, modernising agriculture (Greece’s main economic sector at the time) and 
structural interventions (Karamouzi, 2013; Gürsoy, 2003). The Greek economy seemed to 
flourish, and the citizens seemed content with the new democratic regime and the 
Europeanisation process (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis, 2014). 
As the country opened up to foreign travellers and became one of Europe’s key tourism 
destinations, the Greek islands and the island complex of Cyclades, in particular, benefited 
from public spending on constructing and improving local infrastructure to make the islands 
attractive for international tourism.  New roads were constructed and paved, existing ones 
widened, ports were constructed, small seaside hotels and apartments – some with swimming 
pools – were built and recreational facilities such as restaurants and bars opened. Investing in 
tourism boosted local economies and revitalised regions that had suffered from out-migration. 
Indeed, tourists rushed to the Cyclades islands, but with them came an increased pressure on 
water resources (Zaharatos and Tsartas, 2005). 
Water provision in the majority of the Cyclades, and on the islands of Tinos and Syros in 
particular, is often insufficient in quantity and is oftentimes interrupted, particularly during 
the summer when limited water resources are channelled to priority areas, particularly during 
peak hours in order to meet the increased needs of tourist accommodations. However, 
according to several Greek laws (for instance the 2003 Water Law and the Common 
Ministerial Decision Y2/2600/2001), water should be provided in quantities sufficient to meet 
all the needs of the entire population and – as emphasised in the Common Ministerial 
Decision – should be uninterrupted. Further concerns regarding water quantity have been 
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awakened by the great amounts of water loss from the network, ranging from 40% to 80% 
overall (Karalis and Emmanouilidis, 2011). 
Furthermore, the issue of water quality often concerns consumers and local authorities 
alike. The network running through some of the Cyclades islands is aged and, because of poor 
maintenance in some areas, red oxidised water, unsuitable for human use, runs out of the 
pipes (Koini Gnomi, 2013). Due to health concerns, water authorities often have to issue 
warnings to inhabitants, urging them to stop using tap water until further notice (personal 
communication).  
Frequent water quality problems have become a reason for inhabitants to lose their trust in 
the safety of tap water. Thus, they only use it for washing and personal hygiene and prefer to 
buy bottled water for drinking and sometimes even for cooking, adding on average 500 to 800 
euros to what households pay annually for water (Karalis and Emmanouilidis, 2011). In 2014, 
a household of three persons on the Cycladic island of Syros with an average monthly water 
consumption of 70m
3
 had to pay approximately 50 euros per month for covering its water 
needs (Municipal Water and Drainage Company of Ermoupolis Syros, 2017). Meanwhile, the 
average cost in Athens was considerably lower, at 20 euros per month (EYDAP, 2017).  
We see then that the problem of the water sector of Tinos and Syros – typical of the 
majority of the Cyclades islands – can be understood as a combination of the insufficient 
quantity, poor perceived quality and high cost of water. Various responses have been 
attempted by national and local governments: laws were passed, technical solutions were 
pursued, and two administrative reforms were implemented. These responses, however, have 
been predominately focused on only tackling the quantity and not the quality or cost of water. 
One attempted means of resolving the problem, mainly pursued by national governments 
in the 70s and 80s, was the construction of dams and reservoirs, a manifestation of the 
engineering way of thinking about water provision. Dams and reservoirs were constructed 
throughout the Cycladic islands, with various degree of success in retaining water. In parallel, 
extensive water distribution networks were constructed, providing water to the majority of 
island inhabitants.  The settlements not covered by such networks include those which were 
either too remote, with challenging geomorphology, making it prohibitively expensive to 
expand the network there, or in some cases were outside the urban planning zone (illegally 
constructed settlements) and, thus, lay outside the jurisdiction of local authorities.  
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The transfer of water via tankers from the mainland – another decades-long state-
subsidised solution – was heavily criticised as being too expensive, unsustainable, 
undemocratic and as serving hidden agendas (Danilakis, 2012; Gikas and Tchobanoglous, 
2009). National governments commissioned water tankers that carried water from reservoirs 
in mainland Greece to islands in the Cyclades.  The water was then stored in small publicly 
owned tanks and reservoirs on the islands, whose inhabitants paid a very low water price. 
More recently, local governments in the Cyclades have commissioned desalination plants, 
over 20 of which have been installed and are operating (Karalis and Emmanouilidis, 2011), 
providing water to inhabitants and hundreds of thousands of tourists visiting these islands 
during summer. These desalination plants are powered from local electrical grids, with power 
stations operating on mazut, a low-quality fuel oil. The average cost for each cubic meter of 
water produced by the plants is 0.84 euros on Syros and 0.62 euros on Tinos (op.cit), in part 
explaining why consumers in the Cycladic islands need to spend more for the most expensive 
water in Greece. 
Greek governments have invested considerable time, effort and financial resources in 
tackling the water provisioning problem for the Cyclades islands. Since the late 80s, two 
major institutional reforms have been carried out, merging jurisdictions and decentralising 
decision-making power. These reforms were intended to grant local authorities greater 
independence from Athens regarding, amongst other matters, water management, with the 
purpose of allowing them to design and implement water management policies best suited to 
local conditions and needs.  
In this process, two major water laws were passed in order to integrate responsibilities 
among different authorities and regulate water use and planning: the Water Law of 1987 
(MDEV, L. 1739) and the transposition of the European Union’s Water Framework Directive 
in the Water Law of 2003 (MEPPW, L.3199) (Kampa and Bressers, 2008). The 1987 Water 
Law sets out a framework for water use permits, whereas the 2003 Water Law requires setting 
up Regional Water Directorates in each of the country’s regions, with the aim of protecting 
and managing river basins within them (Kampa and Bressers, 2008). The Regional Water 
Directorates are also responsible for handling water quality and quantity issues. This was 
reinforced by a 2011 Administration Reform named Kallikratis, according to which additional 
jurisdictions have been given to regional administrations. More specifically, the regions have 
now become the ones responsible for planning and financing water works.  
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1.2 Research Questions and Objectives 
Against this background, I aim here to understand the reasons for the apparent inability to 
rectify the problems facing the water sector of two selected islands in the Cyclades (Syros and 
Tinos), based on the assumption that the above-outlined technical and administrative steps 
have been taken to tackle them. I thus seek to answer the following research question:  Why is 
the water sector in the Cyclades still dysfunctional, despite the implementation of technical 
solutions and administrative reforms aimed at rectifying its shortcomings? 
My research has been based on the institutionalist and pragmatic approaches, which 
respectively hold that institutions are crucial to understanding human action and that human 
action is context-dependent. I have also drawn on the tenets of nissology – the study of 
islands – which holds that islandness, also called the “island mind”, offers a cognitive 
template distinct from the “mainland mind” and, in its turn, differently shapes human 
(inter)action among island dwellers. In the light of this theoretical background, I pose the 
following sub-questions: Firstly, how does the level of administration (national, regional, 
local) exert influence on how water resources are governed in the Cyclades? Secondly, what 
is the role of the geography of the Cyclades? Does islandness shape the ability of local and 
national administrations to govern water resources in these islands?  
1.3 Research Roadmap 
These research questions have shaped the research roadmap I have taken (Fig. 1), guiding 
the methodological steps deemed necessary. As an initial step, I adopted an abductive 
research approach to guide me through the research process, assuming that it would allow me 
to unravel the reasons behind the dysfunction, as it requires the researcher to create and 
empirically check the plausibility of hypotheses that might explain the occurrence of a 
surprising phenomenon – in this case, the dysfunctional water sector of Tinos and Syros – by 
immersing herself for alternate periods in the relevant social world and withdrawing again for 
reflection and analysis. I also selected the case study approach as a method for obtaining 
empirical data and have applied other qualitative methods to allow me to form a holistic view 
and in-depth understanding of the water sector in Tinos and Syros.  
With this theoretical underpinning in mind, I have taken a three-phase empirical approach. 
During the first phase and following a literature review, I conducted an explorative stay of on 
month on the two selected islands, where I had informal interviews with residents and 
officials that led to verification of the relevance of my research questions. When I returned 
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from the trip, I reflected on what I had learned and formed hypotheses on the reasons for the 
dysfunction. The second empirical phase, consisting of a stay of one month, included a 
second and more focused round of recorded interviews. This phase led to revision of the 
analytical framework, based on the insights gained from the interviews and theorising the 
concepts that emerged from them, and concluded with another round of reflection and 
formation of hypotheses that were then tested in the third and last empirical phase. During this 
phase, during 45-days stay, the analytical framework was finalised, and the third round of 
interviews took place, accompanied by data analysis and discussion of preliminary results. In 
the final step, I reflected upon the theoretical and empirical insights gained pertaining to the 
research questions in order to write the present monograph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the research roadmap for the present study 
Source: own compilation 
Initial steps 
 Abductive research strategy 
 Case studies 
 Qualitative methods 
 Verifying relevance of research questions 
 Literature review 
 Explorative field research and first round of informal 
interviews  
 Reflection and forming hypotheses regarding reasons for 
dysfunctional water sector 
 Second round of interviews  
 Theorising islandness 
 Revisiting analytical framework  
 Reflection and forming hypotheses regarding reasons for 
dysfunctional water sector 
  
 Theorising remedial power 
 Finalising analytical framework 
 Third round of interviews  
 Data analysis and preliminary results 
 Reflection on theoretical and empirical insights 
 Completion of monograph Final steps 
3
rd
 empirical phase 
2
nd
 empirical phase 
1
st
 empirical phase 
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1.4 Structure of this Work 
This dissertation is organised into six chapters, beginning with the current chapter 
describing the problem at hand and specifying my research questions. Chapter 2 discusses 
water as a resource and offers a relatively detailed description of the Cyclades island complex 
and the two selected islands, looking at their administrative structures, socio-economic 
characteristics and status of their water resources. It concludes with a description of the water 
sector in the Cyclades, especially focusing on and further specifying its dysfunctions. 
Chapter 3 sets the theoretical grounding for the study. It conceptualises islands using tenets 
from administrative studies and nissology. It further considers approaches to understanding 
and analysing institutions from an institutional economics approach using transactions as the 
unit of analysis and combines the three concepts (islands, institutions, transactions).  It 
concludes with the development of an analytical framework that brings these categories 
together and structures empirical research. 
In Chapter 4, I explain the development of the research approach of the dissertation, and 
summarise the ontological and epistemological assumptions guiding it. I discuss the abductive 
research design and the methods of the empirical data collection employed as well as situate 
the empirical phase within the broader social context of the Cyclades and Greece. 
In Chapter 5, I present my key findings, relating them to the conceptual framing used for 
the study, and tell the story anew by summarising them. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the main 
conclusions derived from the analysis and their implications for institutional change needed 
for rectifying the water sector in Tinos and Syros. 
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2 The Diagnostic Imperative 
In order to analyse a problem, one must first understand it and clarify the concepts used so as 
to make clear what is being put under scrutiny. The present study poses the question, “why is 
the water sector in the Cyclades dysfunctional, despite attempted government responses to 
rectify it”. Consequently, it seems to me that the main concepts we need to clarify at this 
stage are water sector, Cyclades islands, dysfunction and responses, as their meanings are 
determined by the context in which they are situated, entailing both the overarching socio-
political and economic context and their dynamic nature over time. 
The socio-political and economic context implies that legislators, policy makers, 
executives, bureaucrats, engineers, construction companies, and water users have a role in 
designing and running the water sector. Their actions are contextual and socially constructed. 
This means that social conditions – institutions and actor position, education, expectations, 
belief systems, economic status and so on – influence their perception of their role, their 
ability to act (and the range of actions they conceive as possible), as well as the options 
available to them (Vatn, 2015). Since water management is regulated by policies crafted by 
governmental bodies, it would seem logical to suppose that political conditions have a 
determining and direct influence on the water sector – and the extent to which it is functional 
or not. Thus, one cannot explain the dysfunction by limiting the scope of analysis to one 
geographical region: the Cyclades. Rather, the analysis must be expanded to cover the 
political entity that, in this case, is the Greek state, regarding how it directly and indirectly 
influences local conditions and capabilities in the Cyclades islands.  
Since the water-sector dysfunction has persisted over time, it is important to understand 
how the main concepts used in this research have evolved historically at the level of the 
Cyclades islands as well as at the national level. Focusing only on the current status of the 
water resources, or on the political conditions prevailing in Greece, would only likely produce 
a static snapshot of a very complex nexus. By incorporating the component of time, causal 
relationships and path-dependencies can hopefully be identified that could offer valuable 
insights on possible rectification of the water sector.    
In what follows, I address the concepts identified as being important for this stage of the 
study: water as a resource and its state in the Cyclades, focusing on the selected islands of 
Tinos and Syros. Furthermore, a rich description of the selected case studies is presented, 
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through which the dysfunction will be more precisely defined, as are the responses that have 
been attempted by key actors to rectify it. 
2.1 The Cyclades Island Complex and Its Water Resources 
 
The Cyclades is an island complex in the Aegean Archipelago, southeast of mainland Greece, 
comprising of thirty-three (33) islands, twenty nine (29) of which are inhabited, the largest of 
which covers an area of 430 km
2 
and the smallest just over 3 km
2
. The total population is 
roughly 120,000 inhabitants and largely varies from island to island: from over 20,000 people 
on Syros, the administrative capital island, to slightly over 100 on Koufonisi or Irakleia. A 
similar geomorphology is common to most of the islands, though, certainly to the ones 
selected as illustrative cases studies for the purpose of this research.  
 
Figure 2: Map of the Cyclades  
Source: Worldatlas 
 
Beginning in 1998, the complex was under the administration of the Prefecture of the 
Cyclades, which was dissolved in 2011 by the Kallikratis Administrative Reform law 
3852/2010 (Government Gazette, 2010). In its place, the Region of the South Aegean was 
created, which further included the Dodecanese Islands. Since 2010, the decentralised 
administration of this region, which is headed by a general secretary appointed by the central 
government, has been setting the region’s agenda regarding water management. The next 
level is the prefecture, a self-governed administrative entity with a regional governor and 
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regional council elected every five years. Finally, there is the municipality, with a mayor and 
municipal council also elected every five years. As of 2010, each island constitutes its own 
municipality.  
 
Table 1: Administrative form of the Cyclades, following the 2010 government reform  
Order of administration Name and form of organisation 
Decentralised agencies 
of the national administration 
Decentralised administration, headed by a general 
secretary appointed by the Minister of Interior.  
Secondary, regional-level 
self-governing entities 
Prefecture headed by a popularly elected governor and 
governed by a popularly elected regional council.  
Prefectures are further subdivided into regional units, 
headed by a vice-regional governor.  
Elected every 5 years. 
Primary, local-level, self-
governing entities 
Municipalities headed by a popularly elected mayor. 
Elected every 5 years. 
Source: own graphic 
2.1.1 The Economy of the Cyclades 
 
The economy of the Cyclades islands is based predominantly on tourism – mainly summer 
beach tourism and a mix of agriculture, fishery and industry (see Table 2). Touristic intensity 
varies within the islands, with some relying almost exclusively on tourism, while others 
engage in tourism as a complementary source of income.  
 
Table 2: Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per sector in the Cyclades  
Source: South Aegean Prefecture,2012 
 
Agriculture’s contribution to the national and local Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has 
been steadily decreasing in the course of the last few decades, following a trend one can 
observe in the whole of Greece (South Aegean Prefecture, 2012).  Agricultural production 
lags behind the national average, as productivity is limited by the poor quality of soils, small 
 Percentage of GDP per Sector in the Cyclades  
 
Agriculture 
% 
Industry -
Construction 
% 
Mining 
% 
Processing 
% 
Energy 
% 
Construction 
% Services %  
2000 4,6 15,3 4,2 1,4 3 6,7 80,1 
2006 3,7 20,6 2,8 3,7 3,8 10,4 75,7 
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plot sizes and paucity of water (South Aegean Prefecture, 2012). There are not many large 
plains in the Cyclades, and the plains that do exist are intensively cultivated, irrigated, and 
also salinated – or face severe risk of becoming so – due to sea-water intrusion in the 
groundwater, as a result of excessive groundwater pumping (South Aegean Prefecture, 2012; 
Stefopoulou et. al, 2008). Unsurprisingly perhaps, olive trees, which demand little water, are 
the dominant crop, covering over 41,000 hectares (Table 3).  Agricultural production is based 
predominantly on the cultivation of olive trees, citrus fruits, potatoes, artichokes, and grapes. 
The main primary sector activity in the islands is animal husbandry, with many small units 
operating throughout the islands, breeding mainly sheep, goats and poultry (over 100,000 
heads each).  
The secondary sector is limited to small-scale family businesses (local crafts, bakeries, 
agricultural produce processing, and carpentry) which, however small, contribute significantly 
to the region’s GDP, making up 20% of total business. They are also a valuable source of 
employment (South Aegean Prefecture, 2012). The only large-scale industrial activity in the 
island complex takes place on Syros, where a large shipyard and mining site are in operation.  
 
Table 3: Crop and Area of Cultivation (in Hectares) in the Cyclades (2003) 
Crop Area 
Olive trees 41.980,5 
Citrus trees 2922,9 
Trees for fruit and nuts * 1089,8 
Fruit trees 809,3 
Potatoes (Naxos) 5371 
Artichokes (Tinos) 130 
Tomatoes (Santorini) 360 
Fava beans (Santorini) 1664 
*walnut, almond, etc.  
Source: South Aegean Prefecture, 2012 
 
The service sector – mainly tourism – is by far the most important economic pillar in the 
Cyclades. According to a strategic planning document of the South Aegean Prefecture (2012), 
the service sector accounts for almost 80% of the productive activity in the Cyclades. An 
indicator of the importance of the region’s tourism sector is the fact that, although the islands 
cover just 2% of Greece’s area and have 1.2% of total population, it comprises more than 
20% of national tourist accommodation and beds (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2011). As a 
result of the predominance and success of tourism, the Cyclades is amongst the regions in 
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Greece with the lowest unemployment rate, although employment in the tourism sector is 
seasonal. 
Population is growing in the Cyclades. Unlike the rest of Greece, where population 
dropped for the first time, by 1.34%, as seen in the 2011 ten-year census (Hellenic Statistical 
Authority, 2011), the Cyclades region has shown a remarkable stable increase of 11% since 
1991 (see Table 4). This can easily attributed to the steady –if only seasonable- employment 
opportunities made available through tourist-oriented business (restaurants, hotels and the 
like), that offer an incentive to local inhabitants to remain in the islands and to extended 
family members living in mainland Greece to return to them.  
 
Table 4: Population in the Cyclades and Greece (1991–2011) 
Population in the Cyclades and in Greece 
 Year of Census Population (in 1000) % Increase 
Cyclades 1991 100  
2001 111 11 
2011 124 11 
Greece 1991 10,258  
2001 10,939 7 
2011 10,815 -1.34 
Source: Compilation from Kaldellis and Kondili, 2007 and Hellenic Statistical Authority,2011 
2.1.2 Water Resources in the Cyclades 
 
Geographically, the islands are semi-mountainous with small plains, and the climate is 
temperate Mediterranean, with the average temperature ranging between 16.5–19.5 °C. On 
average, the islands receive approximately 350 mm of rainfall annually (Fig. 3). Naturally 
occurring surface water is very limited, as the small size of these islands does not allow for its 
creation and sustenance. For this reason, rivers are usually ephemeral torrential ones, and the 
majority of the relatively large surface water bodies have been artificially constructed and are, 
in fact, water reservoirs or dams. Groundwater is abstracted rapidly and beyond the recharge 
rate, and some aquifers in the islands have by now become salinized (Fig. 5). Unregistered 
and uncontrolled private abstraction is oftentimes five times larger than registered public 
abstraction, further intensifying groundwater depletion.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of total precipitation in Greece 
Source: Stefopoulou et al., 2008 
To illustrate the extent of water shortages in the Cyclades, various indices are used, for 
example, the consumption index (Fig 4), which is defined as the ratio of total water demand to 
total available water resources. Values higher than 80% represent possible water shortage, 
whereas values higher than 130% represent severe water stress conditions. 
 
Figure 4: Water consumption index in the Cyclades and Dodecanese  
Source: Stefopoulou et al., 2008 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates that in the Cyclades there are essentially no islands that do not face 
some form of water shortage, with the exception of Paros. Furthermore, it seems that water 
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shortage is the norm, and the only variation is the degree of it. For the smaller islands in 
particular, water scarcity is even more intense.   
 
Figure 5: Areas in Greece facing aquifer salinisation 
Source: Stefopoulou et al., 2008 
 
As a result of decreasing water tables, groundwater is being salinised by sea-water 
intrusion, a wide-spread occurrence as Figure 5 testifies. This reduces the quality of drinking 
water and renders other, more costly water supply options (such as desalination and transfer) 
unavoidable. Furthermore, due to the mountainous geomorphology of the islands and 
abandonment of previously cultivated terraces, topsoil is eroding and rain generally does not 
reach the groundwater level, further intensifying the risk of desertification. 
Currently, water intended for human consumption in the Cyclades usually comes from two 
sources: a) wells, which mainly supply agricultural facilities and other small-scale uses not 
requiring purification, and b) a municipal network, which provides potable water to 
residences, commercial, industrial and tourist facilities.    
One can talk of conventional and non-conventional water sources, renewable and non-
renewable, surface and groundwater. Gikas and Aggelakis (2009) follow the 
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conventional/non-conventional divide and describe water management in the Aegean islands. 
According to Gikas and Aggelakis, conventional sources of water generally include: a) 
precipitation, b) artificial lagoons and dams and c) transportation of potable water from the 
mainland. Non-conventional sources include: a) desalinated water, b) treated wastewater, c) 
drainage water, d) brackish water or excess rainwater and e) traditional water-collection 
techniques, such as runoff collection from roofs and other paved surfaces. In the Cyclades 
islands, the only forms of non-conventional water used are predominantly desalinated water 
and, less so, collected runoff water.  
 
 
A typical municipal network for distribution of potable water consists of the following. Water 
is stored in reservoirs or other storage facilities and fed into a treatment plant for purification 
(removal of impurities and addition of chemicals), which ensures potable water quality 
standards. The purified water is then transferred via pipes in storage tanks to be released upon 
demand. In the case of desalination, water must first be produced. Sea water is pumped and 
transferred to the desalination plant, where salts and minerals are removed. Another pipeline 
system then transfers the desalinated water to the connection point of the existing water 
network. Figure 6 provides a visualisation of the physical and human hydrological cycles in 
the Cyclades islands.  
Water storage facilities are of utmost importance in arid regions, and especially the 
Cyclades, as water transferred from water-richer regions is stored there until needed. Some 
islands –particularly smaller ones- rely increasingly on water transfers from the mainland for 
covering water needs, which peak during summer months. Table 5 illustrates the increasing 
reliance of small arid islands on transfers from 1997 to 2004, as larger islands now cover their 
Figure 6: Physical and human hydrological cycles in the Cyclades 
Source: Own graphic 
Precipitation 
Evapotranspiration 
Groundwater 
flow 
Infiltration + 
Runoff 
Supply Sources: 
Reservoirs 
Groundwater 
Desalination 
Importation 
Wastewater 
Distribution 
Treatment 
Treatment 
Discharge in sea + 
Network losses 
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needs through desalination plants. The amount of water imported increased by almost four 
times: from 86.000 m
3 
in 1997 to 330.000 m
3
 in 2004. 
 
Table 5: Quantity and transport cost of water in the Cyclades 
Quantity and transport cost of water in the Cyclades 
Year 
Quantities  
(in 100.000 m
3
) 
Cost  
(in 100.000 
euros) 
1997 86 311 
1998 91 650 
1999 87 672 
2000 145 1,158 
2001 202 1,625 
2002 328 2,561 
2003 335 2,772 
2004 337 2,787 
Source: Karagiannis and Soldatos, 2007 
 
In Table 6, one can observe the intense seasonality of water transport, as the volume of water 
transferred increases five-fold during the third annual quarter, which coincides with the tourist 
peak. 
 
Table 6: Seasonality of water transport to the Cyclades (in m
3
) in 2004 
Seasonality of water transport to the 
Cyclades (m
3
) in 2004 
1
st
 quarter 33,000 
2
nd
 quarter 88,000 
3
rd
 quarter 148,000 
4
th
 quarter 68,000 
Total 337,000 
Source: Karagiannis and Soldatos, 2007 
 
According to available data, from 2006 until 2014 water transfers cost over 70 million euros, 
with a cubic meter in the arid islands costing five times as much as in Athens (Koinignomi, 
2016; Kathimerini, 2014).  In 2014, 5.5 million euros were spent on transferring water to the 
Cyclades and another island complex, the Dodecanese. Several actors in the Cyclades as well 
as researchers have proposed constructing desalination plants, the construction costs of which 
would not exceed 3.1 million euros, a fraction of what is spent annually for importing water.   
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This is not to say that desalination is a panacea, as desalinated water is still much more 
expensive than abstracted groundwater. Consequently, Ermoupoli, the capital of the island 
Syros, which essentially receives all municipal water from desalination plants, has the most 
expensive water in Greece. For 30 m
3
 of water, a household in Ermoupoli pays 51.38 euros, 
whereas in Athens, a household would pay 30.70 euros for the same amount (Stefopoulou et 
al, 2008).  
In the Cyclades, water losses from the water network itself have been attributed to leaks 
amounting to at least 40%
1
 (Kathimerini, 2014; Voivontas et al., 2003). The network pipes are 
aged and, as there are no monitoring possibilities meters within the network to locate leaks 
early on, it is very difficult to spot them unless a pipe bursts. The severity and persistence of 
water losses in the network are known to local authorities, who have been gradually trying to 
modernise them (South Aegean Prefecture, 2012). Such losses are so commonplace in the 
islands that networks have been constructed to accommodate larger volumes than actually 
required so as to compensate for them (personal communication). To put this in more 
concrete terms, water networks in the Cyclades are constructed to accommodate 200 
litres/person/day (personal communication). As there are no laws or guidelines clearly setting 
this capacity, it was set according to the experience of planners, local settings and local 
conditions. In the Cyclades, consumption is 120 lt/person/day, averaged between winter and 
summer. The remaining capacity (80 lt) is designed to accommodate for losses in the network, 
watering of gardens in rural areas and often unexpected increases in need for water.  
Another factor contributing to increasing water shortages is the common practice in the 
Cyclades islands of discharging treated wastewater into the sea, rather than re-using it for 
agricultural purposes, which could improve the quality and quantity of local agricultural 
produce while reducing pressure exerted on local water resources due to drilling wells. As 
farmers would not have to drill so deep to find water, which is expensive, it would also reduce 
production costs.  
Non-conventional sources generally require additional investments in new infrastructure, 
in additional to the existing water distribution network. Since water works infrastructure are 
strictly local (due to the isolated nature of islands), they are small in scale and, therefore, 
considerably more expensive than those on the mainland. The same applies to desalination 
plants using fossil-fuel energy. 
                                                          
1
 Karalis and Emmanouilidis (2011) estimate water losses to actually be as high as 60%, owing to a 
combination of losses through leaks and water flowing unmetered, due to the poor condition of water meters.   
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2.2 The Selected Islands 
 
Two Cycladic islands have been selected as case studies – Tinos and Syros – which are 
situated on the northern side of the island complex, just over 20 km apart.  Despite their 
proximity, however, they are very different in many aspects.  
2.2.1 Syros 
Syros is the administrative capital of the Cyclades and also of the Prefecture of South Aegean 
and has an urban character. It seats the majority of public services, such as the peripheral 
court, tax office, and administrative headquarters of the Cyclades, including the Water 
Directorate
2
. In 2010, the only university department in the Cyclades – the Department of 
Product & Systems Design Engineering – was founded in Ermoupoli3 by the University of the 
Aegean adding to the urban character of the island. Over half of the island’s population lives 
in Ermoupoli, a densely built city.  
The Cycladic islands have been inhabited for thousands of years, and many contemporary 
villages and towns have evolved around those ancient settlements. This is not the case for 
Ermoupoli, which is a relatively new settlement compared to other Cycladic cities and was 
founded by over 30.000 refugees fleeing from slaughter and persecution as a result of the 
Greek revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1822.  From early on, Ermoupoli, and therefore 
also Syros, became a national industrial and commercial hub with a growing urban 
population.  
Already in the 1856 census (Koufodimos, 2007), Ermoupoli was mentioned as the second 
largest city in Greece after Athens. With the establishment of the Hellenic Republic in 1830, 
the majority of foreign trade fleets docked in the port of Ermoupoli, illustrating its central role 
in the geopolitics and trade of the time. Ermoupoli kept on growing, with high schools, a 
theatre (a small-scale replica of Milan’s Scala), a city hall and one of the largest squares in 
Greece. When the port of Piraeus, situated very close to the capital Athens, opened in 1880, 
Ermoupoli’s trade activities declined. In their place, a relatively large industrial zone was 
created, with a shipyard, tannery, textile-spinning mills and the like. To this day, the shipyard 
is a stable and important source of employment for the residents of Syros, despite its declining 
stealth.  
                                                          
2
 The Water Directorate is a department within the Devolved Administration of the Aegean, which in turn is 
a branch of the Ministry of Interior.  
3
 Ermoupoli is sometimes also spelled Hermoupolis. 
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The other main employer is the public sector. As the administrative capital of the 
Prefecture of South Aegean, which consists of the island complexes of the Cyclades and the 
Dodecanese, Syros is the island with the highest percentage of employment by the public 
sector in the Cyclades (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2011).  
 
Figure 7: Map of Syros 
Source: Greecetravel, no date 
 
As in any other Cycladic island, for Syros tourism plays a crucial role in the local economy 
as well. The tertiary sector overall employs more than 50% of the workforce. As in Greece, 
tourism is not accounted separately from other service sector activities, so no exact statistics 
exist on how many people are employed by businesses that are directly associated with 
tourism (e.g., hotels). It can be assumed, however, that restaurants, small retail shops, bars, 
cafeterias, crafts shops and similar small businesses benefit to a large extent from increased 
tourist activities.   
2.2.2 Tinos 
Tinos is the fourth largest island in the Cyclades with 8.590 inhabitants, half of which live 
in the port and capital, Chora. Tinos has a very strong religious tourism sector, concentrated 
on the island’s capital during Easter and summer. Similar to Syros, most of its infrastructure, 
facilities and services are concentrated in the capital, although it no longer has a tax office and 
similar services as they were merged and moved to Syros as a result of budget restraints. 
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Unlike Syros though, Tinos has a variety of economic activities, such as cropping, animal 
husbandry, minor processing industry, none of which are predominant in the island and rather 
complement the main income sources of people as part-time activities. Water provision 
efforts have also been concentrated on the capital, where the urban population lives. 
The primary sector remains an important hub of activity on the island, as Tinos is amongst 
the most active islands in crop production and animal husbandry (as well as dairy products) in 
the Prefecture of South Aegean (Prefecture of South Aegean, 2012). It is indicative that in 
2001 more than 11% of the workforce in Tinos was engaged in the primary sector, compared 
with 3.7% in Syros. By 2011, these numbers had dropped to 7.11% and 2.89%, respectively, 
as can be seen in Table 7 (Hellenic Statistic Authority, 2011). 
 
Figure 8: Map of Tinos  
      Source: Villa Artemis, no date 
 
 
Table 7: Employment by sector in Tinos and Syros, based on the 2011 Census 
 Tinos Syros 
 Total Percentage Total Percentage 
Employed 3164 100 7525 100 
Primary Sector 225 7,11 218 2,89 
Secondary Sector 829 26,2 1538 20,42 
Tertiary Sector 2100 66,37 5769 76,566 
Unemployed 500 15,8 1509 20 
Source: Hellenic Statistic Authority, 2011 
On the other hand, during the period 2001-2011, unemployment doubled on both islands, 
increasing from 8.7% to 15.8% in Tinos and from 9.71% to 20% in Syros (Hellenic Statistic 
Authority, 2011; Prefecture of South Aegean, 2012).  
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2.2.3 Water Sources in Tinos and Syros 
 
Water sources in Tinos and Syros vary. In Syros, where drilling has now reached 500 meters 
below the surface –making drilling very expensive, on the one hand, and providing salty 
water as well – the local administration has opted for a water provision system almost 
exclusively based on desalination. Thus, 95% of water running in the Syros water network is 
desalinated, and the remaining 5% is provided by municipally owned drilling wells (personal 
communication). Until the 1980s there was no water network set up in Syros, with the 
exception of some small parts of the island. Water supply was carried out via water sellers: 
small-businesses extracting water from wells and then selling it to households for a price 
(Nokas, 2010).  
In Tinos, since 2001, when the first desalination plant was constructed, three quarters of all 
the water intended for consumption has been produced through desalination. Up to 2001, 
water was secured through dams, groundwater drilling and occasional transport via water 
tankers. The dams of the island can retain up 100.000m
3
 per year, enough to account for 15% 
of all water provision. The remaining 10% is drilled from groundwater or collected from fresh 
water springs. Increasingly, the local administration is planning to construct more desalination 
plants, as water precipitation is erratic, the dams do not retain enough water in some years and 
groundwater is already heavily deteriorated in many parts of the island. Worth mentioning 
here is that, although all the dams in Tinos were constructed by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
farmers consume less than 10% of the water collected in them. The rest is allocated for 
domestic and touristic uses (Nokas, 2010).  
Tinos’ population doubles in the summer months, when water consumption increases from 
an average of 1.500m
3
/day to an average of 2.700m
3
/day/person. Syros follows a similar 
pattern, with consumption doubling during summer and reaching 3.000m
3
/day/person. Water 
managers on the islands distinguish between winter consumption (between September and 
May) and summer consumption (between June and August). It is generally accepted that 
winter consumption can be met without interruption and with relatively high water quality 
with the current mix of water sources. The challenge arises when the water collection, 
production and distribution network’s capacity has to more than double its output for three 
crucial months a year. 
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2.2.4 Water Governance on Tinos and Syros 
 
There was an administrative reform in 2010, known as Kallikratis, through which 
jurisdictions were re-allocated (see Table 8 for an outline of the main actors and their 
jurisdictions regarding water management). Since 2010, the administrative apparatus for the 
region has consisted of a national decision-making centre and a regional one. The national 
one is represented by the Devolved Administration of the Aegean, covering the Cyclades, the 
Dodecanese and Crete. Its seat is in Piraeus, on mainland Greece. Its mandate includes 
regulatory representation of the central government in its geographical coverage area: the 
Aegean Sea.  
Table 8: Main actors in water governance in Syros and Tinos 
Actor Level Establi
shed 
Seat Jurisdictions Appointed/ 
elected 
Special 
Secretariat of 
Water 
(Ministry of 
Environment) 
National 2010 
within 
the 
WFD  
Athens a. Implements Water Management Plans  
b. Monitoring and coordination of all 
state agencies and institutions involved in 
water management.  
c. National water monitoring 
programmes 
Appointed 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
National 1910 Athens Provision of water for agricultural use 
(via dam construction): 
 assigns  water-related studies; 
 issues licences for the 
construction of dams (when possible also 
co-financing them) 
Appointed 
Devolved 
Administratio
n of the 
Aegean 
(Ministry of 
Interior) 
National 2011 Athens  Regional policies  Appointed 
Water 
Directorate of 
South Aegean 
(branch of 
Devolved 
Administratio
n of the 
Aegean) 
National 2011 Syros  Issues permits for all water uses 
in South Aegean 
 Imposes fines for breaches of law 
Appointed 
Prefecture of 
South Aegean 
Regional 2011 Syros  Collects and processes 
applications for water uses and 
recommends to the Water Directorate 
regarding their acceptance or rejection  
 Rural development (in 
cooperation with the municipalities) 
 Imposes fines for environmental 
violations (pollution, illegal dumping of 
waste in water streams and so on).  
 Responsible for good quality of 
aquifers and monitoring (but has no 
control over permits for water use) 
Elected 
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 Proposes and issues Regulatory 
Decisions which can, however, be blocked 
by the Devolved Administration  
 Conducts studies and water works 
on small islands (usually with population 
of less than 4.000) that do not have the 
personnel, technical know-how or other 
means to plan water works  
Municipalities Local 2011 In 
every 
island 
 Conduct controls to check for 
violations (illegal boreholes, dumping, 
pollution of streams, etc) 
 Water provisioning for all uses 
except agriculture, including pipe-work, 
desalination, municipally owned 
boreholes, and wastewater treatment  
 Responsible for assigning studies 
for projects and securing their financing. 
 Rural Development, shared 
jurisdiction with the Prefecture, but also 
not having permit-giving authority 
 Water pricing (where there are no 
municipal water and drainage companies) 
Elected 
Municipal 
Water & 
Drainage 
Company 
Local 1997 Syros  Maintains network and 
desalination plants 
 Sets the price of water 
 
Appointed 
Source: Own compilation 
At the regional level, the Prefecture of South Aegean, covering the island complexes of 
Cyclades and Dodecanese, was constituted through the 2010 reform. According to the reform, 
the prefectures have the mandate to plan, schedule and implement policies on a regional level 
within their jurisdictions, in accordance with the principles of sustainable development, social 
cohesion and taking into consideration national and European policies. The inhabitants of the 
islands elect the heads of the prefecture every five years, together with the heads of the 
municipalities. 
The municipalities are the last local administration level. Following the 2010 reform, each 
island is now its own municipality, with the exception of the Municipality of Naxos and Small 
Cyclades, where five very small islands have been administratively attached to the nearby 
larger island of Naxos. The municipality water administrations are elected every five years, 
and their main tasks include water provision, water pricing and securing funding for water-
related projects. Some municipalities (like Syros) have established municipal water and 
drainage companies to take over water provisioning and pricing. Tinos, however, has no 
municipal water and drainage company.  
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2.3 Identifying the Dysfunction 
 
The World Health Organisation (2003) has set optimal access to drinking water as being at 
least 100 lt/person/day, delivered through multiple taps simultaneously and able to cover all 
consumption and hygiene needs. In Greece, there is only a by-law setting minimum water 
provision requirements. In a 1991 Joint Ministerial Decision (D11/F.16/8500
4
), the six 
Ministers of Interior, Economics, Agriculture, Tourism, Environment and Industry set the 
minimum and maximum limits of drinking water for the “rational use of water” in domestic 
and touristic uses. According to the Decision, for residential areas the minimum requirement 
is set at 100 lt/person/day and the maximum to 250 lt/person/day.  
Various legislative documents
5
 decree that water should be provided in a quantity sufficient 
to meet all the needs of the population, and it is emphasised that such water provision should 
be uninterrupted. The 2003 Water Law additionally sets out a framework for water quality 
standards. We see, then, that there is a legal framework setting a minimum requirements for 
good-quality water that should be available in sufficient quantities and without interruption 
for human consumption.   
When water supply is not sufficient to cover human needs, or when water quality is not 
use-optimal, then one can speak of water scarcity. Definitions of what constitutes scarcity 
differ, based on the discipline studying it, but where all definitions agree is the imbalance 
between water supply and demand. For example, the United Nations (UN) defines scarcity as 
“the point at which the aggregate impact of all users impinges on the supply or quality of 
water under prevailing institutional arrangements to the extent that the demand by all sectors, 
including the environment, cannot be satisfied fully” (UN, 2006, p.2), whereas the European 
Commission (EC) Water Scarcity Drafting Group (2006, p.23) defines scarcity as “a situation 
where there is insufficient water to satisfy normal requirements” (emphasis added). 
Assimacopoulos (2008) distinguishes between what he frames as physical and socio-
economic scarcity, with the former being “limited access to water resources, attributed either 
to climate conditions (water shortage) or to the unsustainable management of resources (e.g. 
overabstraction)” and socio-economic scarcity being best understood as society’s economic 
inability to develop water resources as well having a lack of capacity to adapt to the physical 
                                                          
4
 Common Ministerial Decision Δ11/Φ16/8500/1991: Definition of minimum and maximum limits of needed 
quantities for the reasonable use of drinking water. 
5
 Such as in the 2003 Water Law and the Common Ministerial Decision Y2/2600/2001. 
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manifestation of physical water scarcity (p. 1). The problem with Assimacopoulos’ distinction 
between physical and socio-economic scarcity is the presumption that there exists such a 
thing as “physical scarcity”, which is where the weakness of his argument is located. 
Overabstraction (which in turn leads to water shortage) is attributed to “unsustainable 
management of resources”, which is seen as belonging to the “physical” and not as part of the 
socio-economic sphere.  
Rijsberman (2006) introduces a different train of thought regarding what qualifies as 
scarcity. When an individual does not have access to good quality and sufficient quantity of 
water so as to satisfy her need for drinking, washing or sustaining her livelihood, then that 
individual is water insecure. When many people in an area are water insecure for a significant 
period of time, then that area is seen as being water scarce. In defining water scarcity, 
Rijsbermann considers a number of factors: a) whose water needs are not met? Are we talking 
about societal water needs, or are we taking ecological water needs into account as well?; b) 
the fraction of the resource made available for use or that could be made available; and c) the 
spatial and temporal scales of defining scarcity.  
The current state water scarcity in the Cyclades is characterised as a deteriorating quality 
and quantity of drinking water that threatens to jeopardise the continuity of the islands’ social, 
economic, and ecological processes. Salinisation of groundwater, for example, renders a 
substantial amount of water non-usable for irrigational or consumption purposes.  
However, water scarcity is not simply a relation of quantity needed and supplied. It is more 
than that. For example, water quality and quantity might be sufficient in terms of numbers and 
could potentially provide for all users, but in practice some users might not be able to obtain 
access to it. Scarcity is, then, best understood as the effect of an institutional status-quo that 
allocates rights to access and use of a resource, in our case water (Vatn, 2005). Water scarcity 
is thus socially constructed (Aguilera-Klink et al, 2000). Kallis (2010) goes a step further to 
claim that water scarcity is institutionally and policy led. In addition to its social aspects, 
water scarcity is also a matter of the allocation or rights to and distribution of water.  
Scarcity is not merely the result of the institutional status quo but is also a leading reason 
for the very existence and change of institutions.  As Commons writes, “it is only scarce 
things, actual or expected, that are wanted and desired. Since they are scarce, the acquisition 
of them is regulated by the collective action which creates the rights and duties of property 
Chapter 2: The Diagnostic Imperative 
25 
 
and liberty without which there would be anarchy.” (1934, p. 6). Here, Commons highlights 
the instrumental role of institutions in regulating scarcity, and indeed society as a whole.  
Turning our attention again to the selected cases, we should note that on Syros, desalinated 
water is of very high standards in terms of quality, as it undergoes regular testing to ensure 
that no harmful substances are present. The process of desalination though produces water 
with a particular taste, which inhabitants of Syros have not yet acquired. As such, a very large 
proportion of water consumers choose not to consume water coming from the network. 
Instead, bottled water is used for drinking and cooking, or domestic desalination units are 
installed to re-filter the network water before consumption. Both options increase household 
water bills considerably and, at the same time, illustrate a lack of trust towards the municipal 
water network. 
Desalinated water is also not used by the island’s farmers, who as we have seen are drilling 
ever deeper to reach water and are increasingly faced with lower water quality, which reduces 
their yields. Calls have been made by farmers’ associations to be allowed to utilise water from 
the island’s wastewater treatment plants, but to no avail. Desalinated water is too expensive, 
and treated water is unavailable.  
We can see, then, that the main problem in Syros is that, although one can argue that water 
provision via the municipal network is now reliable, uninterrupted and in quantities sufficient 
to meet the needs of the urban population, there are still two inhibiting factors. First, the urban 
population does not trust the municipal network water and, thus, they do not use it. Can one 
then really talk of “water provision in sufficient quantity” in this case? Second, farmers do not 
have access to water of good quality. Is sufficient quantity enough? Or should quality 
concerns be an issue as well? 
In the case of Tinos, the dysfunction is obvious in terms of water quality. An issue present 
throughout the years has been the safety of the municipal network, as large parts of it are 
constructed with asbestos pipes – a fact that poses a considerable safety concern. As the 
percentage of desalinated water in the network increases, the taste of the water is also being 
altered and –again like Syros- many users (domestic and touristic users alike) opt for bottled 
water for their needs (Zikos and Papasozomenou, 2014). Increasing demand for water is 
exacerbating the problem further. 
To sum up, we see that in the Cyclades, and more specifically in the selected islands of 
Tinos and Syros, the water sector is dysfunctional because the water provided is insufficient 
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to satisfy normal requirements; unless potable water it is produced by costly desalination, 
prolonged water scarcity becomes water insecurity; and given the social construction of this 
state of  water scarcity – and hence insecurity – there are basically two logically linked paths 
that have caused it. The first one is that poorly designed institutions and policies have led to 
this chronic dysfunction, manifested as disrupted and insecure water provision (cf. Vatn, 2005 
and Kallis, 2010). The second conclusion is that the same dysfunction itself (scarcity) acts, as 
per Commons, as a driver for these institutions to be changed. We can see here a vicious 
cycle, as the same apparatus that has created and sustained the dysfunction is then called upon 
to rectify it.   
The question then becomes, how can this vicious cycle be broken? At which point in the 
process should interventions occur so as to positively alter the outcome? To this end, in the 
next chapter I explore potential theoretical foundations upon which to ground my analysis of 
possible rectifications for the water sector in Tinos and Syros. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Chapter 3: Theoretical Grounding 
27 
 
3 Theoretical Grounding 
3.1 Conceptualising Islands 
The present study poses the question of why the water sector in the Cyclades is still 
dysfunctional, despite great effort being taken to rectify it. What is the reason for this evident 
inability to positively transform the water sector? Various explanations could help us in 
exploring hypotheses in the attempt to explain the dysfunction.  
A possible explanation might lay in the very geographical nature of the Cyclades islands, 
that is, their insularity. To this end, the next section will examine the effect of insularity on 
the ability of administrations to set up and implement policies for securing water resources in 
this type of environment (Section 3.1.1). Then, in Section 3.1.2 I will approach the question 
from the perspective of size. Can a small local administration deliver policies and intervene in 
a meaningful and effectual manner?  What happens if the administration is both insular and 
small? Finally, in Section 3.1.3 I consider the level of policy making. If the small island 
administration is not a sovereign one – meaning it is not a national state but is part of one – 
what is its scope of discretion? For the scope of this study, these concerns translate into the 
following questions: if the island administration has a limited scope of discretion/action, at 
which level should one look for solutions to the water sector dysfunction? Can the problem be 
fixed at the local level, that of the separate island(s), of at the regional level, that of the island 
complex of the Cyclades? Perhaps one should turn to the national level in search of a 
solution? Or perhaps better coordination between the various levels is needed? These 
questions will guide the inquiry for this manuscript.   
3.1.1 Mediterranean Islands and Approaches to Water Management  
 
The Cyclades are not unique in their struggle to achieve a balance between economic, social 
and ecological well-being within their limited geographical space. There is a growing body of 
literature on islands and water management, acknowledging the challenging nature of striking 
a balance between economic development and natural boundaries.  
Islands are appealing to study in this respect because, if seen as insular socio-ecological 
systems (Zikos and Roggero, 2012; Liu et al., 2007; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
2005; Adger, 2000), they hold great potential to enhance our understanding of interactions 
between humans and the natural environment (Fitzpatrick and Keegan, 2007).  It is important 
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to note that humans are not distinct from the natural environment; we are as much part of it as 
we are its users (Vatn, 2015). This becomes even more obvious in the case of islands, where 
biophysical boundaries, in terms of land and water resources for example, are finite and much 
more visible than the biophysical boundaries of their continental counterparts.  
Studying islands presents epistemological and methodological challenges, because “we are 
grappling with the impact, conditioning and paradigmatic effects of the hybrid identity and 
‘location’ of subjects (islanders, natives, settlers, tourists, second home owners), as well as 
those who would study them – who may be locals as well as outsiders (mainlanders, 
continental dwellers) looking in” (Baldacchino, 2008: 38). Defining islands is itself an elusive 
taks, and nissology, the study of islands, has offered many definitions of them. A prevailing 
one is that islands are pieces of land permanently surrounded by water whose surface is larger 
than 0,1 km
2
 (Baldacchino, 2008). Islands are defined using a combination of minimum 
population size and area, minimum distance from the mainland and the absence of a fixed link 
to the mainland.   
Meanwhile, the European Commission has lumped islands together with mountainous 
regions and sparsely populated areas as regions facing structural handicaps, which have 
consequently attracted increasing EU regional policy attention. The economic development of 
islands, mountainous regions and sparsely populated areas is considered important in 
achieving territorial cohesion within the EU (Armstrong et al, 2012, European Commission, 
2007). 
From a biophysical perspective, the majority of the Mediterranean islands share their semi-
mountainous geography, thus combining two of the special geographical features spelled out 
in the EU’s geographical cohesion policy: islandness and mountainous geography. One of the 
characteristics these islands have in common is their struggle to overcome acute and 
persistent water stress and secure stable and good-quality water provision for their inhabitants 
and visitors. Achieving sufficient water provision is a challenging task for these islands’ 
administrations, which see their populations increase up to over 10 times during summer 
months, which is when the tourist influx is at its annual highest, whereas precipitation and 
water availability are at their annual lowest. Since islands are bounded by a physical 
discontinuity of space and territory (Spilanis et al, 2012), island jurisdictions, unlike their 
mainland counterparts, cannot call upon distant aquifers for water transfer. In what follows, I 
review various responses to water scarcity by other islands within the Mediterranean space 
and how they have been viewed within the pertinent literature.  
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Armeni (2008) notes that over 30% of Italian households reporting irregularities in water 
supply were located in islands. In this vein, Corsale and Iorio (2006) explore the relationship 
between tourist-sector development and water availability in a city in Sardinia, 
acknowledging the seasonality of water demand in a tourism-oriented city. They conclude 
that increasing water prices for local inhabitants would reduce consumption, thus making 
more water available for the summer months when water demand peaks.   
Water scarcity amongst Italian islands has long been documented and attempts were 
already made to minimise its effects early on (Massarutto, 1999). Lazarova et al (2001) 
further document various attempts across the Mediterranean region to govern water resources 
of its islands in such a way so as to ease the pressure on local water resources, including 
reclaiming wastewater and harvesting rainwater, as implemented in Sardinia (Italy), Corsica 
(France) and the Baleares (Spain). They stress that, if these measures are to be successful, 
then they need to be part of an integrated water management plan and further identify steps to 
be undertaken for such management, such as: “(1) developing any undeveloped water 
resource, including desalination of brackish or sea water, (2) wastewater treatment and reuse, 
(3) inter-basin transfer, (4) more efficient irrigation systems, (5) minimizing water leakage, 
(6) application of adequate charges for water, and (7) importing water from neighbouring 
countries” (ibid, p. 27).  
All of these measures have been applied across the Mediterranean islands in various 
degrees and combinations. Indeed, the examples used in the literature (Tirado et al, 2006; 
Kent et al, 2002; Chartzoulakis et al, 2001) spring from islands much larger than the ones 
examined in this study, both in terms of population and size (Table 9 below) In fact, 
Formentera, the smallest of the Balearic Islands, has received minimal attention in the 
literature, probably because the demand for water there is much lower there compared to the 
rest of the Balearics, which are touristic hot spots.  
The degree of autonomy of these islands is also quite different than that of the Cyclades. 
The Balearic Islands are led by an autonomous, decentralised government that has the power 
to craft policies. The same applies to the large Italian islands of Sardinia and Sicily as well as 
for the Greek island of Crete. Malta and Cyprus are both nation states and, as such, have of 
course full control over their water policies.  
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Table 9: Population of Mediterranean islands (in thousands) and area (km
2
) 
 
Island Population  
(in thousands, in 2011) 
Size  
(in km2) 
Sardinia 1.582 24000 
Sicily 5.074 25000 
Mallorca 869 3640 
Minorca 95 702 
Ibiza 132 571 
Formentera 10 83 
Malta 423 316 
Crete 623 8336 
Cyprus6 1.241 / 840 9251 
Cyclades: (total) 119 2570 
Syros 20 83 
Tinos 10 194 
Santorini 13 90 
Mykonos 7 105 
Source: CYSTAT, 2011; Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2011; INE, 20111; ISTAT, 2011 
It is reasonable to expect that the breadth of options available to an island of over a million 
people will be much greater than that of an island of twenty thousand, if only because of 
financial reasons. Mallorca, for example, can draw on financial resources much greater than 
what is available to Syros.  It is also relatively certain that water resources will be greater in 
volume as well as more diverse in their origins on an island of thousands of square 
kilometres, compared to one that is ten or even a hundred times smaller.  We can see, then, 
that smallness of physical size and population should be a concern when looking at water 
resources and their governance, though it does not seem to have particularly occupied 
scholars thus far.   
The two Mediterranean islands examined in this study and mentioned in Table 9 above, do 
have a striking similarity between them: to a greater or lesser degree they are autonomous and 
exert control over their own policies, though always within EU frameworks.  Thus, their size 
does not seem to affect their ability to self-govern, at least to the author’s best knowledge. 
                                                          
6
 Population of the whole island / Population of the Republic of Cyprus 
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Consequently, we could speculate that their autonomy seems to be a determinant factor in 
deciding their courses of action relating to water management much more so than their small 
size.  
In the next subchapter we will explore the concept of smallness as it pertains to islands and 
then relate it to the ability of small islands and small administrations to formulate effective 
policies.   
3.1.2 Understanding Small Islands  
 
In the relevant literature, one often sees the adjective “small” preceding the noun “islands”. 
Indeed, the majority of the literature on islands is concentrated on smallness (Godenau, 2008; 
McElroy, 2003; King, 1993), particularly on small Caribbean islands. If one, however, applies 
the definition Baldacchino (2008) offers of islands – as pieces of land permanently 
surrounded by water whose surface is larger than 0,1 km
2
 – then one can see that the majority 
of islands is in fact found in the temperate and sub-arctic zones of the northern hemisphere 
and not in the tropics, where the literature on islands has been focused (ibid).  
Smallness is a debated term in the island literature. Is small a matter of land surface or 
perhaps of population? Of both? Can there be a clear definition of what constitutes a small 
island? There have been several attempts by scholars to define smallness in relation to, but not 
restricted to, islands. Smallness has been defined by primary indicators such as population 
size (Hein 1985; Kuznets 1960), land surface (Jalan, 1982), gross domestic product (GDP), 
(overlapping) social relations (Benedict, 1966), as well as in terms of international relations 
(the impact a small state has on international systems) and even by military indicators 
(Veenedaal and Corbett, 2015).  
Baldacchino (2008) points to the relative nature of smallness. What may have been a small 
island off a mainland, can become in itself “the mainland” for even smaller islands, as is the 
case for Syros and the rest of the Cyclades. Defining smallness has been an elusive and, as 
many scholars now agree, even a seemingly arbitrary endeavour.   
It is indeed the very concept of smallness that is of great interest and relevance for the 
scope of this study. Anthropologists, political scientists and geographers have long concerned 
themselves with defining smallness, and it seems that the very idea of smallness supersedes 
major differences between small states, small island states and small societies. Their 
smallness – as arbitrary as it is to define – is a trait common to all geographical or 
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administrative units that scholars choose to characterise as small. For the purposes of this 
study, I have taken Tinos and Syros to be both small islands and small societies at the same 
time. Yet smallness, as Baldacchino (2008) noted, is relative. Tinos is smaller than Syros 
because Syros has a larger bureaucracy and greater jurisdiction than Tinos, though they are 
both smaller than their national administrative capital. 
Considering the breadth of small islands studied under the umbrella of nissology, we can 
observe that the Mediterranean islands have not attracted particular attention, probably 
because the focus of nissology has generally been placed on island states rather than island 
societies. Although, following their accession to the European Union in 2004, the 
Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta have attracted scholarly attention due to their dual 
capacity as small national states and EU Member States, in this study we are concerned with 
even smaller islands, particularly ones that are not nation states. In short, here I focus on two 
small Mediterranean islands of Tinos and Syros, as they combine traits that are understudied 
in the literature and seem capable of offering valuable insights not only for the study of 
islands but also of policy formation and implementation.  
3.1.3 Small Islands as Small Societies and Their Administration 
 
Small countries, and indeed small societies, are not merely smaller versions of large countries. 
Their differences go beyond quantification, as their qualitative differences are profound. 
Compared to larger countries, the importance of individual and personal relationships and 
networking is overwhelming in small societies, jobs are multi-functional and more, often than 
not, they suffer from the effects of brain drain (Chittoo, 2011; Randma-Liiv, 2002). 
Unlike geographers, anthropologists understand smallness as a function of the relationships 
individuals in a society develop rather than as a relative correlate of size. Randma-Liiv (2002) 
uses the terms “small states” and “small societies” interchangeably and offers an overview of 
the debate concerning small states (societies) and bureaucracies and the challenges they 
present for public administration. For the purpose of this study, “small states” refers to small 
societies, as it has been used interchangeably in the literature already.  In a small-scale 
society, social relationships are over-lapping. As Benedict (1966) proposes, in a small society 
“an individual interacts over and over again with the same individuals in virtually all social 
situations” (ibid., p. 23). He maintains that there are two main categories of smallness: that of 
a territory and that of a society. The main criteria for territories (states) are their area and 
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population, whereas the criteria for societies are the number and quality of roles and 
relationships. He also notes that small societies can exist within large states that have a high 
degree of segmentation, such as islands due to their strict geographical delimitation, or in 
terms of minorities groups.    
Benedict identifies several particularities of small-scale societies that are particularly 
relevant to the understanding and study of policy implementation.  These particularities 
revolve around the axis of roles and relationships amongst a societies’ members – and the 
consequent effects they have in the organisational structure of these societies. The qualitative 
divide between small-scale and large-scale societies can be conceived as the generally 
particularistic nature of relationships in the former and the universalistic kinds of relationships 
predominant in the latter.  
In particularistic, small-scale societies, one can observe overlapping, congruent economic, 
political and kinship systems, where most social relationships end up serving many interests 
(Randma-Liiv, 2002; Benedict, 1966). Relationships and roles are person-specific; standards 
of judgment are based on who the person is, rather than what her actions are. Values used by 
members of society are to a large degree based on personal criteria, kinship and the position 
of an individual. As Benedict puts it, “decisions in the economic, political, and legal fields 
have a pervasiveness in small-scale societies which they lack in societies of larger scale” (op. 
cit, p. 28). In the legal arena, one can observe how juridical relationships are based on status 
and how, “because of the multiple connections between litigants, lawyers, and judges, small-
scale societies often experience difficulties in applying impersonal law” (op. cit. p. 29). This 
is of particular importance for my study, since the officials that are called upon to implement 
a law in the Cyclades are embedded in a closely knit small-scale society with all the 
implications this entails for the implementation process.  
Chittoo (2011) makes a case for the need of adaptation of small-state administrations to the 
particularities of their small scale, rather than continue the blind adoption of the large western, 
Weberian type of state. He elaborates on the administrative advantages and disadvantages that 
size (or scale) endows upon a society and, much like Benedict (1966), looks into the personal 
nature of administrative transactions, seeing as well the pervasiveness of decisions. Public 
officials are personally identified with and related to their decisions and their consequences, 
so it is not possible to separate their official tasks and their personal and social lives. This puts 
public officials under pressure and possibly causes conflicts as well, especially when 
unpopular decisions are to be implemented. Chittoo argues that perhaps the challenge lies not 
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in perfecting the detachment of roles of public officials but rather in capitalising on the deeply 
and pervasively personal nature of public life. But this suggestion contradicts the prevailing 
paradigm of impersonal bureaucrats who execute orders and do their duty within their scope 
of discretion.  
As already mentioned, research on small societies and conceptualisation of smallness has 
been predominantly focused on small and developing island states, mostly in the Caribbean 
Sea, as well as on the genus of small states (not only island states) (Bertram, 2007 ; Randma-
Liiv, 2001; Cock and Kirkpatrick, 1998; Baker, 1992). But so far very little attention has been 
given to small island societies within large states that meet Benedict’s criterion for small 
societies–states.  The level of analysis has therefore been different within the literature than 
the one relevant to the object of this study. Nonetheless, the small societies examined here 
face all the challenges that societies of small nation-states face, such as brain drain, 
overlapping of personal and professional roles undertaken by the same individual and, more 
often than not, fiscal challenges (Bertram, 2007). What is different about the small societies 
focused on in this study is precisely the fact that they are not states – they cannot unilaterally 
craft policies – but are rather the recipients of national policies decided upon in distant 
decision-making centres. Additionally, their insular character adds to the complexity of 
administration and governance.   
The island studies literature has not been very strong on identifying the importance of 
levels of jurisdiction (national, regional, local) when it comes to the study of islands, because 
of its primary focus on sovereign island states that have full control over their policies. I 
propose that this gap in the nissology literature can be partly filled by also looking at 
institutional perspectives on governance; exploring why the water sector in the Cyclades is 
dysfunctional can greatly benefit from taking the island perspective into consideration, but it 
will need to go further than that.   
Likewise, the public administration literature has emphasised the importance of both size 
and level of jurisdiction, but has been weak in acknowledging the limits set by natural 
geography, coupled of course with those of a specifically administrative nature. Another 
important drawback of the public administration literature with regard to answering the 
leading question of this study is that it has not usually been concerned with the process of 
policy making but rather seeks to offer a snap-shot understanding of bureaucracies. It thus 
lacks the dynamic aspect inherent in public policy processes and is, from my perspective, 
inadequate by itself to offer a satisfactory answer to the questions posed in this study, which 
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are aimed at explaining the chronic dysfunction of the water sector in the Cycladic islands of 
Syros and Tinos. 
The particularity and complexity of the Cyclades case lies in the multiple layers of levels 
of action that need to be observed, the multiple identities of Syros and Tinos. It is not only 
that the two Cycladic cases are small or that they are islands, the combination of which would 
already be sufficient to make water management challenging. It is also that they belong to a 
national state, the decision-making center of which is on the mainland, far away from the 
islands. The national state is also a member of a multi-national federation of national states, 
the European Union, whose directives and laws are to be implemented throughout its area of 
jurisdiction.  
The literature dealing with small societies has not really focused on the dynamics of policy 
making in small societies within bigger countries. What seems to be missing is a multi-level 
institutional perspective that can capture the dialogue between local and national levels and 
how that dialogue is defined by institutions, meaning in this case how these institutions define 
choice for society and its use of water.  
Addressing this gap, and taking an institutionalist approach, in the next sections I introduce 
the key concepts needed to answer the research questions I have posed above. These concepts 
include institutions and the process by which they change as well as the reasons behind their 
change. Transactions (nature-related transactions and legal transactions) and the 
interdependence they cause or reveal between actors across various levels and locations 
(Hagedorn, 2015) will also be discussed. Finally, the concept of remedy will also be 
introduced.   
3.2 Conceptualising Institutions 
 
This subchapter considers approaches to understanding and analysing institutions, with the 
aim of examining to what extent the institutional perspective can offer satisfactory answers to 
the research questions posed by this study.  
As we have established in Chapter 2, water scarcity is constructed through institutions 
regulating aspects of water governance, from production/abstraction to transportation, 
distribution, access, allocation rights and so on. Institutions define choice for society and its 
use of water. 
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3.2.1 Understanding Institutions 
Issues related to institutions and institutional change have been incorporated into 
economics by various schools of thought. In what follows, I present the main approaches to 
institutions and institutional change relevant to the purposes of the current study.  
One influential scholar in institutionalism is North (1990), for whom institutions “are the 
rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (ibid, p.3). Institutions, according to North, are external constraints 
for individuals, whose goal is to maximise their utility. From his perspective, the individual is 
a rational agent, with stable preferences, unaffected by external factors, and complete 
information, constrained by rules that strictly define his action sets (institutions). In order to 
maximize their utility, individuals inter- or transact with others. These transactions are not, 
however, without cost in terms of resources and time. Consequently, institutions are created 
as tools to regularise transactions, with the more or less conscious intention of eventually 
reducing their costs. However, a closer look also reveals an ‘enabling’ character of 
institutions in North’s definition. In this vein, Hodgson (2006, p. 2) uses the example of 
traffic rules as both constraining a driver’s behaviour while simultaneously enabling easier 
and safer driving. 
According to some other scholars of institutionalism, the collective is important, and 
institutions are not perceived as constraints but rather as enablers of realms of choice. For 
Commons (1924), institutions are legal relations a) between individuals and b) between 
individuals and the state. Bromley (1989) defines institutions as “rules and conventions of 
society that facilitate coordination among people regarding their behavior” (p.22). For 
classical institutional economics, institutions are purposefully constructed by the collective, 
with the purpose of altering interactions between members of a going concern, which is best 
understood as a collection of activities, forming a community, coming together for a shared 
purpose. As defined by Commons, a going concern is “animated by a common purpose, 
governed by common rules of its own making, and the collective behavior in attaining that 
purpose we distinguish as ‘going business’” (1924, p. 145). A going concern can be a firm, a 
nation, a family, a village, essentially any group of people coming together motivated by a 
shared belief. As Ramstad put it, going concerns are “concerted action for ends foreseen in the 
future” (Ramstad, 1990, p.74). They are “essential in how the world makes sense to people. 
Going concerns also give rise to shared ideas about what is important” (Hiedanpää and 
Bromley, 2016, p. 108).  
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Vatn (2005) agrees with Commons and Bromley when he sees institutions as socially and 
purposefully constructed, offering a typology of them according to their form and motivation. 
Institutions are thus “the conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a society. They 
provide expectations, stability and meaning essential to human existence and coordination. 
Institutions regularize life, support values and produce and protect interests” (Vatn, 2005, 
p.60).  Conventions (like language) address and simplify simple coordination problems. 
Norms differ from conventions in their incorporation of values and are viewed as socially 
created and internalised rules to define and support values in a situation with conflict 
potential. The last category, formally sanctioned rules, combine a) an act which is either 
allowed or forbidden with b) an agent or a system with sanctioning authority. This third 
category is referred to by Commons (1924) and Bromley (2006) as legal correlates (dualities), 
the purpose of which is to create order and resolve conflicts. As Bromley stresses, these 
institutions “carry the expectation of legal sanction” (ibid, p. 51). 
Such institutions –legal correlates-  define what individuals “must or must not do (duty), 
what they may do without interference from other individuals (privilege), what they can do 
with the aid of the collective (power) and what they cannot expect the collective to do in their 
behalf (no right)” (Bromley, 1989, p. 43).  
Table 10: The legal correlates 
Legal Correlates 
                                                         ALPHA  BETA 
Static Correlates Right  Duty 
Privilege  No Right 
Dynamic Correlates Power  Liability 
Immunity  No Power 
Source: Bromley, 2006 
 
Basing himself on Hohfeld’s fundamental legal relations, Bromley elaborates on the possible 
legal relations (correlates) between one social entity (Alpha) and another social entity (Beta). 
Social entities might be individuals or groups of individuals. Recall that these correlates only 
take effect in the presence of a legal system with sanctioning authority, so one cannot talk of 
legal correlates within norms or conventions, since no enforcement mechanisms are in place 
for such classes of institutions.  
Keeping the above in mind, a right held by Alpha is a “state-sanctioned and enforced 
expectation and assurance that Beta will behave in a certain way towards Alpha” (Bromley, 
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2006, p. 52).  This means that Beta has a duty to behave in a certain manner towards Alpha.  
If Beta does not uphold that duty, then Alpha has the right to call the collective to come to her 
aid. The second legal correlate is that of privilege–no right. If Alpha holds a privilege with 
regard to Beta, then Alpha can act without considering what the effects of her actions might 
be on Beta. Alpha has the privilege of acting without consideration and, therefore, puts Beta 
in a position of no right and has no prerogative to call the collective to his aid, since 
“privilege is a situation of no-law” (ibid, p. 53). Beta is thus at the mercy of Alpha.  
To have power is to be able to force others into a legal situation against their will. When 
Alpha has power, she can enlist the coercive power of some authority to impose her will on 
Beta’s choice domain. In this case, Beta suffers from liability to Alpha’s power. In a case 
where Alpha is unable to force Beta into a legal situation he would not like to be in, then we 
can say that Beta enjoys immunity and that Alpha is in a position of no power.  
One can identify many similarities shared between Bromley’s legal correlates and 
Hagedorn’s (2015) integrative and segregative institutions (ISI). Although they both refer to 
transactions and interdependencies between actors, their point of departure is different, but 
complementary. Bromley is looking at legal relations (legal transactions), whereas Hagedorn 
(2008, 2015) is concerned with taking a physical perspective on transactions, tracing the 
origin and creation of institutions in nature-related ones. He holds that, in nature-related fields 
such as agriculture, it is actor characteristics and transactions properties that interact and, 
consequently, effectuate institutions. Based on the consequences of actor decisions leading to 
transactions, Hagedorn further distinguishes between integrative and segregative institutions 
governing them. 
Table 11: Physical view on transactions: integrative and segregative institutions 
Physical View on Transactions Integrative Institutions Segregative Institutions 
Beneficial effects 
 
Appropriate all benefits and 
leave no gains to others 
Forego some benefits and 
leave gains to others 
 
Adverse effects 
 
Accept all liability and shift no 
nuisance to others 
Deny complete liability and 
shift nuisances to others 
Source: Hagedorn, 2015 
 
Integrative institutions hold decision makers accountable for virtually all transaction 
consequences, while segregative institutions free them from some of the costs induced by the 
transaction. Hagedorn (2015) links transaction characteristics to the requirements for 
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institutional design, arguing that nature-related transactions, being complex and 
interconnected, require that the trade-off between segregative and integrative institutions be 
considered if sustainable interaction outcomes are desired.  
Integrative institutions achieve “consensus and legitimacy by deliberation and rational 
debate” (Skogstad, 2003, cited in Hagedorn, 2015, p. 594). Consequently, one can identify a 
congruency between the social and physical perspectives on intergrative and segregative 
institutions, derived from the physical and social perspectives on transactions. 
Table 12: Impact of integrative and segregative institutions on transaction costs 
Physical View on Transactions Integrative Institutions Segregative Institutions 
Internalising transaction costs      Duty to internalise incomplete duty to internalise 
Externalising transaction costs No right to externalise Some rights to externalise 
Source: Hagedorn, 2015 
 
As Hagedorn (2015) notes, the more complex, nature-related and interconnected 
transactions are, the more integrative institutions need to be to address this complexity at the 
social level. Hagedorn further draws attention to the possibility that congruency between 
institutions and transactions will not always be entirely symmetric. Oftentimes, socially 
integrative institutions are not directly associated with physically integrative institutions, and 
vice versa. In such cases, communities might collectively decide that they can tolerate some 
nuisances caused by entrepreneurs if their activities would translate to other benefits for the 
community, such as employment for example.  
One can easily identify this situation of asymmetric congruency on the two selected islands 
where, to a large extent, the local communities accept the actions of the tourist sector (of 
which they are also a part) because the benefits it brings to the islanders outweigh the 
perceived nuisances of water scarcity.  There is apparently sufficient reason for the 
community to accept deviation from the optimal balance between social and physical realities.  
Regarding water sector dysfunction facing these islands, the correlates within legal 
relations and integrative–segregative institutions will be important to note when we examine 
the water sector and examine which actors holds which legal correlates, how the water sector 
dysfunction is related to the integrative or segregative nature of existing institutions and what 
implications these factors may have for rectifying the dysfunction.  
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3.2.2 Institutional Change 
Institutional change is the creation of an institution in an area where no institution had 
previously existed or the replacement of an existing one. Theories of institutional change 
address questions of both how and why an institutional status quo changes, approaching them 
through different perspectives. Some theories start off from the assumption that change is 
spontaneous or designed, while others make a distinction between whether it is initiated by 
the “top” or the “bottom” of a hierarchy.   
North (1990) approaches institutional change as a means to reduce transaction costs, via 
state monopoly on regulation and coercion. The state, through its regulatory and coercive 
power, creates and sustains institutions and markets, thus creating a stable structure for human 
interaction and, consequently, reducing uncertainty. 
Vatn (2005) proposes a typology of reasons for which institutions change in cases of 
designed institutional change, based on the following three grounds: a) efficiency, meaning 
reduction of transaction costs and uptake of technological advancements; b) alignment with 
interests, values and power; and c) response to crises and shocks. According to Vatn, 
efficiency (reduction of transaction costs) is achieved through protection of present or future 
benefit streams through establishment of property rights. The question of who will be granted 
those rights is a question of whose interests are protected and advocated and whose interests 
are denied. The last ground upon which institutional change is predicated is that of response 
to crisis, as adapting to a crisis generally requires new institutions. Vatn (2005) cautions, 
however, of the possibility that crises might legitimise changes that would otherwise not be 
accepted.  
Bromley and Anderson (2012) propose that change occurs because the status quo ante is 
not working as expected. Change as a result of human volition is the focus of Bromley (2006), 
who views institutional change as deliberative action occurring when a surprising event takes 
place and doubt needs to be settled.  The surprising event might be, for example, that the 
current institutional status quo fails to “conduce to agreeable outcomes” (ibid, p.35). Created 
and available imaginings regarding the future are evoked in terms of the volitional nature of 
institutional change. Institutional change then becomes public policy in its conception and 
implementation. 
Hagedorn (2015) explains institutional change using the concept of the transaction-
interdependence-institutions-cycle (TIIC) explicating the causal relationship (nexus) 
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connection between transactions and institutions. According to TIIC, by causing 
interdependence between actors, transactions affect social relationships. As a result, we can 
observe the emergence of institutional change – either by design or unintentionally – in 
response to conflicts or opportunities for cooperation arising from the consequences of 
physically grounded transactions.  
It is in this way that we are now reminded of the particularities of islands. Physically 
grounded transactions have cascading effects that influence and are visible not only to 
islanders themselves (owing to the “discontinuity of space” and geographical “isolation” of 
islands) but also flow to the mainland, where they may be addressed by officials and 
legislative bodies at the national level. Islands thus offer a perfect setting where the 
interdependencies between the social and the ecological can be studied.   
Applying the TIIC (Fig. 9) to the Cycladic water sector, we can postulate the following 
sequence of events around the nature-related transactions surrounding water usage:  
1) Individuals, predominantly farmers, abstract groundwater, oftentimes without permit. 
(2) The groundwater table deteriorates, resulting in water availability is reduced. 
(3) Sea-water intrudes into the groundwater. 
(4) Salty water reduces agricultural productivity, leading farmers to turn to local officials 
requesting support, either financial or regulatory.  
(5) Local officials regulate water provision through water cuts to households, due to 
limited water availability. 
(6) Farmers, household water users and officials recognise their interdependence regarding 
the use of water.  
(7) This stimulates interaction between actors directly (water users) and indirectly 
(politicians), such as discussion, negotiation and consensus building on rule making. 
(8) Adaptation processes in the social system (e.g., regarding rules and organisation of 
water quality and regulating abstraction rates) result in institutional change and governance 
reform. 
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Figure 9: The transaction–interdependence–institutions cycle 
Source: Hagedorn, 2015 
 
What becomes clear here is that actors react to consequences of physically grounded 
transactions, what Hagedorn calls nature-related transactions. Human behaviour is, thus, 
influenced by attributes of the “biophysical and material world being acted upon or 
transformed” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 22). It is the nature-related transaction that acts as the 
surprising event referred to by Bromley that motivates individuals to realise that something is 
not working properly in the institutional status quo. So consequences of physical transactions 
activate action situations.  
3.3 Legal Rules and the Importance of Remedies 
 
We have already taken a brief look at legal rules and legal relations in the subchapter on 
institutions (3.2.1). Here we revisit these concepts and elaborate on them further. Legal rules 
are working rules (institutions) of political concern (Stupak, 2014; Bromley, 2006; Commons, 
1924). Recall that working rules specify the allowed and prohibited domains of action for 
individuals and, thus, define the domain of choice for the whole society. For the present 
study, institutions are seen as social constructs that define choices within a going concern, 
whether it is a family, community, firm, nation, or an island society. Going concerns operate 
within the boundaries set by working rules, and three sets of working rules setting the 
boundaries of three types of going concerns can be distinguished. A political going concern 
(such as a state) operates within boundaries set by legal rules. An economic going concern 
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(such as a firm) operates within boundaries set by contracts. And, finally, a moral concern 
(such as a family) operates within boundaries set by norms and conventions. Although we 
will be touching upon all three types of working rules, we will mainly focus on the interplay 
between working rules of political concern (legal rules) and those of moral concern (norms 
and conventions).  
As we have seen, legal rules (and indeed any institution) include the notion of correlates, 
of dualities, meaning that they define what individuals “must or must not do (duty), what they 
may do without interference from other individuals (privilege), what they can do with the aid 
of the collective (power) and what they cannot expect the collective to do in their behalf (no 
right)” (Bromley, 1989, p. 43). Legal rules – translated to correlates of right–duty, privilege–
no right, power–liability, immunity–no power – influence to the ability of the individual to 
call on the collective (state) to come to her aid. We have examined how working rules, in the 
form of legal rules, establish legal relations between members of a going concern and very 
briefly discussed rights and duties, powers and liabilities. In what follows, I develop these 
concepts further and relate them to the discussion in section 3.1.3 on the “discretion” of 
officials.  
A right is one of the core legal concepts, and clearly assigned and defined rights, especially 
property rights, have long been considered as the solution to many resource-related problems, 
such as groundwater degradation. Hardin (1968), for example, famously argued in favour of 
the assignment of private property rights as the way to save pastures from over-grazing. To 
hold a right is usually understood as being permitted to act in a certain way. There is, 
however, more to a right. As mentioned above, a right is also an expression of relationships 
among members of going concerns. A right exists always and only in relation to (is correlated 
with) a duty. The right of Alpha is correlated with the duty of Beta (Bromley, 2006; 
Commons, 1924; Hohfeld, 1917).  To have a right thus means that someone else has a duty to 
respect it. Rights can be protected and duties can be enforced through a third authoritative 
agent, which is usually the state or the government.  
Hohfeld identified three classifications of legal relations that have had implications on how 
they should be approached in analysing them.  Commons (1924) summarises these as the 
approach of a) “the legal practitioner […] before the court”, b) “logical, mathematical or 
syllogistic relations existing between legal concepts”, and c) “the supreme court, a legislature, 
or an economic inquiring. What are the limits and purposes of society’s working rules 
themselves, and what are the economic or social consequences of a particular legal relation 
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created by a particular type of conduct?” (p. 91-92). It is the third approach that has 
implications for our study.  
Here I am particularly interested in the relationship between right and duty and how it 
comes into effect. A right and a duty remain abstract concepts until a third party enforces 
them. A third party is needed that has the authority over both duty and right holder. In the 
absence of a “powerful” third party, disputes would likely be resolved via violence or 
extensive negotiations. And still a great amount of trust would need to exist between the 
parties that the agreement would be bind together. This is why an authoritative third party 
with the ability to guarantee rights and duties is needed.  The role of this authoritative agent is 
assumed by the state and it is spelled out in the rulings of courts, parliaments and legislatures.   
Rights and duties do not come out of a vacuum but are rather set through the legal 
correlates of exposure and privilege, respectively. A privilege is the “field where the 
behaviour is unrestrained or uncompelled by authority” (Common, 1924, p. 99). With 
privilege, there is no lawfully wrong act; there is no law regulating that sort of behaviour. If 
Alpha acts with privilege, he may visit harm on others who suffer under exposure and have no 
ability to call on the collective to come to their aid. Privilege and exposure indicate the limits 
of law’s reach. To be operational, these correlates (rights/duties, privilege/exposure) must be 
supported by/through authoritative relations. As we have seen earlier, authoritative relations 
exist between legally superior and legally inferior agents and are determined by the power–
liability and immunity–no power correlates mentioned by Bromley (2006).  
The authoritative agent (government) is not free to do as it pleases either, as it acts 
according to the power and liability assigned to its officials. Power is the ability to force 
others in a position they do not wish to be. In the case of public officials, they have the power 
to force members of the going concern that is society to perform their duties. And the 
members of the society (duty holders) are obliged to comply. The power–liability correlates 
also mean that citizens can call on their officials (representing the collective) to come to their 
aid. Officials are then liable for executing the rights of citizens and, essentially, have a duty to 
do so.  
Recall that rights and duties exist only if they are supported by an authoritative agent and 
more specifically by the “remedial power–liability relation” (Commons, 1924, p. 109). 
Commons explains: 
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 “In one sense the right does not exist as a “fact” before either it or its remedy is exercised 
– but, if so, then the “fact” is only a mental process, a hope, a fear, an expectation that since a 
certain working rule has been applied in the past, it will be applied again in similar cases” 
(ibid).  
He insists here that, without the authoritative remedial relation, rights and duties are mere 
wishes or ethical assertions; they are not a legal fact. So, according to Commons, we see that 
rights and duties are actually determined not by what is written but by the actions of public 
officials implementing laws.  He explains further that:  
“remedy is none other than the activity of officials setting the machinery of government in 
motion, and getting one set of officials responsible for enforcing what they define to be the 
rights in the case. If the officials are corrupt, negligent, incompetent, biased, or revolutionists, 
the legal right is nevertheless exactly the equivalent of what they do or may be expected to do, 
and practical sophisticated men, without illusions, act accordingly, although ethically they 
may condemn the situation” (Common, 1924, p. 110-111, emphasis added).  
So, here we see an emphasis on the vital importance and functional role of remedy – the 
activity of officials setting the machinery of government into action – in determining what 
actually constitutes a legal rule.  Two aspects emerge here as being relevant for this study. 
The first one is that remedy is a precondition for the existence of a right. Without remedial 
power, a right is a mere wish, as Commons (1924) emphasised, a fear or a hope. It does not 
effectually exist in the legal realm.  The second relevant aspect is the question of who holds 
and exercises that remedial power. It is the officials of the state, and not the legislature, that 
“define […] the rights in the case” (Commons, 1924, p. 110), as the law needs to be 
implemented in order for it to be effectual. An unimplemented law is a non-existent one, as it 
has no effect over the society whose scope of action it aims to alter. We see, then, that “when 
there is no remedy, there is no right” (Commons, 1924, p. 110).  
Public law for institutionalists, and Commons in particular, is the procedure designed to 
enforce responsibility upon officials. In accordance with the dual nature of legal correlates, 
the responsibility of officials in none other than the liability of citizens to fulfil their duties. At 
the same time, officials are also liable to be “acted upon through judicial mandamus or 
injunction, through legislative impeachment, through executive removal from office, through 
popular election or recall” (ibid, p. 111). This procedure is undertaken and safeguarded by 
governments or by the state that essentially represent the “legal order”. As Commons notes, 
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“[s]ince, however, government and the legal order are behavioristically none other than the 
officials-in-action, we speak of it as simply officials. The correlative of the power of officials 
is the liability of other officials” (1924, p. 111).  
Public officials become, then, an important agent in the implementation and enforcement 
of legal rules and an intermediary between the will of the state and its citizens.  
We turn now to transactions, which are a means for explaining the emergence, 
enforcement and change of institutions. 
3.4 Transactions 
A transaction, as an object of study, is defined and used differently by different disciplines. In 
might be understood as the exchange of commodities, as the transfer of a good or service 
across technologically separable interfaces (Williamson, 1985), or as a “physical phenomenon 
that is induced by a decision of one or more actors and affects one or more actors” (Hagedorn, 
2008, p. 363). Commons (1934, p. 55) defined the transaction as “the unit of economic 
activity” and further “the smallest unit of institutional economics” and “the alienation and 
acquisition, between individuals, of the rights of future ownership of physical things” (ibid, p. 
58).  
I elaborate here on both the physical and legal definitions of transactions, as these two 
approaches are complementary and not competing, as already established in section 3.2.1 on 
the conceptualisation of institutions. The first focuses on physically grounded institutional 
change, through the interdependence of nature-related transactions caused by actors, thus 
affecting social relationships and ultimately leading to institutional change  
(Hagedorn, 2008). Meanwhile, the latter is concerned with analysing the processes for 
creating new institutions, involving the alienation and acquisition of rights to future 
ownership of physical things (Commons, 1934).  
3.4.1 The Physical View of Transactions 
A nature-related transaction consists of “economically relevant processes by which goods and 
services, resources and amenities, and damages and nuisances are allocated” (Hagedorn, 
2008, p. 360). All transactions have properties such as frequency, uncertainty, and asset 
specificity, which are connected to frictions between various activities (Williamson 1996). 
 In complex, nature-related systems such as agriculture and water supply, nature-related 
transactions have further properties related to achieving coherence between human activities 
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and biophysical processes (Hagedorn 2008), including excludability, rivalry, asset specificity, 
frequency, uncertainty, complexity, heterogeneity, jointness and legitimacy (Hagedorn et al, 
2002), as described in Table 13. 
Table 13: Properties of nature-related transactions and their description 
Excludability Difficulty of preventing actors from accessing benefits of a transaction 
Rivalry Degree to which goods or services consumed in a transaction reduce the 
resource available for others 
Asset specificity Degree to which investments can be redeployed 
Frequency How often transactions occur 
Uncertainty Certainty in action–outcome linkages 
Complexity Degree of interconnectedness in factors leading to outcomes 
Heterogeneity Variation in spatial characteristics or other physical stochastic phenomena 
Jointness Ability to separate one transaction from another 
Legitimacy Whether affected actors view transactions as legitimate 
Source: adapted from Hagedorn et al, 2002 
Modularity of structures and functional interdependence of processes related to a specific 
transaction are key attributes that further enable the classification of nature-related 
transactions (Hagedorn 2008). Modularity captures the decomposability of processes in self-
contained sub-processes (Roggero and Thiel, 2017), denoting the capacity of subsystems to 
perform their activities with little interaction with other modules. Functional interdependence 
refers to how changes in the state of one module affect changes in the state of the other 
modules in a system. Combinations of these two attributes result in four types of transactions, 
ranging between two extremes: atomistic-isolated transactions, which are characterised by 
high modularity and low functional interdependence, and complex-interconnected 
transactions, for which low modularity and high functional interdependence are common. The 
properties of the different transaction types can be accounted for differently by various 
institutions and governance structures (Hagedorn, 2015).  
Yet, as Roggero and Thiel (2017) note, transactions between highly interdependent activities 
can still be modularized through rules such as technical standards (Baldwin, 2007). By 
shaping mutual expectations, rules (institutions) greatly decrease the effort necessary to 
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coordinate highly interdependent activities across different units of the same organization. 
This last point leads us to review the legal view of transactions.  
 
3.4.2 The legal View of Transactions 
Transactions are not, then, limited to the exchange of goods but also acquire a legal status as 
well. Commons defined the transaction as the “alienation and acquisition, between 
individuals, of the rights of future ownership of physical things” (1934, p. 58). He established 
a three-way classification scheme for transactions – bargaining, managerial and rationing – 
and assigned a negotiational psychology to each (see Table 14). Bargaining transactions 
occur between four or more legally equal parties and are concerned with “the legally 
sanctioned transfer of ownership over future net benefit streams” (Bromley, 2006, p. 38).  The 
four potential parties of the bargaining transaction are the successful seller, the successful 
buyer, the disappointed seller and the disappointed buyer. Commons sees two strategies in 
bargaining: coercion and persuasion. Persuasion is a strategy both participants will employ 
when their bargaining power is equal. In most cases, however, although the participants might 
be equal in the eyes of the law, they are generally not be equal in their actual bargaining 
power. Thus, we might expect to see coercion in cases where one party enjoys economic or 
political superiority over others.  
Table 14: Transactions and their corresponding negotiational psychology 
Types of transaction Negotiational Psychology 
Bargaining Coercion and Persuasion 
Managerial Command and Obedience 
Rationing Pleading and Arguments 
Source: Own graphic based on Commons, 1934 
 
Commons further distinguishes between managerial and rationing transactions. 
Managerial transactions are concerned with the creation of wealth, not the distribution of it, 
and occur between two legally unequal parties within a hierarchy, and not four, as in 
bargaining transactions. They involve, for example, an employer and employee, where the 
employer gives orders and the employee executes them. The negotiatonal psychology here is 
one of command and obedience (Commons, 1950, 57). At times, there will be disagreement 
on what constitutes reasonable demands from the employer and reasonable obedience from 
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the employee. If such disagreements reach the level of requiring formal resolution, will be 
resolved by the law-setting bodies, whose judgement will change depending on what is 
considered “reasonable” at any given point of time.   
Rationing transactions are involved in the “negotiations of reaching an agreement among 
several participants who have authority to apportion the benefits and burdens to members of a 
joint enterprise” (Commons, 1934, p. 68).  Such transactions are policy-shaping, as “the 
rationing of wealth or purchasing power, not by parties deemed equal, but by an authority 
superior to them in law” (Commons, 1934, p. 68). Negotiations over the rationing of future 
wealth or benefits, occurring in legislatures or parliaments and courts, entail the ideas of 
pleading and argument and involve reason giving. Rationing transactions not only set up the 
working rules upon which bargaining and managerial transactions are based, but they are also 
the necessary condition for institutional and policy change. As Bromley notes, “[w]hen I say 
that new public policy is a new collective action in liberation, restraint, and expansion of 
individual action, it is the rationing transaction that embodies (captures) this idea” (Bromley, 
2006, p. 40). 
Bromley and Hiedanpää (2014) have further expanded Commons’ typology of transactions 
by including a fourth one, the inducing transaction, the purpose of which is to induce 
behavioural change, especially of habits.  More specifically the inducing transaction aims to 
“bring about specific behavioral changes when the individual agent has no interest in altering 
those existing behaviors. There is nothing in it for her” (ibid. p. 10). They illustrate this newly 
conceptualised class of transaction by employing Payments for Ecosystem Services as an 
example where a potential seller approaches a group of potential buyers and offers them 
economic incentives to alter their behaviour, that is to break an existing habit. This transaction 
occurs between a potential seller and a group of potential buyers, and Bromley and Hiedenpää 
emphasise that its purpose is not to make its participants equally better off but rather to induce 
change in the (here, environmental) behaviour of the “targeted” participant, the buyer. Habit 
breaking is not easy and can only persist when the beliefs of the buyer also change. Monetary 
incentives usually do not suffice. The inducing transaction is a new concept and has not yet 
been elaborated upon in a context outside of the Payment for Ecosystem Services scheme.   
What is clear, and what Commons insisted upon, is that there is an authoritative agent in 
all transactions, because “if this superior […] third party is not believed to exist or to 
intervene then the relation of right and duty between the two [transacting parties] disappears 
altogether” (Commons, 1924, 84). He correlates authorised and authoritative relations with 
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authorised and authoritative transactions. According to this distinction, authorised 
transactions will occur between legally equal parties. For example, bargaining transactions 
between prospective sellers and buyers or rationing transactions between parliamentary 
members deliberating on a new law. Authoritative transactions occur between legally unequal 
parties, between a legally superior and a legally inferior, and their purpose is to ensure order 
in a society by enforcing conformance to legal rules. Authoritative transactions may occur 
between, for example, a water agency official ordering the owner of an illegal well to stop 
abstracting water from the groundwater.  
Taking Commons’ correlation a step further, we can see a clear relation between 
transactions, remedies and working rules. The inalienability rule implies that no bargaining 
(i.e. authorised) transaction may take place between imposing and exposed parties. On the 
other hand, property and liability rules do allow two parties to engage in bargaining 
transactions. Meanwhile, a working rule specifies whether a specific transaction is allowed or 
not, and under what circumstances, such as whether drilling for water from private wells is 
allowed to be sold or is only for its owner’s consumption. Whether or not this rule will be 
actually enforced depends on the remedial power of the relevant officials. In the next section, 
we will address human behaviour as understood through the lense of institutionalism. 
3.5 Behaviour and Institutional Economics 
 
Individuals engage with their society in a world constructed by institutions to which they are 
indeed “habituated”. The institutions that exist today are the result of the will of the 
authoritative agents of the past and, by coming into being, these institutions have shaped the 
institutional reality of today. Through experiencing a reality shaped by institutions, we 
become habituated, which also means that we can no longer claim to merely act on free will, 
as this would mean that we can readily dismiss the effects of institutional structures on the 
options available to us and their effects on our minds. Institutions shape the ways we perceive 
the world, our rights and duties, our sense of right and wrong, our expectations and our claims 
to benefit streams. Commons called this the “institutionalised mind” (Commons, 1934).   We 
are, in fact, so habituated by the institutions surrounding us that it is only when the effect of 
an institution is undesirable, or becomes so, that we take notice of the causal relationship 
between working rules (institutions) and our actions. It is then that we may begin to 
contemplate how to change such institutions by asking what kind of desirable outcome we 
want to achieve in the future (Bromley, 2006).  
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We can then say that changing behaviour, changing the institutional structure that shapes 
behaviour, is precisely predicated upon first realising that the current institutional structure 
does not deliver what we – as a society – find desirable. It is only when institutions do not 
serve a useful purpose to us that we take notice of them and go about trying to change them.  
Commons holds that institutional economics is ultimately about behaviour, especially the 
“behaviour of individuals while participating in transactions (Commons, 1934, p. 654). As 
illustrated in the previous subchapter, a transaction involves at least two parties and, hence, 
the psychology characterising the behaviour of participants in transactions is one of 
negotiation. In negotiational psychology, “[e]ach participant is endeavouring to influence the 
other towards performance, forbearance or avoidance. Each modifies the behavior of the other 
in greater or lesser degree” (Commons, 1934, p. 655). 
With the term “negotiational psychology”, Commons coined the mental process and 
associated activities of people as they engage in transactions. Key to understanding the 
centrality of negotiational psychology in Commons’ view of transactions is looking carefully 
at some of its main features. Futurity is the term Commons chose to illustrate his belief that 
humans always act with the explicit aim of controlling or influencing outcomes in an 
uncertain future and that the meaning an individual attributes to a certain act lies in the 
expectations that individual may have on the action’s future consequences (Commons, 1934). 
Purpose, then, becomes a central issue in the psychology of transactions, and purposes give 
birth to expectations.   
Expectations also refer to expected actions of the other counterparts in a transaction. A 
transactor must “anticipate, account for and possibly influence the actions of others” (Biddle, 
1990:3). Such actions on the part of others could either work as instruments towards 
achieving her own goals or act as barriers and obstacles (ibid).  Most of the time, though, 
transactions are a matter of routine, as a certain level of certainty regarding expectations and 
behaviour of others is born from numerous similar transactions that the transactor had already 
been involved in in the past.  This certainly is, at the same time, a result and source of the 
working rules of collective action, which have “injected order into transactions, providing the 
security of expectations that people needed in order to function on [a] day-to-day basis” 
(Commons, 1934, p. 704-705). 
However, there is always some degree of uncertainty in any transaction, as there is always 
some scope of discretion available to transactors, who have opportunities to attempt to 
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influence each other. Moreover, transactors can never be entirely certain that they share the 
same understanding of given working rules with other involved parties and, thus, have even 
more reason to try to exert their own influence. If individuals want to achieve a certain 
purpose in the future, they need to engage themselves in transactions they are involved in, 
particularly if there are novel elements in them, and they need to think strategically if they 
want to advance their interests.  
This is what lies at the heart of the negotiational psychology: negotiations between human 
wills in order to achieve each actors’s desired outcomes in the future. As Biddle (1990) put it: 
“if the innovator [person introducing a new pattern of action] was to be successful, he would 
require the co-operation of some, the permission of others, the voluntary or involuntary 
inaction of still others. He would have to transact with the right people [...]. People would 
have to be persuaded, induced, coerced, convinced” (ibid, p. 7). 
So, the behaviour of participants in transactions is not stand-alone, it is not purely 
individual. The negotiational psychology of institutions “resolves into the persuasions and 
coercions, the advertising and propaganda, of bargaining transactions; the command and 
obedience of managerial transactions; or the arguments and pleading of rationing 
transactions” (Commons, 1934, p. 31). As Bromley (2006) noted in his review of Commons’ 
ideas about transactions, individuals differ in terms of their personalities or social or 
economic position and status and, hence, their ability to influence and carry out these 
transactions.  This is corroborated in Biddle’s (1990) examination of Commons’ negotiational 
psychology, where he holds that the perceptions of transactors are as important as their 
objective conditions, such as the ones listed by Bromley (social positioning and economic 
status). These perceptions, Commons believed, are rooted in what he called habitual 
assumptions, which are “formed in the course of social interaction and maintained by social 
sanction” (Biddle, 1990:14).  These assumptions are the core beliefs held by an individual, 
which shaper her representations of what should constitute a desired outcome. In Biddle’s 
words, “Each participant’s negotiational psychology had its roots in his habitual assumptions” 
(1990:16).  
At this point, the following questions arise: What happens when the public officials 
engaged in managerial and/or rational transactions do not exercise their remedial power as 
planned? Why would they not do so? To answer these questions, we need to briefly 
reconsider a concept discussed earlier: reason. As I have already established, reason is a 
vision of the future, looking towards the future that one wants to achieve. To quote Bromley, 
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“actions are both explained and justified in terms of the future states they are expected to 
brings about” (2006, p. 6). An individual undertakes an action in the present to experience a 
desired for outcome in the future or to avoid an unwished one in the future. We act now, 
looking towards the future. So, when deciding on the action, an individual also makes a 
decision regarding what achievable or avoidable future outcomes ought to be. Additionally, 
the behaviour of an individual, if it is to be purposeful – as it has to be if it has a reason – 
needs to include the following elements, laid out by Bromley:  a) “belief by the performer of 
the act X in the law ‘if X, then Y’”, b) “desire by the performer of the act X that Y (the 
outcome) indeed occurs”, and c) “implementation by that desire and that belief jointly, of the 
act X” (2006, p. 112-113). 
So, the basis for any action is belief that the desired action will yield the desired outcome. 
Bromley (2006) develops a theory of how these beliefs are formed in the domain of collective 
action. The policy process operates based on whether policy makers accept various truth 
claims (assertions or imaginings) put forward by scientists as being reasonable or not, as 
legitimate or not. Policy makers will then tend to act upon these truth claims based on 
whether or not they are seen as legitimate. There are two categories of legitimacy: a) within 
the scientific discipline and b) as accepted by an intended audience. The first category is 
termed “warranted belief” and the latter “valuable belief”. Warranted belief “concerns the 
provenance, veracity and coherence of such claims as judged by the shared standards of 
disciplinary practices from which they spring” (Bromley, 2006, p. 130). It is a “benediction 
bestowed by the wider members of a discipline, not simply by those responsible for producing 
those assertions” (Bromley, 2006, p. 149). When the wider discipline cannot offer its 
consensus on a truth claim (assertion), then this assertion loses its legitimacy (warrantability). 
If the wider disciplinary community reaches a consensus on the truth claim, however, then we 
can speak of a warranted belief that policy makers would have no reason to doubt the 
legitimacy of. However, internal acceptance of assertion is not a sufficient reason for its 
acceptance. Valuable belief has to settle. This happens when members of said scientific 
community can justify their assertions to the broader public towards whom assertions are 
directed. The public may or may not be convinced of the value of the claim and can, thus, 
reject it. Once the assertion is accepted, however, it becomes a valuable belief – one upon 
which people may be ready to act. Once valuable belief settles in among non-expert members 
of the public, policy change can commence.  
Chapter 3: Theoretical Grounding 
54 
 
The process of arriving at action directed towards institutional change is illustrated by 
figure 10 below. 
 
 
Figure 10: A theory of action  
Source: Bromley, 2006 
 
So, when going about answering seeking to answer the question of why the dysfunctional 
water sector in the Cyclades is difficult to rectify, we must first understand what motivates the 
behaviour (actions) of the main actors engaged in trying to improve the functioning of the 
water sector. The following statements and concepts guide the conceptual framing of the 
current study:  
i. In small societies, and more so in island societies, the acts of public officials (through 
remedy) represent the will of the state. The official stands in for the state, because of the 
remedial power granted by it to officials.  
ii. Behaviour is driven by reason (what is reasonable or not, what is desirable and what 
not), and it is based upon reason that actors engage in transactions.  
iii. Public officials and other citizens act within their fields of discretion as dictated by 
legal rules.  
iv. Human behaviour is habituated through institutions.   
3.6 Analytical Frameworks 
3.6.1 Analytical Frameworks in Institutional Economics  
Analytical frameworks can be understood as constructs bounding “inquiry and direct the 
attention of the analyst to critical features of the social and physical landscape. […] 
frameworks organize inquiry, but they cannot in and of themselves provide explanations for, 
or predictions of, behaviour and outcomes” (Schlager 1999, p. 234). They are developed 
around a specific set of problems and are influenced by the “theoretical and empirical 
background of their producers” (Hagedorn 2013, p. 4). They are useful to researchers as they 
specify the variables of interest and the relationships between them thus providing the basis 
for theory development (Schlager, 1999). In turn, theories explain actors’ behaviour and the 
related outcomes.  
Desire  Belief  Action 
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Various analytical frameworks have been developed for the study of social-ecological 
systems. Binder et al. (2013) and Hagedorn (2013) offered elaborated comparisons of the 
available research heuristics in the field. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
and the Social-Ecological System (SES) frameworks developed by Ostrom and McGinnis 
(McGinnis and Ostrom 2014; Ostrom 2007, 2009) are among the most frequently employed 
frameworks. They appear helpful in analysing the use of a resource system by a group of 
actors, and are often applied in the case of common pool resources.  
The Framework of Institutional Analysis (IAD) (Ostrom et al. 1994) was initially 
developed to guide empirical analysis of public goods provision and addresses decision 
making at the constitutional, collective choice and operational levels (Ostrom 2007, p. 22). It 
guides the analysis by operationalising interactions between actors (in the action arena), by 
incorporating exogenous factors and the outcomes of actions. A drawback of the IAD for the 
case of this study is that it is almost exclusively dealing with self-organising entities and is 
therefore unsuitable to address the multi-level and complex structure of the Cyclades water 
sector.  
Another analytical framework was put forward by Hagedorn, Arzt, and Peters (2002) and 
further elaborated by Hagedorn (2008) and Hagedorn (2015) in order to help analyse the 
influence of transaction properties and the actors’ characteristics on the emergence of 
particular institutions and governance structures. Titled Institutions of Sustainability (IoS), it 
embraces four core categories that pertain to human action and interaction in social-ecological 
systems: actors and their characteristics, transactions and their properties, institutions and 
governance structures. These categories become relevant when the actors enter particular 
action situations, in which they are confronted with a set of potential actions (Ostrom 2005).  
Furthermore, the IoS framework structures analytically issues related to sustainability 
according to four main categories: a) transactions, b) actors, c) institutions and d) governance 
structures (Hagedorn, 2015). With the IOS (Figure 11), Hagedorn aims to emphasise the role 
of physical processes on causing, transmitting or accelerating externalities (effects -usually 
negative- of one’s action to another individual). Governance structures represent 
organisational constructions for carrying out transactions (Williamson, 1996, p. 4-7). They 
differ with respect to their incentive and adaptive attributes and can range from classical 
markets to hierarchical organisation in the form of firms and public bureaucracies. Between 
the two extremes one can observe a diversity of mixed modes of governance (hybrids) 
(Williamson, 1985). Institutional alternatives, comparable in terms of their transaction costs 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Grounding 
56 
 
economising effects can be yielded when transaction properties are aligned with governance 
structures.                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: The Institutions of Sustainability Framework 
Source: adapted from Hagedorn (2008) 
 
Transactions are influenced by the physical attributes of ecological systems. According to the 
IOS, the only requirement for an action to be called transaction is that the actor affects another 
or others due to physical implication of her action. With the IOS framework, Hagedorn (2008) 
shows that nature-related transactions are strongly influenced by the attributes of the 
respective natural systems, which are characterised by complexity and interconnectedness (as 
it is explicated in TIIC).   
Keeping in mind the social dimension of a social-ecological system, it is impossible to refer to 
properties of transactions as mechanical facts (Berger, 2015), neglecting at the same time the 
importance of social construction, which is influenced by the social dimension. When actors 
are confronted with action situations, they consciously decide which action they perform. It is 
here we observe the human will in action. It is here that we can look for reasons for human 
action.  Having this in mind and based on the valuable insights gained by IOS, I will present 
the analytical components that will guide the diagnosis of the water sector in the Cyclades, 
emphasising on reasons for human behaviour.  
Action arenas 
 
 
Transactions  
(properties of 
transactions) 
Institutions 
(rules defining 
 choices) 
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Actors 
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actors) 
 
Governance 
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3.6.2 The Analytical Framework for the Water Sector in the Cyclades 
 
In previous sections, we have examined how the literature on administration and geography 
understands smallness, particularly insular smallness and how it influences public 
administration in island localities, its role within the society and the multiple – and 
overlapping – roles of public officials in such societies. A public official working, for 
example, in a department dealing with the approval or rejection of water use permits does not, 
in reviewing a permit application, act only within the field of discretion dictated by legal 
rules. It is quite possible that she will also act conditioned by being an acquaintance of the 
applicant or as a neighbour, a client, or even a parent of a student taught by the applicant. 
Roles in small societies overlap, and as I have established in our review of the public 
administration and nissology literature, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a public 
official to disengage herself from her multiple roles when acting as an official of the state. 
Bureaucracies in small societies are not impersonal Weberian ones. In small societies, 
bureaucracies tend to be very personal indeed.  
Both the nissology and administrative sciences literatures acknowledge the importance of 
smallness (in terms of overlapping roles and relationships) in moulding/shaping the behaviour 
of public officials. This concept resonates well with Commons’ view that the acts of the 
officials are essentially expressions of the will of the state. So, by combining the overlap of 
roles in small societies
7
 and Commons’ remedial power of the official, we can claim that 
officials are an embodiment of the state.  
Can the literature concerned with smallness and islands offer deeper insight into how the 
remedial power of officials functions when said officials have multiple, and oftentimes 
conflicting, roles to fulfil?  What, for instance, are the limits of officials’ remedial power? Is 
there room for them to manoeuvre and reconcile their multiple roles? Perhaps what was once 
conceived as such officials being slack is actually an act of reconciliation and acceptance of 
the multiple roles they are called upon to fulfil?  
Institutional economics can, I believe, offer deep insights for understanding behaviour 
associated with the water sector dysfunction in the Cyclades, both that of officials and that of 
water consumers. It can do so by a) offering a framing through which to consider how to 
analyse the institutions liberating and constraining human action in the domain of water 
                                                          
7
 In this study, the terms small islands and small societies are used interchangeably, as small islands are 
small societies.  
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management in the Cyclades and b) offering a theory of human action based on beliefs. It is 
not enough to know that individuals’ behaviour might vary due to the multiple roles they 
hold; we must also understand the reasons behind their actions. What institutional economics 
has to offer in terms of explaining behaviour is the recognition of the domain of human 
volition that animates action. There is a reason for every action.  Granting volition to 
individuals, and not undertaking a mere mechanical quest for their utility maximisation, 
makes every action undertaken by water users, every decision taken by officials and every 
legal rule decided upon by legislatures subject to explanation. There are reasons why water 
users drill illegal water wells; there are reasons why water officials might not strictly monitor 
illegal water wells; there are reasons why legislatures pass laws requiring that all water wells 
be registered and granted permits. At bottom, there are reasons for the dysfunction of the 
water sector in the Cyclades. So, by following the abductive syllogism and accepting that 
people act not only within the scope of the discretion laid out for them by institutions but also 
as volitional agents looking towards the future, then we will hopefully be able to unravel the 
tangle that is the water sector dysfunction in the Cyclades.  
In order to proceed, we must attempt to understand a) the existing institutional structures of 
the study locations that habituate the minds of their inhabitants and set their scope of 
discretion; b) the ways in which officials exercise their remedial powers in such small 
societies, meaning in practice how operating within a small island society influences the 
exercise of such power; and c) the reasons why individuals involved in the water sector act in 
the ways they do by coming to know the visions that motivate their actions. To this end, the 
analytical toolbox (Fig. 12) to employed in the present study while diagnosing the water 
sector dysfunction in the Cyclades is based on understanding and explaining the following 
five pillars: 
1. Institutional structure (working rules), 
2. Remedial power of officials and its relation to smallness, 
3. Reasons for the actions of individuals, 
4. Influence of overlapping social relations and 
5. Manifestation of islandness. 
The theories examined so far suggest that working rules will be put in force via the 
remedial power of officials, and the public (water users) will generally react to these rules by 
either accepting or rejecting them. If the public find the working rules to be reasonable, then 
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they are likely to accept and implement it, whereas if they find them to be unreasonable, they 
may demand that they be changed, which could lead to institutional change.  
 
Figure 12: The analytical framework guiding the diagnosis of the water sector in the Cyclades 
Source: own compilation 
 
What we see in our case is that this circle is actually skewed when one takes into 
consideration the overlapping social relations prevailing in a small society, as is the case in 
the two small islands selected for this study. The boundaries between what constitutes a 
working rule and what not become blurry, and the personal beliefs of the officials – upon 
which their reasons for acting is based – become even more relevant, as it is not their 
hierarchical position but rather their relation to the recipients of the working rule that is likely 
to determine whether or not (or to which degree, or with how much flexibility) they will 
enforce a particular working rule.  
Having that in mind, when diagnosing the water sector in the Cyclades, we will need to be 
sensitive to the cultural aspect of water management, to the context in which it takes place. As 
such, we will need to understand the socio-economic and spatial setting and explain the 
behaviour of individual actors participating in the water sector in the Cyclades. The reasons 
for the current state of dysfunction there will thus be sought in the domain of transactions 
amongst actors, of working rules regulating those transactions, and officials’ remedial powers 
at all levels (national, regional and local), focusing foremost on island officials. 
At each stage of the water sector in the islands, there are transactions occurring (Fig.10). 
Between central officials and island officials (authoritative transactions), between officials at 
the islands (authorised and authoritative), between officials and the users (authoritative) and 
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between the physical and the social dimension of the action arena. It is difficult and very 
laborious to track each social (legal) transaction and particularly each nature-related 
transaction in such a complex social-ecological system such as an island complex. There are 
many different actors acting simultaneously and it is not always feasible to track down with 
exact action led to which exact transaction and its effect. Instead, this framework and this 
analysis is based on the explicit assumption that the physical transaction triggers the action 
arena and that there are multiple interdependencies between actors, institutions and 
transactions that go unobserved. What lays in the focus of this analysis is understanding the 
reason for key-actors’ behaviour, as it is only through understanding what motivates human 
action that we can offer prescriptions. It should be noted that in accordance with the abductive 
research strategy, which is the strategy selected for this study, the researcher engages in a 
“dialogue between data and theory” (Blaikie, 2010, p. 156) with the theory being developed 
and refined constantly. As a consequence, the analytical framework can only function as a 
construct bounding “inquiry and direct the attention of the analyst to critical features of the 
social and physical landscape” (Schlager, 1999, p. 234).  As I will explain in the next chapter 
on methods, arriving at a satisfactory explanation for the dysfunctional water sector in the 
Cyclades, that is, developing a theory on the dysfunction of the water sector, will require an 
iterative process, one in which data collection, analysis and theory building alternate.   
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4 Methods 
This chapter deals with the overall research strategy and design, the methodology and 
research methods employed, in order to answer the key concerns of this study, foremost being 
why the water sector in the Cyclades dysfunctional. Chapter 4 offers a comprehensive account 
of how data were collected, analysed and set in dialogue with the theoretical considerations 
developed in the course of conceptualising and carrying out the study.  
4.1 Research Strategy and Design  
 
For the purposes of this study, I have selected an abductive research strategy to guide the 
research process. Answering the question “why is the water sector in the Cyclades 
dysfunctional?” requires a deep understanding of the reasons behind the dysfunction, which 
includes touching upon the relationships and dependencies between actors and their socio-
ecological system. Understanding “is the exclusive preserve of the [a]bductive strategy” 
(Blaikie, 2010, p.105). 
Abduction – also referred to as a form diagnosis – is “a class of inference that yields 
explanatory hypotheses for observed phenomena” (Bromley, 2006, p. 96). With the abductive 
syllogism, one tries to explain the occurrence of a surprising event by creating and checking 
the plausibility of hypotheses. An abductive inquiry would commence with the observation of 
a surprising fact, one that is out of the ordinary. Let us call this suprising fact, C. The analyst 
would then go about developing various assumptions, or hypotheses – let us call them A – 
under which C (the surprising fact) would become a matter of fact, meaning it would not be 
out of the ordinary. In other words, using the abductive syllogism we can explore whether our 
hypotheses (A) can be seen as plausible explanations for the occurrence of the event in 
question (C). One can go far back as one wishes (or is able to) in trying to unravel the origin 
of the event such that the hypotheses (A) might end up becoming the event (C) in the next 
round of abduction.  
If we apply the abductive syllogism to our case, the water-sector dysfunction in the 
Cyclades, the surprising event (C) that has attracted our attention is the interrupted supply and 
insufficient quantity of water on Tinos and Syros, called here the “water-sector dysfunction”. 
Laws, bureaucracies and infrastructure are in place with the intention of securing 
uninterrupted water provision in sufficient quantity for the populace. So why aren’t they 
delivering properly? Here I test various assumptions/hypotheses (A), seeking to offer 
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plausible explanations for this dysfunction. Is it, for example, due to shortage of the natural 
resource itself? Is it actually the case that the natural resource is present in sufficient 
quantities but is not made available because of managerial problems? Is the infrastructure not 
able to cover the entire area of these islands? If it is a matter of insufficient infrastructure, 
then this hypothesis then becomes the surprising event that begs to be explained. 
Consequently, the new question to be answered would be: why then is infrastructure 
insufficient? 
As Blaikie notes, with the abductive syllogism “research becomes a dialogue between data 
and theory mediated by the researcher. Data are interpreted and reinterpreted in the light of 
emerging theory, and, as a result, change in the process” (2010:156). This inquiry (or 
“dialogue” in Blaikie’s terminology) needs to continue until the analyst comes to a plausible 
explanation or until his/her toolbox does not enable any further analysis and until satisfying 
answers have been arrived at. Thus, what is characteristic of the abductive research strategy is 
that is iterative, demanding that the researcher become immersed for alternate periods in the 
relevant social world (here, the water sector in the selected Cycladic islands) and then 
withdraw from it for reflection and analysis. Data collection is done in distinct phases, 
allowing the researcher time to understand what has been observed, formulate plausible 
explanations (hypotheses) for it, and then return to the social world under study to refine the 
derived hypotheses.   
It seems logical, then, to adopt the case study approach as the method for selecting sources 
of data on the social world under study for this research. There are numerous ways one can 
regard case studies:  as a type of research design, as involving (usually) qualitative research 
methods, and finally as “a method of selecting the source of data” (Blaikie, 2010: 186).  It is 
upon the last perspective that my own understanding and use of case-study is grounded. As 
Stake proposes, the “[c]ase study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be 
studied” (2005, p. 443). As such, and based upon the abductive syllogism, the site of the case 
study then becomes the social world that may provide relevant clues for, in this particular 
case, unravelling the reasons for the water-sector dysfunction in the Cyclades.  
4.2 The Case Studies 
 
In section 3.5, I concluded that the investigation being presented here needs to focus on 
collecting data regarding actor actions, beliefs and motivations (on all levels), the 
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relationships between actors across levels (national and local) and the working rules that 
influence their scope of discretion. The two case studies (presented in detail in chapter 2.2) 
were selected as the “sources of data” for various reasons. First, Syros is the administrative 
capital of the Cyclades island complex and, as such, the seat of the majority of administrative 
organisations. Its water-related particularity is that it practically has no fresh water reservoirs 
and is exclusively dependent on costly desalination plants for its potable water needs as well 
as on increasingly expensive to drill salinized water for irrigation.  Tinos, on the other hand, 
just 20km away from Syros as the crow flies, is a relatively water-sufficient island compared 
to others in the Cyclades, with agriculture being a dominant activity. Nonetheless, water 
quality concerns have been raised regarding the safety of the municipal water network, which 
adds a safety dimension to its particular dysfunction. Like Syros – and indeed like almost all 
the Cycladic islands – Tinos is increasingly relying on desalination plants.  
Both cases studies are, I believe, representative in terms of the conditions necessary to 
characterise the water-sector dysfunction of the region: insufficient quantity, questionable 
quality and high prices. Given their proximity to each other, it also made the iterative 
collection of data feasible from an economic point of view, as it allowed me to frequently 
travel between the two islands.  
The collection of empirical data was realised in three distinct phases. The first field visit 
was an exploratory one, conducted in July 2013, followed by a deeper and much more 
focused interview round in April of 2014 and, finally, the most “refined” and intensive 
interview round conducted in December of 2014. 
4.2.1 Initial Sources of Evidence 
 
Before going into the field it was important, as spelled out in the analytical framework in 
section 4.2 to collect information on working rules and on the reasons for actor’s behaviour. 
This can be obtained from two sources: from documents and from accounts of actors involved 
in the water sector in the selected cases.  
The first source (documents) comprises of legal documents indicating actors responsible 
for the water sector, setting legal rules regulating water use and protection, as well as rights to 
access to water and establishing the legal framework for transactions to take place. They also 
define the jurisdiction of administrative organisations operating in the Cyclades. By-laws and 
decrees were also considered in the document review conducted. Scientific publications on 
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the water sector of Cyclades were also considered, as well as information and expert opinions 
published in the media.  
The review process offered a general understanding of water sector in the Cyclades, 
clarified the division of tasks and jurisdictions among different level of administration and 
clarified who the major and pertinent actors for this study were. Table 15 illustrates the 
officials identified as pertinent actors by the analysed documents.   
Table 15: Officials operating in Cyclades 
Officials 
Ministry of the Environment and Energy
8
  
Special Secretariat of Water  
Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food  
Water Directorate of South Aegean  
Prefecture of South Aegean  
Municipalities (of Syros and Tinos) 
Municipal Water and Drainage Company of Syros 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 16 depicts the main water user groups identified as pertinent actors in Cyclades. 
Table 16: Major water user groups in the Cyclades 
Main Water Users 
Agricultural Associations 
Hotel and other touristic lodging owners 
Individual households 
Source: Own compilation 
4.2.2 The Iterative Cycle of Interviewing and Theorising 
 
The first phase of the empirical work on this thesis which took place in July 2013
9
 was an 
exploratory one, whose aim was to roughly map out the problem at hand, verify that the 
                                                          
8
 It is very common in Greece that each new government reforms and restructures the ministries.  At the 
time of the empirical data collection, the ministries had a different name and jurisdictions.  Ministries and 
official organisations will be presented here with the name and jurisdictions they currently (March 2017) have. 
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problem that the researcher perceived as important (the dysfunction of the water sector) based 
on the literature review conducted, was indeed an actual, existing one which was of 
importance to the actors and the inhabitants of the islands. To this end, I visited both islands 
and had informal and non-recorded discussions with some officials and water users 
(households, small business, and agricultural users). It became clear from the discussions that 
there were indeed concerns about the provision in the islands, in terms of quality, quantity and 
cost, shared by everyone I talked with. The dysfunction was verified. 
After returning to my office, I revisited the literature, in light of the newly verified 
dysfunction. The next step was to look for possible reasons for the dysfunction. These reasons 
could be grounded at physical or social traits of the water sector in the Cyclades, or most 
likely at a combination of both. Maybe the municipal water network was damaged, or did not 
cover the whole geographical expand of the islands. Maybe desalination plants were 
functioning below their capacity. Maybe water needs for tourism were greater than the ones 
the network could provide for. Or maybe users were simply wasting water, by consuming too 
much it. Maybe the municipalities overcharged for water, or charged too little.  
These questions, together with others dealing with the different tasks each agency was 
charged with regarding managing the water sector were the focus of the second phase of the 
empirical work, taking place in April 2014. A first sketch of the analytical framework was 
drawn, and questions also included the applicability and suitability of European directives and 
national laws to the island context. Most of the interviews were conducted with officials at 
both islands, looking at the way the implement rules and regulations regarding water 
management. A few interviews were conducted with officials in Athens, the national capital.  
What surfaced as a crucial determinant of the officials’ behaviour was their perception of 
the rules and regulations as appropriate to the local island context: the spatiality of the case 
studies, the islandness emerged as a defining factor.  Furthermore, there was a difference in 
way in which national and local officials prioritised water management, or rather in the way 
in which it was related to other aspects of social and economic life in the islands. National 
officials tended to be more objective/goal oriented, referring to the need to meet national 
obligations towards various European bodies, or fines that Greece is paying for failure to meet 
required goals. Local officials on the other hand, were relating water shortages or water 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
9
 There was an even earlier empirical round, in May 2012, which included a field visit and interviews in the 
Balearic Islands in Spain. At that time, the focus of the study was on the impact of the EU’s Water Framework 
Directive on the water sector in small European islands. Following that field work, the focus was further refined 
and specified on the Greek Cyclades Islands alone, allowing for in-depth understanding of the problem at hand.  
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quality concerns much more to issues pertinent to the local (island) level rather than 
(inter)national ones. Actors at the national level have a different understanding what the 
dysfunction is and how it should be rectified, compared to the understanding held by the local 
officials.  
It became then apparent in the course of that phase of the empirical work and also later 
during the reflection, that diagnosing (and subsequently rectifying) the dysfunction would 
require incorporating the island nature of the case studies: how islands societies operate as 
small societies, are influencing what an official can and cannot do (or finds it difficult to do, 
as we have seen in chapter 3. Institutions were coming together with small societies and 
islandness
10
. By this time it was also clear that the dysfunction was not grounded on a poorly-
maintained set of infrastructures; making sure the infrastructures work (updating municipal 
network, or making sure that spare parts were quickly available for the desalination plants) 
would not solve the problem, because it went deeper than that. The dysfunction was strongly 
related to the actions/behaviour of the officials.  
A further enrichment of the conceptual toolbox to include island geographies, island 
studies and small societies’ studies, led to the development of the final analytical framework, 
in which smallness is related to the remedial power of the officials, and the influence of 
overlapping social relations are added.    
The third and final empirical phase took place in December 2014, where interviews 
focused on the remedial power of the officials were conducted. Emphasis was also given to 
the multiple roles of officials at the local level, and their beliefs. Of course water users were 
interviewed as well, mainly focusing on what and how and by whom they thought was 
possible to change in the water sector. 
Returning from the field and reflecting on information acquired during that time, it became 
clear that there rectifying the water sector in the Cyclades would take more than just ensuring 
that local officials implement rules and regulations coming from the national level. We will 
be discussing this on detail in chapter 5.  
 
 
                                                          
10
 As mentioned in chapter 4, island and small societies are used interchangeably in this study.  
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4.2.3 Field Research Protocol  
Before each field trip, an interview guide was prepared, first in English to make sure that all 
pertinent theoretical concepts were included and then translated into Greek, in a more 
“empirical language” (Blaikie, 2010), with which the interviewees could more easily relate.  
Interviews were planned as in-depth, so as to allow the respondents to express their beliefs, 
and interpretations of the status and future of the water sector and to freely elaborate on issues 
their perceived as important. An in-depth interview allows for a free flow of conversation 
between interviewer and interviewee and for the emergence of other topics that might be of 
relevance (Yin, 1994). Indeed, it is precisely because this format of the interviews (providing 
rich and detailed information on topics that were not covered in the interview guide) that 
allowed for the iterative theoretical refinement of the research focus. 
There were three different sets of interview guides prepared, each corresponding to a 
distinct empirical phase. There was a common structure of the interview guide, with questions 
common for all interviewees which was complemented by specialised questions for different 
actors (users of different economic sectors, local and national officials). A template of the last 
interview guide, used in December 2014, is seen in Table 17.  In all three empirical phase, a 
research journal was kept in which notes were taken regarding things that stack out; maybe an 
interviewee was reluctant to answer a specific question, or maybe on that day something 
particular happened that might influence the interviewee’s responses. The journal was useful 
in the analysis of the interviews.  
Table 17: Sample interview guide for the third empirical phase 
Focus Interview question 
Quality and quantity 
concerns / defining 
the problem 
Do you think there is a water problem in the Cyclades islands? If yes, in which 
respect? 
Do you think there is a water problem in the specific island? If yes, in which 
respect? 
How important is this water problem
11
 in comparison with other problems 
facing the island? 
How, in your opinion, was the problem created? 
What is being done to rectify it? By whom? Do you think this is sufficient? 
According to your opinion, what should be done to rectify the problem? 
                                                          
11
 Problem here refers to the problem identified by the interviewee as important. 
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Policies and 
regulations 
Could you briefly describe the water management policy in Greece? 
Do you believe that current policies are sufficient to address the problem you 
described? 
Why, do you think, are policies as they are? 
Policy 
implementation 
and Remedial 
Power 
How are pertinent policies developed? Who is involved in the process? Are 
you? 
Do you think you are in a position to influence the design and/or 
implementation of the policies? 
In your opinion, are policies implemented as they should?  
Are your actions monitored? By whom? How often? Are there sanctions? 
Do you monitor others? Who? How often? Are there sanctions?  
Are you satisfied with the communication you have with central agencies and 
local actors? If not, what would you like to change? Why?  
Do you cooperate with other officials / actors? If yes, are you satisfied with 
your cooperation? If not, how would you like it to change? 
Thinking about your field of action, would you say that you are able to perform 
and behave as you would you like to? If not, what would like to change? 
Could you briefly describe what your tasks are? How are your tasks defined?  
Are you able to perform all your tasks as you should? Is there something you 
would like to change in your tasks and the way you perform them? 
What is for you a successfully performed task?  
If you could do anything, how would you rectify the water sector dysfunctions? 
What are the necessary steps forward?  
Source: Own compilation 
 
In accordance with research ethics, each interviewee was given a project information sheet 
(Appendix 1) and an informed consent form (Appendix 2) to read and sign. If it was possible, 
the project information sheet was sent in advance via e-mail so that the interviewee had time 
to go through it and think about any issues that might have been of concern. The informed 
consent form functions as a sort of contractual agreement between the researcher and the 
interviewee. The interviewee, having being sufficiently informed about the project, consents 
to give information via an interview, and the researcher consents to ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality in the treatment of and use of the information obtained (Stupak, 2014).  
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4.3 Field Research 
 
This section provides a detailed account of the context of empirical (research, of the 
interview process in itself and of the results obtained from it. 
4.3.1 Rich Context of Empirical Research 
“Context has been a central concern in qualitative inquiry from the start” (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 2004, p. 297, cited in Stupak, 2014). One of the basic premises of the analytical 
considerations underpinning this study is the habituation of individuals. We are conditioned 
by the working rules (institutions) of the society we operate in. It is important therefore to 
understand the context in which the actors live and behave, if we are to understand them, to 
interpret their messages in an informed and meaningful manner. This is particularly important 
when an interviewee tries to avoid responding to a question, or respond in an unsatisfactory 
way. Most importantly though, understanding the context enhances the researchers sensitivity 
and empathy with the interviewee regarding certain issues, and establishes a connection to the 
interviewee who might subsequently be more open to discussing sensitive issues. The 
research journal kept during the field trips supported the enrichment of the understanding of 
the context.  
What is crucial in the understanding of the Cycladic context is that the data collection took 
place during the –ongoing- financial crisis and the harsh austerity in Greece. The crisis has 
deeply and profoundly shaped the context, not only in the two selected islands, but indeed in 
the whole country. All interviewees, without an exception, referred to the crisis at best as a 
barrier to any efforts done to rectify the water sector, but most commonly as a reason for its 
deterioration. As such, it is important that the reader understands what the interviewees mean 
when they refer to “the crisis” and what possible effects it has on the behaviour of actors. 
It was –and still is- a period of political instability in the country, and most of all of doubt 
and mistrust to the political establishment. The three Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) 
between the Troika and Greece have had dire effects on the social fabric of Greece, on its 
economy and on the trust of the citizens to the political establishment ruling the country. 
Unemployment soared to over 30%, people at risk of poverty at over 33% and the GDP is 
shrinking (Eurostat, 2016). The drastic reduction of salaries and wages combined with a 
shrinking local demand and the excessive taxation of lower and middle class led to an 
increase of the public debt (Argitis and Michopoulou, 2012).  
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At the same time, the structural reform programmes heavily promote privatisations. So far, 
the country’s biggest commercial and tourist ports have been privatised, international and 
peripheral airports, telecommunication companies, as well as part of the electricity company.  
The water and sewage utilities of big cities (Athens -- EYDAP and Thessaloniki –EYATH) 
have already been partly privatised, although the country’s highest court ruled their 
privatisation unconstitutional and ordered the Utilities being brought back into full public 
control. The subsidiary of EYDAP (EYDAP Nison – Island EYDAP) that is responsible for 
water provisioning of the Cyclades islands is on the list of the public utility companies to be 
privatised, further causing rifts in the already shaken trust of citizens to the national 
government.  
Post-dictatorship Greek governments were formed almost in rotation by (the conservative) 
ND and (the social-democratic) PASOK that secured electoral wins with vote shares around 
40% each, at any elections. This was the case until the elections of 2012, the first one since 
the first Memorandum of Understanding and the subsequent austerity measures. PASOK, the 
ruling party at the time, saw its vote share plummet from 44% in October 2009 to 13% in 
May 2012. New Democracy (ND) gathered half of what it used to. The smaller parties of the 
left, and SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) in particular, absorbed dissatisfied voters 
from the two (former) major parties. SYRIZA, from a 3% party saw its percentage drastically 
increased to 16% in the May and to 27% in the June elections.  Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 
(2014) caution however against assuming that this shift is attributed solely to a punishment of 
the ruling party by the electorate. They argue that what happened to the Greek electorate goes 
deeper than that. They identified “open hostility towards the political class and specifically 
toward the two major parties” (op.cit, p. 2). This hostility can be attributed to two main 
factors. The first one is that the electorate was concerned about ceding sovereignty in key 
policy areas to institutions non-elected by it and held the ruling parties responsible for that 
(Teperoglou and Tsatsanis, 2014).  The second is the rejection of the politics of inevitable and 
of the “security discourse” (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2013). According to this rhetoric, an urgent 
threat is evoked by governments as a way to deflect blame attribution when harsh measures 
are to be implemented. These measures are presented as the only way to survive the 
existential threat. In the 2012 elections a big percentage of the electorate did not accept the 
government’s rhetoric and was unsympathetic to the “lesser of two evils” argumentation.   
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The 2012 elections (May and June) led to the formation of a coalition government between 
PASOK, ND and Democratic Left, a small left party. During this period the second MoU is 
signed and more austerity measures are implemented.   
Elections are called for the 25
th
 of January, 2015, just weeks after the final empirical phase 
of the PhD. It was anticipated that SYRIZA would win the elections with a big margin with 
the mandate to put an end to the austerity and to cancel the MoU. As the party leader, and 
later Prime Minister was saying, SYRIZA would cancel out the MoU with one law. This had 
generated great expectations in many of the officials interviewed at that time who were 
undergoing an admittedly unfair evaluation, according to which certain quota (25%) of civil 
servants had to be evaluated as performing poorly, regardless of their actual performance, and 
thus be dismissed from work, in order to save on public spending.   
The empirical phase ended before the elections. This is important to note, because the 
weeks before the elections was perhaps the time where the Greek citizens were most 
optimistic about the prospects for a positive change in the future, an optimism that seeped 
through the interviews as well.   
What followed the elections of January 2015 were monthly negotiations between the Greek 
government and the international lenders over ending austerity, or modifying it, cutting the 
national debt, until in July 2015 the government brought the end result of the negotiations to 
the electorate. With a referendum, the first one to take place in Greece after the abolishment 
of the dictatorship, the electorate would decide whether or not the proposed measures would 
be accepted by the government or not. Although the proposed measures were rejected with a 
62% majority, the government accepted the new austerity package.  
This has been a catastrophic hit for Greek democracy and on the collective psyche.  As 
Morales et al (2014) note “[d]emocracy is generally associated with the capacity of citizens to 
control political choices, a control manifested in the theoretical responsibility of elected 
representatives toward those they represent and in their obligation to publicly justify the 
decisions they make” (op.cit. p. 441). This capacity of citizens took a severely hit after the 
referendum.  Teperoglou and Tsatsanis (2014) report on satisfaction with democracy and trust 
towards national and European political institutions. Already in 2011 satisfaction with 
democracy in Greece had fallen to “historically low levels” (op. cited p.6).  Trust in national 
government, parties, the parliament and the European Union plummeted. Studies have yet to 
be conducted to document the effect of the overruling of the referendum (one of the most 
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direct means of democracy) on the trust towards the government or democracy but it is safe to 
assume that it will be at even lower levels at those recorded in 2011.   
The last point, the trust of citizens on democracy (their capacity to control political 
choices) was one that emerged in the interviews often and we can see that democracy and 
trust to the political regime has been an important concern for the interviewees, even before 
the referendum.  
4.3.2 The Interview Process 
The list of potential interviewees was at first compiled based on the document review and 
further on enriched by an internet search on which agencies were responsible for water 
management in the Cyclades and who the biggest users are. It was later on enriched and 
further refined with each empirical phase. The most common and preferred way of 
establishing a contact with a potential interviewee was by phone, usually upon referral by 
another interviewee. Alternatively an e-mail was sent, but this was not very common.  
It was observed that local actors were very keen on having their points of view heard and 
getting an appointment with them was usually very easy, and the interviews would last for at 
least an hour, with many interviews lasting over two hours. On the other hand, national actors 
based in Athens were somewhat reticent to disclose any information that went beyond what 
was available on-line on their agencies’ website and interviews with them rarely exceeded 
thirty minutes.   
All interviews were intended to be face-to-face, but one was made exclusively by e-mail, 
while three more where initially made face-to-face but then other questions emerged and were 
followed by e-mail interviews. One of those face-to-face interviews had to be interrupted due 
to prior engagements of the interviewee. One more e-mail interview was arranged but the 
interviewee never responded.  
After having read the Project Information Sheet, the interviewee was asked to read and 
sign the Informed Consent Form, which without exception, everyone did. One national actor 
was sceptical about the transparency of the project and whether or not their anonymity would 
be ensured, but at the end they too signed the Informed Consent Form. After that, the 
interviewee would be asked whether or not they would consent to having the interview 
recorded, in order to help the researcher in the analysis. All but one interviewee in Athens 
accepted.  
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Upon completion of the interviews, the researcher’s notes were noted down in the research 
journal. These included the time and place of the interview, conversation flow, reactions of 
the interviewee in a specific topic, information that stood out as extraordinary and that ought 
to be followed up by the researcher, as well as self-evaluation on the researcher.  
In total 30 in-depth interviews were conducted (see Table 18), without counting the follow-
up interviews via e-mail or phone. 
Table 18: Interviews conducted by the author 
Seat Authority Interviews 
Athens Special Secretariat of Water 3 
Athens Ministry of Agriculture 2 
Syros  Water Directorate of South Aegean 5 
Syros  Prefecture of South Aegean 4 
Tinos Municipality 5 
Syros Municipal Water and Drainage Company 2 
Syros Agricultural Association 2 
Tinos Domestic Water Users 3 
Tinos Legal Experts 2 
Syros Touristic Users (owners) 2 
Total 30 
Source: Own compilation 
4.4 Ethical Considerations 
Researchers face ethical issues at every phase of their research. An important ethical 
consideration of concern during this study was ensuring the anonymity of the interviewees. 
This study clearly names the two selected islands, as the research design depends on the rich 
case description and the deep understanding of the local context. If one of the islands were not 
the administrative capital, it would have been possible to name the two Islands “Island A” and 
“Island B”. Since this is not the case (there can be only one capital after all), the option of 
anonymising the role held by the interviewees was preferred.  
Interestingly, with the exception of two officials in national agencies, none of the other 
interviewees explicitly expressed any desire to remain anonymous. In fact, some of them said 
they would have no problem if their names would appear on this dissertation or subsequent 
publications that would stem from it.  However, as some of the information obtained in the 
Chapter 4: Methods 
74 
 
interviews was quite personal or could only be obtained by the specific interviewee, and in 
accordance with research ethics, all interviews were anonymised. This is easier said than 
done, since one of the particularities of these islands are, as mentioned in previous chapters, 
precisely their small societies, which means that officials are very easy to recognise based on 
their position. There is only one director of a specific agency as there is only one agricultural 
association. To avoid revealing the identity of the interviewees, their position will not be 
mentioned, where possible. Instead, terms such as “high-ranking official” or “member of the 
agricultural association” will be used, even though even this does not guarantee full 
anonymity.  
4.5 Data Analysis 
All interviews were transcribed using F4 software, and then analysed with the Atlas.ti 
software which can support the analysis of such large qualitative information in text format, 
such as transcriptions of interviews. The analysis was done by a) reading all the transcriptions 
once to get a general grasp and then b) re-reading them and assigning codes to segments of 
statements, c) identifying causal links between the (dys)function of the water sector and the 
behaviour of the officials and water users and finally) concluding on the reason for the 
dysfunction of the water sector.  
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5  Results 
5.1 The Water Sector’ Dysfunction According to the Actors.  
 
 “What I know is that every official, every administration, interprets the legislation as they 
like”. (Interview 1) 
Identifying who is responsible for what concerning water governance on Syros and Tinos 
has proved an elusive task, one that not even key officials were easily able to shed light on
12
. 
A law, for example, is commonly updated by numerous bylaws, such as common ministerial 
orders (CMO) published in the Government Gazette (FEK), or more often than not a new law 
is passed without having first rendered the previous one obsolete, leading to a confusing 
situation where multiple laws are in effect over the same issue, often negating each other. 
There is a Greek term for this phenomenon – polynomothesia13 – which carries the meaning 
of multiple, complex and often contradictory legislation. It is then up to the officials who are 
called to implement these laws and regulations to understand the institutional context, 
translate it and then explain it to those concerned.  Through this process, the officials 
articulate the will of the state and thus become its embodiment.  
An elected regional official (Interview 1) made special mention about the process of 
acquiring an installation permit for a small-scale floating desalination unit for a very small 
island, which would relieve its current water stress during the summer months. The 
installation permit alone required the fulfilment of over 70 conditions, issued in 69 different 
Government Gazettes (FEK). This means that at least 69 different common ministerial orders 
were issued, regulating the installation of one small floating desalination unit of 150 cubic 
meters. Acquiring the installation permit took over two years and, at the time of the 
interview
14
, the regional office had been waiting for months for an archaeologist to visit the 
island because, according to one of the FEKs, installation of the floating desalination unit can 
only proceed with the presence of an archaeologist.  
A comparatively simplified illustration of how polynomothesia hinders the work of 
officials and, hence, prevents not only attempts to rectify the water sector but even prevents 
officials from understanding their own responsibilities is the process for issuing permits for 
                                                          
12
 For a comprehensive list of key actors and jurisdictions, refer to Table 8, p. 21 
13
 Polynomothesia: poly = many + nomothesia = legislation.  
14
 May 2014 
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water use, as required by CMO 145026/2014
15
. Through this common ministerial order 
(CMO), a National Registry of Water Abstraction Sites (NRWAS) was set up, requiring that 
all water abstraction activities are to be registered upon being granted a permit. According to 
the legislation, it is the responsibility of the Prefecture to issue fines in cases of breaches of 
law, such as illegal water abstraction. But when asked about it, many actors reported that this 
was not the case in practice as, according to a recent bylaw, the Devolved Administration of 
South Aegean now had that responsibility:  
“A few days ago, an official from the Prefecture came to my office and told me this 
jurisdiction is not ours any longer, it’s the Devolved Administration’s now because the law 
changed. So, we took all our rulings and sent them to the Devolved Administration. This is 
ridiculous, it causes serious problems”. (Interview 1)  
The administrative reform of 2010 (Kallikratis) further exacerbated the confusion over 
jurisdictions, as newly formed administrative units were named after old ones but without 
having the same jurisdictions. An example is the authority known as “Prefecture”. In the old 
administrative setup, Prefecture referred to what is now called an Administrative Region
16
, a 
branch of the central government which retains many of the old administrative unit’s 
jurisdictions. Following the Kallikratis, now Prefecture refers to a new form of 
administration, composed of elected officials.  
As one official said, “Prefecture here, Prefecture there. It is confusing even for us who are 
involved in it. We couldn’t make sense of it at first. Imagine what this did to the citizen. I think 
this just finished off the citizens”. (Interview 2)  It is worth mentioning that, even during the 
interviews with officials in the Special Secretariat of Water in Athens, officials were still 
referring to the now-obsolete old Prefecture and disregarding the elected Prefecture, 
established in 2010.  
Another appointed official in Tinos put it thus: “So at some point there is a mixing up of 
jurisdictions with Kallikratis that we still haven’t figured out what and how things should be 
done. And it’s a whole mess”. (Interview 3) She further noted that, following the reform, she 
now has “a network of people in municipalities in the Cyclades that I call to exchange 
interpretations, ask how did you do it”, because the legislation is so confusing, and in her 
organisation there is no legal expert to clarify such issues for the officials. In this vein, an 
                                                          
15
 Published in the Government Gazette: ΦΕΚ 2878/Β/27102014 
16
 In this thesis, I opted for the term Prefecture instead of Administrative Region, as it is the term readers 
most likely will be more familiar with. 
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issue that surfaced several times during the interviews in relation to interpretation of the legal 
framework is a lack of personnel qualified to do exactly that:  interpret and translate complex 
and often contradictory working rules. Although it has been foreseen in the organisational 
plans for all authorities throughout the nation that they would have at least one legal expert, 
there is in fact no one employed in the whole of the Cyclades for this post (Interview 4). One 
official in Syros said about his dealings with the current legislation have made him 
“paranoid” (Interview 1).  
Difficulty in deciphering the currently revised working rules is not the only grievance of 
local and regional officials. Their inability to influence policies gives them a “sense of 
helplessness” (Interviews 2 and 5), and it is easy to see that there is a clear top-down setup 
that allows little space for voices to be heard.  
Yet, the officials in Athens don’t seem to share the islanders’ bafflement.  From early on, it 
became apparent that the officials in the Special Secretariat for Water in Athens were not keen 
on sharing their experiences with me.  Appointments were postponed and even cancelled on 
the spot. Unlike in the authorities on the islands, there was indeed a legal expert in the 
organisation, who was not persuaded of the validity of the questions I had posed and left 
within five minutes into the interview. The people I did talk to mentioned that there is no 
problem with coordination between the national (Athens) and local (island) levels. They 
specifically mentioned the Prefecture
17
 as a “basic actor” in preparing the River Basin 
Management Plans for the Cyclades, as required by the imposition of the EU’s Water 
Framework Directive. Specifically, the official said that “we have a very close cooperation 
and communication on a daily basis. Not only in regards to the management plans but also on 
many issues” (Interview 6).  
At the time of my field visit, the central officials in Athens were overseeing preparation of 
the river basin management plans for the Cyclades, as required by the European Water 
Framework Directive (WFD). The management plans were to include a state-of-the-art 
overview of water resource status, pressures and challenges upon which management 
measures would be prescribed. Acquiring data for groundwater was assigned to a national 
agency which, according to some interviewees, had either incomplete or outdated data, the 
reason for which was that there was no data registry in that agency, as every official worked 
on their own field and was not obliged to share data with others. What is more, upon their 
retirement, officials would not hand over their data to younger colleagues. As one interviewee 
                                                          
17
 In fact, they meant the Devolved Administration and not the elected Prefecture.  
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put it, “It’s a misfortune in the sense that there are people who left that agency, retired 
colleagues, older, and they did not inform their juniors. Or there were not any juniors to start 
with, there was a gap. So the experience was not transferred from the old generation to the 
new” (Interview 7). This reluctance and hesitance to share information was confirmed by 
various interviewees in different agencies.  
To a large extent, the data used in the management plan are already secondary in the sense 
that they were not collected by the agency but rather taken from existing sources, rendering it 
outdated.  Reasons for the lack of primary data collection are – according to some 
interviewees – that the agency is understaffed as well as the fact that the agency does not 
seem to cooperate closely with local officials who have a deeper and more detailed 
knowledge of local resources and conditions (Interviews 6,7 and 12). As one official in 
Athens commented, the management plan “should have been done by authorities at the 
islands, but that was not a possibility so it was done centrally” (Interview 6).  
The central officials in Athens – the ones who at the end of the day will actually be 
designing the nation’s policies – are disconnected from the reality of the islands. They use 
outdated secondary water data and, although they are in contact with local authorities, they 
communicate in a hierarchical manner, as suggestions from local authorities are not taken up 
by central ones.  
Perhaps though, the problem does not lie in the administration in Athens or in the 
Cyclades. Perhaps the water sector is dysfunctional because water users are careless in their 
water consumption. It might be that locals working in the tourism sector are unaware of the 
challenges or that agricultural producers use water-intensive technologies and crops. To 
explore to what degree these statements were true, I interviewed domestic water users, hotel 
owners and farmers on both islands. What can be said without any doubt is that all of the 
individuals interviewed were well aware of the existing water scarcity and tried their best to 
make the best of the situation.  
A hotel owner in Syros mentioned that her water consumption (and therefore also water 
bill) was very high because “I can’t expect people from Scandinavia, for example, to know 
about water scarcity here, and I can’t be the water police and tell them don’t do this and 
don’t do that. People come here to relax.” (Interview 8). What she did though, was to 
establish a common kitchen, where she does not allow her guests to do the dishes. She does 
them herself instead, because her way of doing them required very small amounts of water. 
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“One does what one needs to do” (Interview 8). What both hotel owners did, both on Syros 
and Tinos, was to install toilets with controlled flow and place a sticker in bathrooms 
requesting guests to save on water.  They inform their guests that tap water is potable but it 
might taste strange and, therefore, they always keep complimentary bottled water in the 
rooms’ fridge for their guests. At home, they were both much more conscious of their water 
use and they saved water wherever they could. When asked whether they thought things could 
improve in the near future, both were rather pessimistic. One hotel owner said:  
 “They say things will get worse, with climate change. And it doesn’t rain as much as it 
used to. And our politicians still work with the same mentality as decades ago. No, things will 
not get better” (Interview 9).  
Domestic users were much more critical than hotel owners. Trust –or the lack thereof – 
was a topic which often emerged in the interviews.  On Tinos, they often talked about not 
trusting the municipal network because of the oxidised asbestos pipes. The municipality runs 
regular tests and quite often issues no-use warnings, a fact that further reinforces the belief of 
the domestic users that the municipal water is generally unsafe for consumption. Even though 
the aged network is slowly being replaced by new asbestos-free pipes, the mistrust remains, 
even within the municipality. “I never give tap water to my children”, an official from Tinos 
said (Interview 3), and a colleague of hers who was listening to our discussion nodded his 
head.  On Syros, some domestic users “use bottled water even to cook” (Interview 13) and 
there are even special delivery services that deliver boxes of bottled water to houses and pick 
up the empty bottles. Desalinated water “tastes funny, unnatural. It’s ok to cook in it, but not 
to drink it” (Interview 13).   
 A high ranking official on Syros said that desalinated water is an “acquired taste. It tastes 
funny at the beginning, but of course it’s safe for people to drink. But this is where we come 
in. We should conduct campaigns telling people it’s safe. I mean, they are paying for it 
anyway! The water is desalinated whether they consume it or not. Why waste it? Especially 
since it’s safe” (interview 4).  We see here that desalinated water is in a way a lost 
opportunity, if people do not use it.  
Agricultural producers cannot use desalinated water though. It is too expensive to use for 
irrigation. Instead, they drill wells and pump groundwater out of the aquifers. This comes at a 
cost, of course, since as groundwater levels get lower, farmers need to drill deeper to get 
water, which is itself of suboptimal quality because of seawater intruding in aquifers. As a 
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way to minimise costs and improve quality, some farmers on Syros collect rainwater during 
the winter and mix it with groundwater (Interview 9). The farmers’ association in Syros has 
proposed that they re-use water from the wastewater treatment plant, which is now discharged 
in the sea upon treatment. 
 “They literally throw water away! We are thirsty, in a matter of speech, and they are 
throwing water away! We went to them many times before the elections, telling them look, it’s 
not that expensive to set a pipe network bringing water up north to us. We will produce more 
and of better quality. Syros will benefit from it! And nothing happens”. (Interview 9). 
 A farmer said that they were willing to go to seminars, to be organised by the regional 
authorities to train farmers in cultivating less water-intense varieties (like aloe vera) that 
would sell for a good price, but “we can’t fund them ourselves, we need support, which we 
don’t get”.  
An elected official in Syros corroborated the concern raised by the farmer about re-using 
treated water, saying that the reason it doesn’t work is because of budget constraints.  
5.2. The Remedial Power of Island Officials: How it is exercised 
In the previous section, I offered an overview of how officials in Athens and on the islands as 
well as water users perceive the water sector and their role in it. Here I provide a more 
analytical account of the transactions occurring among officials and between officials and 
users.  
5.2.1 Transactions Between Central Agencies and Island Agencies 
According to views expressed in the interviews by officials from the two islands and in 
Athens, the only officials who believe that there is sufficient communication, interaction and 
cooperation between central and island authorities, are those in Athens, which speaks volumes 
about the quality of interaction and its direction.  “We have a very good and tight cooperation, 
of course. On a daily basis, for many and various topics, not only the management plans”, a 
central official said regarding the cooperation with island authorities. Yet, although a regional 
official in Syros corroborated the fact that they do talk frequently with colleagues in Athens, it 
was usually merely to clarify legislation and not to voice their own opinions or suggest new 
policy measures.  
Elected island officials were disheartened by the “dominant political culture in Greece” 
(Interview 1 and 14). One of them went on to say that, at the “governmental level, and I have 
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said this many times, there is an organised attempt to devalue local administration. So, our 
politicians, and when I say politicians I mean the legislators, constantly devalue local 
administration. And local administration is an important tool!” (Interview 1). He continued 
by explaining that “they believe that the more jurisdictions they keep to themselves in Athens 
and the fewer they give to decentralised local administration, the more they can control the 
citizens”. 
But this disappointment is not limited to elected officials or to relatively low-level 
officials. High-ranking officials with whom several Ministries are supposed to have close and 
good relationships expressed their feelings of abandonment and helplessness, grounded 
mostly on the one-way communication style of the Athens officials and the belief that they 
are “not being heard and taken seriously” (quote from interview 2, corroborated by 
interviews 4, 7 and 14). One particular official said that on several occasions he had sent 
proposals to several ministries and agencies when, for example, the town building code was 
being reviewed or when policy proposals were made public for deliberation. “We saw a 
window of opportunity there, you know? If we could get our proposal through then things 
would be improved” (Interview 4), he explained. His proposal included making underground 
rainwater retention cisterns obligatory for all new construction on the islands, and his agency 
calculated that winter precipitation would be sufficient to meet most of the domestic needs of 
the permanent island population during summer, thus minimising pressures on groundwater 
and the need for expensive desalination plants. “Other places with similar scarcity have it. In 
the USA, in Australia”, he pointed out and then asking “Why not us? Why pay so much money 
when the solution is here, in front of us? Some few people install such cisterns but it’s on their 
own initiative and with no financial support, you know? And we can’t rely on people’s 
initiatives. And a few cisterns won’t change the situation”.   
His proposal was left unanswered on all occasions.  We see here an attempt by island 
officials to engage in a rationing transaction, to provide a remedy upstream in the direction of 
the central administration. The official (along with colleagues from the agency) argued in 
favour of their proposal, but they could not convince the legally superior party to adopt it; 
they were not powerful enough to force the others within a presently existing legal situation.  
The same official – who has many years of experience in water management on the islands 
– also offered insights about the way large infrastructure projects are planned, constructed and 
maintained.  In accordance with the dominant hydraulic paradigm of the past decades, 
relatively large dams were constructed by the Athens-based Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) on 
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the majority of the Cycladic Islands. According to the relevant legislation, dams could be 
constructed by the MoA only for agricultural and not for domestic use
18
. What is interesting 
to note here is that there was a tacit agreement between all agencies and officials involved that 
the MoA would fund and construct dams, in theory to be used for agricultural use; in reality, 
however, the bulk volume of water collected in the dams has been fed into the municipal 
network for domestic use.  
In sum, it would be difficult to say that all was well that amongst the MoA and the island 
officials. “Personally I like the people there,” said one island official, “they know what they 
are doing in their field. But their job is their own, you know? They just come up one day with 
a plan for a dam, and I say wait, why weren’t we asked?”. (Interview 4) An experienced 
official
19
 working for the MoA further corroborated this view, stating that essentially MoA 
only seeks to open up communication with local officials once the construction of a dam is 
ready to commence (Interview 15). Just like the officials in the other agencies based in 
Athens, this official too seemed very well informed on his field of expertise (dams and 
agricultural use of water in the Cyclades) and was capable of providing very rich, insightful 
and useful information on that field. Nevertheless, the information he was able to provide on 
other water-related topics – such as desalination and the municipal network, effect of the 
reforms – was not up-to-date and could understandably not be compared with the breadth and 
depth of knowledge that local officials have.  
What we see here in the domain of transactions between MoA and island officials is a form 
of managerial transaction. Although the MoA and the island officials are not in the same 
hierarchy – they work in different agencies, and many island officials’ hierarchical superiors 
are from the Ministry of Interior, not of Agriculture – there is still a clear dominance of the 
negotiational psychology of managerial transactions: that of command and obedience. The 
MoA commands that a dam will be built, and the island officials are expected to obey. Once 
again, the island officials find themselves in a position of no power to effectuate any change.  
5.2.2 Transactions Amongst Island Agencies 
Officials working in the islands do not comprise a single homogenous group. There are 
elected officials acting at the regional level and others at the municipal, but there are also 
                                                          
18
 A possible explanation for this was that at that time (from the 1970s to the early 1990s) the everyday 
economy of the islands was based on agricultural activities. 
19
 This official refused to be recorded and I cannot therefore provide direct quotes, although I took notes 
during the interview. 
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appointed officials acting at the same two levels. And their visions and beliefs regarding how 
and by whom water management ought to be done in the Cyclades do not always match.  
Perhaps the greatest tension can be found between the numerous agencies of the Prefecture 
and the Devolved Administration
20
. The interviews illustrate two main reasons nurturing this 
tension. The first can be traced to the re-distribution of jurisdictions following the 
administrative reform of 2010 – which gave more jurisdictions to the Prefecture – and the 
Law 3199 for water management, passed in 2013. The latter transferred many jurisdictions 
back to the Devolved Administration, a move that was not welcomed by officials in the 
Prefecture, who felt that their ability to influence water management was thus severely 
crippled. One interviewee from the Prefecture put it this way: “We have so many 
jurisdictions; we are responsible for the good status of water resources for example. Fine. 
You tell me, how can I be responsible for the good status of water resources if I don’t control 
who is using them?” (Interview 5). This statement refers to the fact that the Devolved 
Administration was made responsible for issuing permits for water use, as per the 2013 law, a 
jurisdiction held until that time by the Prefecture.  In the wake of the new law, continued the 
interviewee, “[w]e have some decorative jurisdictions left, nothing of essence. It’s like 
everything has to be controlled by the state. Because the Devolved [Administration] is the 
state here” (Interview 5). 
The second reason for the tension between the two agencies can be attributed to the 
different approaches taken by their high-ranking officials, who, although they were educated 
in the same field (geology), are diametrically opposite in terms of their beliefs regarding how 
water management ought to be done on the islands. One believes that drilling wells is still 
feasible for the Cyclades, as long as it is strictly monitored and the public retains the right to 
cease operation when deemed necessary. “Not everywhere is salinized, not everywhere has 
sea-water intruding the aquifer. Some parts still have good quality water”, he remarked 
(Interview 4). Meanwhile, the other official believes that “we have already overstepped our 
limits; we should not permit any more drilling. The [toxicity??] values for half of the drilling 
operations are over the safety limits” (Interview 15). The dissidence between the two is so 
profound that, as one island official lamented, “[it]makes things much more difficult than they 
should be. We have good personal relationships with them, but it’s difficult to make them see 
our point of view” (Interview 1).  
                                                          
20
 I remind the reader that the Prefecture is the elected regional government and the Devolved 
Administration is a part of the Ministry of Interior. 
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One of the jurisdictions held by the Prefecture is the possibility to regulate, that is to 
propose, Regulatory Decisions (RD) to be incorporated in the national Water Management 
Plans, which embedded within the Water Framework Directive. Through Regulatory 
Decisions, the Prefecture can impose restrictions on water abstraction and use, as well as any 
other domain that lies within its scope of discretion. Two major issues surfaced here during 
the research period. First, these management plans had not yet been finalised at the time of the 
interviews and, therefore, no Regulatory Decision was able to take effect. Second, the 
Prefecture was not engaged in the drafting of the management plans and, hence, “only the 
views of the Devolved Administration will be reflected” (Interview 15) in the result. What is 
more, none of the RDs proposed got the necessary permissions from the Devolved 
Administration, a fact that seemed to further exacerbate and intensify the tension between the 
two sets of agencies.  
We can see from the foregoing that, in the last few years, meaningful jurisdictions capable 
of influencing water management on the islands were taken away from the Prefecture, which 
was then left with essentially no regulatory control over its water resources. Reflecting on 
what this could mean in terms of transactions, I argue the following. One can observe a trend 
towards transferring jurisdictions from the elected Prefecture to the Devolved Administration, 
which is consequently being given more rights and more powers, even if this is not 
accompanied by increases in staff. The more rights the DA is given, the more duties the 
Prefecture has. Although it would be possible to imagine that they could engage in bargaining 
transactions, each trying to persuade the other to adopt their stance, in reality we can clearly 
observe here the key characteristic of managerial transactions emerging: command and 
obedience.  
The Prefecture, much like the Devolved Administration (DA) does with the central 
administration, has been trying through Regulatory Decisions to provide upstream remedies 
by attempting to engage in rationing transactions in order to influence water management on 
the islands. These attempts have been unsuccessful, because they are blocked by the 
Devolved Administration exercising its power as legal superior. In a way, the psychology of 
managerial transactions (command and obedience) is employed here as well. This is not to 
say that there is a personal vendetta between the two agencies and that the Devolved 
Administration deliberately blocks the Prefecture’s RDs. Rather, it appears to be more the 
case that the DA is making use of its advantageous legal positioning in relation to the 
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Prefecture to advance its interests and to pursue water management on the islands as its key 
officials see fit.  
On Tinos, relationships between local officials and the Devolved Administration were 
characterised by one interviewee, after a few seconds’ pause, as “tight but complicated” 
(Interview 3). They are very frequently in touch because “they give the final approvals. They 
are the long arm of the ministry, although they are called ‘devolved’. They are a state 
agency” (Interview 3). According to the local officials, the laws and regulations are not 
always clear to them, and they consequently need the input of the Devolved Administration 
officials, who “are also struggling to understand things. Things change every day, and no one 
can keep track”.   
On the other hand, one newly elected official in Tinos characterised the local officials’ 
relationship with both the Devolved Administration and the Prefecture as being “very good 
and long lasting. We have very good cooperation” (Interview 19), adding that he was very 
pleased with how his municipality’s input and ideas were received by both agencies.  
Within Tinos there are not many officials working on water management, which in itself 
was an issue of concern for all the interviewees, who found it extremely challenging to cope 
with their agencies being understaffed. There was for instance no legal expert and, thus, the 
officials were left to either interpret the laws themselves or discussed them with officials at 
the Devolved Administration. Furthermore, there were not enough technicians to repair the 
network and no agronomists or geologists. Since there is also no municipal water company, 
unlike in Syros, water management goes directly through the (politically influenced) hands of 
the municipality of Tinos.  
What becomes clear in the case of Tinos is that it is an island peripheral to Syros, and its 
local agency does not have the political stealth of its counterpart in Syros. Those on Tinos 
were truly at the receiving end of policies, with virtually no possibility to influence them. 
What they could do was apply for European funds to install and operate desalination plants, 
since national funds had been obliterated as a result of the financial crisis in Greece and the 
Memoranda of Understanding that brought about a harsh austerity program.  
Although Syros lies on the periphery of Athens, Tinos is, in turn, peripheral to Syros, 
which is the administrative capital of the island complex. As such, the transactions in which 
officials from Tinos engage are mostly bargaining ones with other agencies within the island 
complex and in Athens, which mainly consist of pleading for information and guidance.  
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5.2.3 Transactions Between Island Agencies and Citizens 
What any policy aims to achieve is to influence the behaviour of individuals so as to bring 
about a desired effect.  What is particular in the cases of Syros and Tinos is that the policies at 
hand are not always clear – neither to the officials called upon to implement them nor to the 
citizens who must adhere to them.  
While examining the transactions occurring between island officials and citizens, the 
following issues became apparent to me. First, the officials truly feel they have an obligation 
to serve the citizens. They do not position themselves on the opposite side; they do not 
believe there is a divide between “us and them”, officials and citizens. This is something that 
is in line with one of the main assumptions of this study: the officials living and working in a 
small society function under overlapping roles, and the boundaries between their roles 
become blurry, which is not necessarily a negative outcome. According to the interviews 
conducted with officials in the islands, they feel liable to and not detached from the citizens, 
as they share the same problems with them. Essentially, although the officials are seen as the 
embodying the state, they also see themselves as fellow citizens.  
Although this does not divert the officials from their duties, it does make them more 
understanding and more open to suggestions. One example of this likemindedness, echoing 
the “island mentality”, can be seen in the proposal submitted by the Agricultural Association 
of Syros to transfer water from the wastewater treatment plant and re-use it for irrigation 
purposes. The proposal was submitted for permits to the Prefecture (before the jurisdictions 
were transferred to the Devolved Administration), which took a positive position; to the 
Municipal Water and Drainage Company of Syros (responsible for the wastewater treatment 
plant), which also saw it in a positive light; and to the newly elected Mayor of Ermoupolis
21
, 
who promised that he would help secure the necessary funds. In this proposal, the farmers of 
Syros argued that using treated water for irrigation makes sense, not only for the farmers 
themselves, who would save on drilling and pumping costs, but also for the local economy, 
since they would not be discharging already paid-for water into the sea but would re-use it to 
produce agricultural products that would be then sold to the local market. An important 
positive side-effect would be that, because farmers would no longer need to drill for water, an 
important pressure on local water resources would cease, allowing the groundwater to 
recover. This point was enthusiastically underlined by one farmer: “I told Mr. […] at the 
                                                          
21
 The last empirical stage of the study took place three months after the municipal elections and 
unfortunately it was very difficult getting an appointment with the newly-elected Mayor of Syros.  
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Prefecture that, if this comes through, all the farmers in Syros would surrender their drill-
keys to him. We wouldn’t need them. We would have water of a superior quality. And as much 
of it as we want!” (Interview 9). 
So, here we have an initiative taken by a group of individuals that, if implemented, would 
be very likely to have a profound effect on the water cycle on Syros as well as on the local 
economy. Most of the local officials responded well to it, even if they were caught up in the 
jurisdictional confusion. And the farmers I talked to were quite positive that the new local 
government would “press on with this issue and we will have the water we need”, because 
they had developed a good working relationship with the new mayor, who is “young and 
active and he used to have an office for helping people acquire funds for projects. So he is our 
guy” (Interview 9).  
If this proposal does go through, it will be a positive sign. It will not, however, be 
considered the norm, as many other users have reported that they do not trust the central 
government and do not believe that elected officials have the citizens’ best interests at heart. 
As one resident explains, “Here, the only way to become a mayor is to be the son of the 
mayor. This is how things are done. At some point, we have to accept that our generation has 
been incapable of addressing things that matter” (Interview 10). But others do not put the 
blame only on the elected officials: “Our society is indifferent, they only care about economic 
criteria. Tourism and the money it brings with it have altered people” (Interview 8). Another 
resident said that citizens expect officials to deliver, without however engaging in a dialogue 
with the latter: “Some people don’t feel they are responsible for anything. They say ‘look I 
elected someone, now it’s their problem. They should fix it’. This is not really the way 
forward, is it?” (Interview 8).  
An initiative was taken by a group of grass-roots activists on Tinos who track streams, 
identifies spots where water has the tendency to flow slowly and create “slow streams”, 
slowing down water speed and allowing it to filtrate into the soil and reach the groundwater, 
which increases thereby the water volume in the aquifer. According to one interviewee, they 
do this voluntarily and without the support of the municipality, which is “too busy building 
desalination plants” (Interview 20). It is worth mentioning, however, that even those users 
who expressed their dissatisfaction with how things are run by the public administration with 
regard to water management have acknowledged that huge steps have been made forward. 
The municipal network in Tinos containing asbestos is being replaced, and water cuts are 
becoming less frequent, due to the operation of the desalination plants. Large dams are not 
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being constructed anymore, and the small reservoir constructed on the outskirts of the island 
capital has become a local attraction and a habitat for wildlife, while providing water to the 
capital during the summer months. They even acknowledge the fact that appointed officials 
are overworked and underpaid and that they cannot do much more than what they already do.  
So it seems that not all is bleak in the relationship between users and island officials, at 
least from the officials’ point of view. What became clear in the interviews is that especially 
the appointed officials want to provide good service and proper, helpful consultation to 
citizens. What was interesting was that the majority of the officials referred to island residents 
as “citizens” and not “people” or “individuals”. This might seem trivial but, as Wittgenstein 
taught us, words are concepts and they matter. So, when officials refer to citizens, this implies 
that citizens have rights and that the officials have a duty to provide services to those citizens. 
An indicative quote here comes from a high-ranking official from Syros: “Public officials are 
exhausted, because they struggle to keep track of legislation, help the citizen as much as they 
can, and in a way to save the citizen” (interview 2). He continued by saying that, “[a]t the 
local level you simply have to – even if you don’t want to, even if you are grumpy – come in 
contact with people that you know. So I believe that serving the citizen is at a much better 
level here on the islands” than on the mainland.  
What “serving the citizen” means differs from official to official. It might mean providing 
information about relevant laws online or explaining such laws when citizens call or visit their 
agencies. It always means providing water to the citizens, even if they don’t drink it, as with 
the case of desalinated water. It might mean issuing water use permits, or not. In the words of 
one experienced official, “I consider my biggest personal success to be not the projects I 
initiated, or helped realise, thought of and started. Not the projects that happened. No. My 
biggest personal contribution was the projects I did not allow to happen! We saved the 
Cyclades and its citizens, because we blocked some projects” (Interview 7). This official then 
went on by explaining which projects were blocked, and who they were initiated by – all by 
ministries in Athens. We see here, then, that this official was able to make use of his power to 
force a national ministry to stop a project.  
As we can also see, another official expressed deep ethical concerns when called upon to 
implement some laws: “I see citizens coming here worrying that if, they don’t register their 
wells, they will pay fines. They are old, troubled, tired. You can see they don’t have much 
money. How can I tell them not to do it? How can I tell them that, if they do register the wells, 
in a few years a new law might come and say ‘Ok, now everyone with a well should pay 
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something, because water is scarce’? I can’t” do either. And, she continued, “I feel I am an 
accomplice to something I disagree with” (meaning overseeing the well registration). “But if I 
don’t do it, maybe someone else will, and much faster than I do. Which is worse?” (Interview 
2). 
The elected officials were generally concerned with the low level of trust that citizens have 
toward them but said they “were trying to make citizens see that we are doing our best” 
(Interview 1) and “[are] of the opinion that citizens should choose wisely who to elect. They 
should choose someone with a vision, not a connection to the right people, and then complain 
about that politician” (Interview 3). Further, “it takes a long time for a culture to change. But 
things are changing” (Interview 19). Towards achieving that end, though, elected officials did 
not seem to engage much with citizens. Rather, they delegated that task to the appointed 
officials, and they also planned management strategies, but mostly they were busy applying 
for European funding schemes to finance either new desalination plants or replacement of old 
network pipes. They did, however, see a need to change citizens’ perceptions about public 
administration, especially local administration, and provide citizen-friendly services as much 
as they could. Yet, given the citizens’ mistrust towards the central government, they were not 
terribly optimistic about the future because, as we have seen, water management remains 
overwhelmingly in the central government’s domain.  
5.3 Users: Relations with Authorities and Beliefs. 
As with local officials, one cannot speak of water users on the study islands as one 
homogenous group either. Users include large and small hotel owners and their clients, 
domestic users in the capitals of the two islands as well as in their numerous villages, and 
various-sized businesses and industrial units. Professional and part-time farmers are also 
water users. In the end, all of the officials are also water users as well, as entailed by the 
multiple roles assumed by officials and the overlapping social relationships occurring within 
small islands and small societies.  
The agricultural users interviewed on Syros were highly motivated and engaged in 
dialogue with regional and local officials. They understood local infrastructures and local 
water conditions very well and, based on that deep understanding, proposed water 
management measures to save and re-use water.  Because of their good relationship with local 
and regional authorities, the Syros farmers were the most optimistic group of users 
interviewed. Their action was informed by the belief that re-using treated water for irrigation 
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would achieve a win–win situation, with everyone benefiting – primarily the farmers 
themselves, as they would be able to produce products of better quality in greater quantity, 
which they could then sell at higher prices at the market. Saving water is key to their plan to 
be financially better off by increasing their production and income.  
Hotel owners interviewed were not as dependent on the quality of water used as the 
farmers were but, rather, more on the quantity. Due to the municipal strategy of increasing 
production of desalinated water and safeguarding water provision during summer months, 
hotels have not experienced water cuts in recent years, but their owners did raise concerns 
about the cost of water, which in turns raised their own operation costs. Because of this, they 
took their own initiative and installed basic water-saving technology (controlled-flow toilets) 
in hotel rooms and put up stickers asking customers to save on water. But, unlike the farmers 
of Syros, they did not reach out to local and regional authorities, because “what can you 
expect from the government? All they want is our money, the taxes. And they give nothing in 
return” (Interview 8). The hotel owners interviewed did not turn to local officials for support 
and did not look for subsidies, because they believed that the state – and in their mind the 
island officials are the state – will not support them. They felt disheartened. They took their 
own initiatives because they believe that saving on water costs will minimize their operational 
costs and, thus, improve their financial situation, because they did not trust the state to support 
them. In effect, saving on water was, it seems, a means to achieve as much independence 
from the state as possible.  
Domestic users from both islands tend to avoid using tap water. On Tinos, it is because 
they do not trust that the water is safe for consumption, even though the municipality runs 
regulars tests and has been replacing old network pipes. It is indicative, though, that even an 
official I interviewed from Tinos said “I would never give tap water to my children” 
(Interview 3). All domestic users interviewed reported dissatisfaction with the taste of the 
water, adding it as another reason they do not drink it. The consequent cost from buying 
bottled water was indeed a concern, but giving up on bottled water was not seen as an option, 
since they believed that avoiding tap water was a safety precaution for ensuring that they 
would not fall ill because of asbestos contamination or from other substances flowing in the 
water through the aged network. This follows from the mistrust residential users have towards 
the capacity of their local administration to act quickly, to locate and repair a damaged pipe 
early on, or run safety tests on an adequately regular basis.  
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 Likewise, on Syros domestic users do not like the taste either and, thus, substitute tap 
water with bottled water or even buy their own “domestic desalination units” that filter tap 
water, once more to eliminate the taste.  Although the network in Syros had been replaced 
recently and meets all current safety standards, and its desalinated water is filtered several 
times, users associate the particular taste of desalinated water with something unhealthy. A 
resident of Tinos offered this opinion: “They say it’s ok to drink, that’s what they say. I don’t 
know. I don’t like the taste of it. It’s ok to cook in it, you know you kill anything inside it this 
way. But I don’t drink it” (interview 20). Thus, it appears that residential users on Syros prefer 
bottled water because they do not trust the taste – and therefore the safety – of their tap water, 
because they do not trust the word of the officials who say “it’s ok”.  
What one can observe here is that hotel owners and domestic users do not consume tap 
water not because it actually is unsafe, but because they perceive it as such, owning to their 
lack of trust towards the officials’ assurances regarding the water’s safety. Public officials 
have failed to bring about a change in the users’ behaviour regarding drinking tap water. This 
is what Bromley and Hiedanpää (2014) coined inducing transaction, the durable breaking of 
old habits and taking of new ones, through durable changes in the environment in which the 
behaviour takes place. This would mean that in the case of water users, who don’t believe in 
the ability of the island officials to run regular controls and take the measures necessary to 
ensure that water becomes and remains safe for consumption, and who moreover feel they 
cannot rely on the state to improve things, there is a clear scope for intervention and 
improvement. If the social and political environment in which the habit takes place is found 
wanting by the users, if the officials in particular (and consequently the state) are seen as 
inadequate, then this also where attempts to rectify the water sector should focus on.  
5.4 Beliefs and Desires Motivating Remedial Power 
So far, we have seen how the remedial power of officials is put into action and, in the 
previous subsections of this chapter, the role of the smallness of these islands has been hinted 
at.  Recall that, according to Bromley (Figure 10, p. 54), an action is set in motion by beliefs 
that are, in turn, informed by the desired outcome one wants to achieve in the future. So, 
when we look at the way officials exercise their remedial power (action), we should also look 
at what drives that action. What are the beliefs of the officials? What are the desired future 
outcomes they thus hope to achieve?  
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 In what follows, I seek to shed light on what beliefs and desires motivate the actions (the 
remedial powers) of the local study-area officials. I have discussed earlier (in chapter 3) the 
central role remedial powers hold in understanding how and why water management is done 
in a specific manner on these islands and what implications it has on the relationships 
between officials and users. In small societies, such as the small islands I am concerned with 
in this study, officials not only set the will of the state in motion but they also become 
embodiments of the state. Their will is the will of the state; their visions are those of the state, 
as are their actions. Exercising their remedial powers not only sets the machinery of the state 
in motion and, thus, exerts influence on island water resources and their management but, as 
they transact with citizens, it also influences the ways the state is perceived by them. 
Remedial power lies at the heart of the transactions occurring between citizens and officials. 
Consequently, understanding the beliefs and desires motivating the behaviour of officials 
working on water management can hopefully provide relevant insights on possible ways to 
improve the water sector.  
What became clear during the interviews is that all officials actually do seem to care about 
ensuring uninterrupted and safe water provision to the citizens. What differs, however, are 
their approaches regarding how and why this is best achieved. One could speak of two broad 
categories of the ways officials prefer, informed by their corresponding beliefs (Figure 11). 
The first category of officials does not perceive what they do as a job but, rather, as a service 
to the public, a leitoúrgima
22
. These include both elected and appointed officials, believing 
that it is their duty to provide good service to the fellow citizens. As one official put it: “In 
our job, you can’t say today I don’t feel like working, right? The citizens are expecting things 
from you. They wait for information, for guidance. They are lost with all this mess. They are 
asking ‘How I do this? What do I have to do?’ And we need to come up with the answers, 
no?” (Interview 2). Another official said something similar:  
“And they [the citizens] are calling me and asking me ‘Mr. X, what kind of paperwork do I 
need for the permit?’ Ten different people are calling me ten times a day. The answer can 
change during the day, because this is how fast the laws change! And I am in the middle of it, 
trying to give the best answer I can. It’s not their fault23” (Interview 5). 
                                                          
22
 In Greece, some jobs are seen as being more than a job, because of the services one provides to others 
through them. These have traditionally included, for example, being a teacher, a priest, a doctor. They are 
called leitoúrgima (having vocation, function, service, responsibility). Many of the interviewed officials referred 
to what they are doing as being a leitoúrgima.  
23
 During that 1.5 hour interview, two people called asking exactly that question.  
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These are the officials who work overtime and are on the phone with officials in Athens 
and in other agencies in the Cyclades to ask about specifications for laws, for possible 
exemptions from them. This is something that has not been mentioned thus far, but it is 
important for understanding these officials. In a country where circumventing the law to one’s 
benefit is a coping strategy and the norm, and where public officials are perceived as lazy and 
self-serving, it is remarkable that not one of those interviewed mentioned or hinted that island 
appointed officials are corrupt. What is more, it is worth mentioning that some officials did 
consider circumventing the law – not so that they might gain but, rather, so that citizens could 
“spared of all this” (Interview 2, corroborated by 3, 5, 14, 18). No interviewees among the 
officials reported that they did in fact act upon their belief that something postulated in a law 
was unfair or uncalled for, but they did report having ethical concerns.  One official, as 
already cited above, said “I feel I am an accomplice to something I disagree with. But if I 
don’t do it, maybe someone else will, and much faster than I do. Which is worse?”.  
 
Figure 13: The desires, beliefs and remedial actions of the two identified categories of island 
officials  
Source: Own compilation 
 
What motivates these officials is the belief that the citizens need saving from a state which 
does not understand or care for them, viewing them only as sources of taxes and as constantly 
trying to cheat it. By contrast, these local officials position themselves on the citizen’s side, 
perceiving themselves as being powerful enough to guide citizens and act as a buffer but not 
powerful enough (of not in the legal position) to effectively change the state.  
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The second category of officials mostly consists of elected officials but also includes 
experienced high-ranking appointed ones as well. Like the officials of the first category, they 
also believe that it is up to them to protect local citizens from an interventionist state that does 
not take them seriously into consideration. What differs here is the entry point for their 
intervention, as these officials believe that it is not enough to simply offer legal guidance to 
citizens; one should, rather, try to change the working rules to start with. Such officials do so 
by becoming engaged as much as they can with agencies in Athens, taking the initiative to 
propose changes in existing laws or proposing new ones. They take advantage of their 
position to effectuate as much change as they can within their scope of discretion, while also 
acknowledging that this is limited. These officials not only strive to set the machinery of state 
in motion but also to alter it, because they believe it to be ineffective and unfair. To this end, 
they attempt to channel their remedy upstream, to Athens, as it is there, the officials know 
well, that decisions on the water sector in the Cyclades are being made, not on the islands 
themselves. 
5.5 Reflecting on the Nature-Related Transactions 
Reflecting on the physical view of transactions brought forward by Hagedorn (2015, 
2008), we can observe the following. The physical transactions (in our case for example the 
collection of actions leading to the overabstraction of groundwater and the operation of 
desalination plants) activate the action situation. There are multiple actors transacting 
simultaneously, each attempting to influence choices available to themselves and to others, 
ultimately aiming at changing the institutional setup governing the water sector, each with 
different ability and power to do so.   
These transactions are characterized by low modularity and high functional 
interdependence of process. Low modularity means that the actors (and transactions) cannot 
effectuate change without interaction with others. They also operate within a high-functional 
interdependent system, meaning that changes in one part of the system (the water sector) 
significantly affect other parts of it. The combination of these two characteristics leads to 
complex-interconnected transactions (Hagedorn, 2015). We can apply this syllogism in the 
proposal brought forward by the Agricultural Association of Syros for the re-use of treated 
wastewater to irrigate their agricultural production. This proposed transaction is highly 
modularised, as it needs the interaction with other actors in order to be effective. The local 
authorities have to agree with the proposal and find the funds necessary to construct the 
pipeline transferring the water to the farmers. It is also highly-functional interdependent, as in 
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case it’s implemented, this transaction would have fundamental effects in the water cycle of 
Syros and consequently in its water sector, by eliminating groundwater abstraction for 
agricultural uses, allowing the aquifer to replenish.  
The same is true for the proposal of island officials to make the construction of sub-terrain 
cisterns obligatory for all new constructions. It would meliorate the pressure on local aquifers 
and would offer a new source of water for local inhabitants. For it to be successful though it 
would need to transact with many other parts of the system (officials in Athens and in the 
islands, as well as actors currently not in the action arena, such as construction companies). 
Officials operating within the central administration, in Athens, also engage in complex-
interconnected transactions. Although they lie outside the physical boundaries of the island 
water system, they have the political and legal power to directly influence it, by defining the 
choices available to local actors and water users. They are the most powerful and influential 
actors in the water sector whose actions have direct and lasting effects.  
5.6 Telling the Story Anew 
In the previous chapter, we considered how central and island officials as well as users 
interpret the institutional setup pertaining to water management and how they perceive their 
roles in it and reflected on the physical view of transactions. We further looked at transactions 
across agencies located in Athens and on the islands. In this chapter, I want to summarise the 
kinds of transactions taking place in the study area and briefly mention some of the main 
conclusions and implications deriving therefrom. 
5.6.1 Summarising Transactions  
Summarising the transactions occurring at various levels within the water-sector domain of 
Syros and Tinos, we can distinguish the following categories: 
a) Managerial transactions between: 
 The Water Directorate officials and individual water users.  
This includes officials at the Water Directorate and individuals who break the law by, for 
example, drilling illegal wells. After someone has filed a complaint
24
, the officials at the 
Water Directorate will examine such wells and, if deemed illegal, a fine will be issued. 
Inspectors of the Prefecture of South Aegean can also issue fines, but only for environmental 
violations.  
                                                          
24
 Municipalities are responsible for monitoring and controlling illegal activities, but they are understaffed 
and rely exclusively on complaints filed with the municipality by citizens. 
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 Officials at different administrative levels. 
Managerial transactions among legally superior and legally inferior officials occur when, for 
example, central officials in Athens request a water abstraction registry to be created by the 
island officials and made available to them by a specific deadline.  Likewise, the Water 
Directorate can request files and information obtained by the Prefecture. Officials resort to 
applying elements of the negotiational psychology of managerial transactions when they want 
to impose their own will on the wills of hierarchically inferior officials, especially whenever 
they believe that their counterpart in the transaction has erred in terms of the way they 
approach water management for the islands.  
Various administrative levels co-exist on the islands, and one can observe bargaining 
transaction taking place between them as well. One typical example is the issuing of 
Regulatory Acts by the Prefecture of South Aegean, through which the elected regional 
authority can influence water management in the Cyclades (i.e., by forbidding groundwater 
abstraction in specific locations, or months, or below a specific depth). These Regulatory Acts 
are to be approved by the Devolved Administration, but, none of the Acts proposed by the 
Prefecture around the time of the interviews had received such approval.  
b) Bargaining transactions are quite common and numerous, taking place between:  
 Island and central officials. 
Island officials from both islands and at different administrative levels (elected or appointed, 
regional or local) frequently call officials in Athens, pleading for clarification of unclear or 
conflicting legal documents or for extension of deadlines for the submission of documents 
needed for acquiring water-abstraction permits.  
Another bargaining transaction worth mentioning is the proposal submitted to various 
agencies by the Agricultural Association of Syros for the re-use of water treated in the 
wastewater treatment plant so it can be used by the farmers for irrigation purposes. 
 Water users and island officials 
Water users often call island officials, pleading for an extension of the deadline for submitting 
documents, and the officials then transfer the request to central officials to Athens. At the 
time of the interviews, numerous extensions had already been granted. Island officials are 
often asked by users to provide specifications regarding various legal requirements or for 
information on where to seek professional assistance in order to meet those requirements. For 
example, a bylaw was passed that required indication of the geographic coordinates of water 
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abstraction points, but many users were not technologically literate enough to do so 
themselves. So officials at the Prefecture advised them to visit a technical study office that 
could provide the required service for a low price (Interview 18).  
c) Although originally conceptualised for parliamentary activity, we can identify some 
form of rationing transactions taking place on the islands, mainly directed upstream. 
In a sense, such transactions pertain to “negotiations of reaching an agreement among several 
participants who have authority to apportion the benefits and burdens to members of a joint 
enterprise” (Commons, 1934, p. 68). Thus, a claim can be made that when island officials 
interpret the legal documents sent to them by central officials in Athens, and when they enter 
into negotiations with them regarding how to interpret and implement the laws written 
therein, they are then engaging in rationing transactions, in the sense that they “apportion […] 
benefits and burdens to members of a joint enterprise” (ibid).  
In a way, officials from the islands attempt to constantly engage in negotiations with 
central officials, either through asking for specifications of legislation – implicitly inquiring 
about the leeway available to them – or through proposing changes in the institutional setup, 
such as by making underground collection cisterns obligatory on the islands. In engaging in 
such transactions, island officials appear to be trying to expand their scope of discretion, or at 
least stretch its effectiveness. Identifying numerous and continuous attempts at rationing 
transactions originating from the island officials seems an evident indication of their wish to 
have a voice in island water management.   
d) It is worth mentioning that inducing transactions, were not identified here. 
Inducing transactions, aiming to “bring about specific behavioral changes when the 
individual agent has no interest in altering those existing behaviors” (Bromley and Hiedanpää, 
2014, p.10), pertain to habit breaking or changing and require (at least) one authoritative 
agent guiding the habit-breaking process. Such a process was not observed in the selected 
islands, even though many interviewees seem to believe that, if the water sector on their 
islands is to be improved, then current ways (or habits) of doings things have to be 
challenged, and new habits must be shaped. This would, however, appear to be particularly 
relevant for all actors involved: from water users avoiding tap water, to hotel owners not 
installing water-saving technologies extensively in their units, to part-time farmers illegally 
drilling wells and so on. Inducing transactions –habit breaking and habit taking, is something 
identified as instrumental for the rectification of the dysfunctioning water sector by nearly all 
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actors involved. It is something whose lack was also commented and partly lamented widely 
by interviewees. It is here that scope for intervention is identified. 
5.6.2 Implications 
Island officials feel they have a duty to serve the citizens of the islands, providing them with 
water of good quality, in sufficient quantity and at a reasonable price. At the beginning of this 
study, I laid focus on the water sector as a whole, and no particular actor was considered to be 
more important than any other.  As my examination of the water sector progressed, it became 
clear that two dimensions in the water sector were of undeniable importance: a) the island 
officials exercising their remedial power and, thus, setting the machinery of the state in 
motion and b) the islandness within which the officials are embedded and by which they are 
strongly defined.  
Residing and working on an island influences the way such officials work, for a number of 
reasons. For one, there is the overlapping social relationships in which they daily engage, 
meaning that the citizen is not only the recipient of their actions but also a neighbour or a 
friend. Another reason is that, due to the discontinuity of space, the finite nature of land and 
other resources on an island become much more tangible than for those living on the 
mainland. Insularity also means that identifying water sources and knowing their current state 
is a relatively easy task. Finally, island officials cannot spare themselves from any 
manifestation of the water-sector dysfunction, as they too will experience water cuts, they too 
will pay higher than necessary water bills. Islands officials then become both representatives 
of the state and citizens at the same time. It is precisely this dual identity of theirs that equips 
them with the necessary knowledge and desire to rectify the water sector. Unfortunately, they 
do not have a legal stance allowing them to act upon their beliefs.  
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6 Conclusions: Why the Water Sector in Cyclades is Dysfunctional 
This study set out to diagnose the water sector in the Cyclades, identify its 
dysfunctionality, analyse the reasons for it and prescribe ways to rectify it. In the previous 
chapters, I have identified the dysfunction (disrupted, costly and insecure water provision, 
Chapter 2), explored conceptual tools with which to diagnose it (Chapter 3) elaborated on the 
abductive research design and methods applied (Chapter 4) and analysed the transactions 
occurring within the Cycladic water sector (Chapter 5). In this chapter, I provide an answer to 
the key question guiding this study: Why is the water sector in the Cyclades dysfunctional?  I 
will do so by continuing to work through the abductive syllogism developed in the foregoing 
chapters and, thus, conclude by developing a theoretical explanation for the continued 
dysfunctioning of the water sector in the Cyclades, despite decades-long efforts to rectify it.  
My interview analysis has revealed that all officials involved, particularly those at the 
island level, appear to be committed to providing uninterrupted, safe and as reasonably priced 
water as possible to the users on the islands. They tend to work long hours trying to fulfil their 
tasks to the best of their abilities, giving rise to a further question: if everyone is so 
committed, why isn’t the water sector functioning in a better way?  
Several key concepts were used to guide the quest for a theory that would explain the 
dysfunction. I have problematised the notion of islands and the effects size, their geographical 
setup (discontinuity of space) and consequent distance from decision-making centres have on 
island administrations. As confirmed by the interviews conducted with island officials, island 
administrations operate in a different manner than their mainland counterparts, owing to the 
overlapping social relations within which such officials are embedded, coupled with their 
familiarity with the local situation. Regardless of their positions, whether they are elected or 
appointed, in a national, regional or local agency, island officials seem to position themselves 
as the islanders’ allies, a view that has implications for the ways in which they exercise their 
remedial powers.  
I have turned to institutional economics to provide a unit of analysis suitable for this study 
and identified transactions as the best-suited unit. Here, using the tenets spelled out in 
Hagedorn’s IOS, according to which the physical transaction is the trigger activating the 
action situation, I used transaction as the unit of analysis. Transactions have been understood, 
as per Commons, as the point where human wills meet, negotiate and, finally, lay down a rule 
for action. To further unravel how these transactions occur and how they come about, we 
explored human behaviour and concluded that human action is motivated by the belief that a 
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certain action will achieve a desired outcome in the future. Thus, human actions – and by 
extension also transactions – are motivated by beliefs and desires.  
This has implications for the remedial powers of the island officials, whose beliefs and 
desires are strongly influenced by their habits derived from living on islands. Remedial power 
is “the activity of officials setting the machinery of government in motion, and getting one set 
of officials responsible for enforcing what they define to be the rights in the case. If the 
officials are corrupt, negligent, incompetent, biased, or revolutionists, the legal right is 
nevertheless exactly the equivalent of what they do or may be expected to do” (Commons, 
1924, p. 110-111).  The officials’ habituation to the characteristics common to living on 
islands leads them to undertake many roles, not least the role of the protector of the island 
(with its people and its water) from the rule of laws originating from the distant decision-
making centres in Athens. How exactly do island officials exercise their remedial power? 
What do they believe when they act in a certain manner? How is this influenced by their 
relationships with central officials in Athens and to island citizens? What is the trigger 
motivating the officials to act?  
Combining insights from nissology, administrative studies and institutional economics, I 
have formulated a basic analytical framework for guiding my investigation in relation to: a) 
institutional structure, b) the ways in which officials exercise their remedial powers in small 
societies, meaning how operating within a small island society influences the exercise of 
officials’ remedial powers and c) the reasons why individuals involved in the water sector act 
the way they do.  
Having conducted and analysed over thirty interviews with officials in Athens and on the 
islands as well as with water users and scientific experts, the following findings were 
generated: 
 
i) Transactions 
All three of Commons’ transactions – bargaining, managerial and rationing – were 
identified, in various frequencies and intensities:  
a. Users engage in bargaining transactions with island officials of all administrative levels 
to extend deadlines and obtain access to information but also, interestingly, to expand water 
management practices on the islands (through, for example, the proposal by an agricultural 
association for the use of treated water for agricultural purposes). 
b. Island officials bargain within island agencies for assistance regarding specification and 
interpretation of the numerous laws they have to implement.  
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c. Island officials often resort to commanding legally inferior officials – thus engaging in 
managerial transactions – as a way of ensuring that they can pursue their method of water 
management for the islands. Central officials, situated at a higher level, do the same with 
island officials.  
d. Mostly though, island officials are constantly attempting to engage in rationing 
transactions with officials in Athens, either trying to influence the crafting of policies or their 
implementation on the islands. At present, these attempts have not yet been successful.  
e. Inducing transactions, the durable change of behaviour through the breaking of old 
habits and the taking of new ones were the transactions most desired and sought after, mostly 
by actors at the island level. Water users wanted to induce changes in the behaviour of the 
island officials, who in turn wanted to induce change in the behaviour of central officials and 
water users alike. However, no inducing transactions were actually observed, as they require 
one authoritative agent to guide the habit-breaking process. The agents that most desired a 
change in the habits of others were the ones with the least power to see such a process 
through.  
f) Various actors attempt to influence the natural component of the water sector, thus 
effectuate change in it. Grass-roots activists in Tinos are creating slow streams where water 
can flow slowly, allowing it to filtrate into the soil and enriching the aquifer, thereby 
meliorating the pressure on the groundwater. The Agricultural Association of Syros sent 
proposals to officials requesting the re-use of treated water for agricultural purposes, thereby 
attempting to reorder and re-structure the water sector on Syros. Without economic and 
institutional support from local and national authorities, these attempts are futile and will not 
bring about a durable or meaningful change.  Most of the transactions occur between highly 
interdependent activities, are characterized by low modularity and high functional 
interdependence of process. Low modularity means that the actors (and transactions) cannot 
effectuate change without interaction with others. They also operate within a high-functional 
interdependent system, meaning that changes in one part of the system significantly affect 
other parts of it. The combination of these two characteristics leads to complex-interconnected 
transactions. A structural change is needed if meaningful change is to occur. Willingness of 
key actors to commit and interact with others operating in different levels and jurisdictions 
need to be cultivated and trust between officials (in islands and in Athens) and waters  needs 
to be built.  
 
ii)  Remedial Power and Beliefs  
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Officials appear to exercise their remedial power motivated by what they believe is in the 
island’s and their fellow citizens’ best interests. Both users and officials have a deep mistrust 
towards the central government in Athens, especially regarding its intentions and dedication 
towards the islanders. This mistrust manifests itself in the continual efforts of users and 
officials alike to gain sovereignty of control over their water. Users, for example, will avoid 
declaring their wells for as long as possible, in fear that they would then be called upon to pay 
a fee for them to the state.  Officials try to protect citizens from what they believe to be an 
over-interventionist central government that does not understand or care about them or the 
islands and that only views them as a source of taxes. These local officials are further split 
into two categories: a) those positioning themselves on the citizens’ side and trying to supply 
as much filtered useful information as possible to them. These are the officials who believe 
what they do is a leitoúrgima, meaning a service to the public; and b) officials who believe 
that it is not enough to offer legal guidance to citizens but that one should start by changing 
the working rules facing them; therefore, they try to influence policies by sending proposals 
and suggestions to Athens.  
The dysfunction of the water sector in the Cyclades has, in a way, become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, as the same apparatus that has created and sustained the dysfunction is called upon 
to rectify it.  I have identified a deep mistrust that cuts through all administrative levels and 
main actors, characterised by a one-way, top-down communication style within agencies that 
does not allow for input from the island level, where officials are much more knowledgeable 
of local conditions, problems and opportunities and could, furthermore, call upon support 
from the local population. The more the island level is not given voice and an active role in 
the decision-making process, the deeper and more chronic this distrust tends to grow, and the 
more difficult eventual rectification of the water sector becomes.  
 
Based on the results of the foregoing research, I can now assert with certainty that the 
water sector in the Cyclades is dysfunctional 
because 
Decisions made on how to manage it are made in distant decision-making centres by 
officials in Athens; 
because 
Island officials, who are knowledgeable and have an immediate interest in rectifying the 
water sector, cannot successfully engage in the transactions they want to; 
because 
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The island administration does not have the autonomy to do so; 
because 
Despite proclaimed attempts at decentralisation, the central administration in Athens still 
retains all policy-making and decision-making powers. 
 
These findings may have significant policy implications. Breaking the vicious circle 
sketched out here will require that the administrative levels most familiar with local 
conditions should be given more power to decide on how to best govern their water resources. 
Granting a substantial degree of administrative autonomy and sovereignty to the Cyclades 
islands – thus empowering island officials to act upon their beliefs, to plan, design and 
implement policies, to take charge of their own budget allocation – will have cascading 
positive effects.  
As outlined here, islanders tend to trust local officials because they have frequent 
encounters with them on a regular basis. Unlike those in the central administration these local 
officials are not seen as impersonal law enforcers but, rather, as neighbours, customers, 
parents, sometimes also relatives. When grievances and problems arise, they are ready to 
discuss and resolve them.  
Most importantly, island officials are islanders as well. They reside on the islands, where 
they too face water shortages, they too experience the particular taste of desalinated water and 
they too pay higher than necessary water bills. They are exposed to many of the same 
hardships as other citizens. Consequently, island officials have many reasons to wish for the 
water sector in the Cyclades to be rectified. Unfortunately, at present, they have no 
administrative means with which to fulfil their wish.  
Empowering island officials administratively is likely to be the most plausible way of 
rectifying the water sector in the Cyclades.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Project Information Sheet  
 
Research Project:  The Water Crisis in the Greek Island Complex of Cyclades: Diagnosis, Analysis 
and Rectification. 
 
M.Sc Ourania Papasozomenou, Humboldt University of Berlin; Faculty of Agriculture and Horticulture, 
Division of Resource Economics, Philippstr. 13, Hause 12, 10099 Berlin.  
Tel: +49 (0)30 2093 46379  Mobile: +49 (0)1511 4475752, +30 (0) 698 57400 70  
Email: papasoou@cms.hu-berlin.de 
 
INFORMATION FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
The research project aims at understanding and analysis the water crisis in the Cyclades. It is based 
on social and political science and the analysis is based on two pillars: a) in the suitability of the 
current institutional setup, and b) in the practical implementation of the legal framework. As a result of 
the research project policy recommendation will be presented, aiming at improving the water sector in 
the Cyclades. 
The method of qualitative interviews was selected as the best suited for collecting information 
needed. This method allows the collection of personal experiences, beliefs and views of those directly 
involved in the design and implementation of water policies, as well as water users. 
Participating in the interviews is voluntary and requires the written consent of the interviewees. As 
an interviewee you are encouraged to ask the researcher regarding the research project, its aims and its 
results, the interview process, your role in in the project etc. You have the possibility to decline to 
reply to any question and/or give comments during the interview.  
The interview will be arranged at place and time that is convenient for you and is expected to last 
less than 1.5 hours. During the interview the following topics will be discussed: 1) current state of 
water resources in the Cycladic islands and the reasons thereof; 2) measure to improve the state of 
water resources; 3) legal framework for dealing with the crisis and 4) examples of implementation. 
With your consent, the researcher would like to record the interview. 
Data obtained during the interview will be processed, analyses and used in academic publications. 
All information is confidential based on scientific ethics. Interviewee’s anonymity will be treated with 
utmost discretion. Any information with might help to identify the interviewees will be concealed. 
Only the researcher will have access to the audio files and their transcriptions, which will be deleted 
upon completion of this research project.  
Results of this project will be published in a monograph dissertation and can as well appear in 
several academic articles published in international scientific journals. The researcher will be able to 
provide all publications to the interviewees if they so wish.  
 
Thank you for your time, 
Ourania Papasozomenou 
 
 
Appendix 
II 
 
 
Appendix 2: Informed Consent Form 
Research Project 
The Water Crisis in the Greek Island Complex of Cyclades: Diagnosis, Analysis and Rectification. 
 
M.Sc Ourania Papasozomenou, Humboldt University of Berlin; Faculty of Agriculture and Horticulture, 
Division of Resource Economics, Philippstr. 13, Hause 12, 10099 Berlin.  
Tel: +49 (0)30 2093 46379  Mobile: +49 (0)1511 4475752, +30 (0) 698 57400 70  
Email: papasoou@cms.hu-berlin.de 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information for interview 
participants. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to decline 
replying to any question or giving comments without giving any reason.  
 
 
3. I understand that the interview will be recorded and I consent to it.   
4. I understand that all information will remain confidential, according to scientific 
ethics and that my anonymity will be secured.  
 
 
5. I consent to the use of anonymous direct quotes from my interview in publications 
and presentations based on this research project.   
 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above mentioned research project.  
 
 
 
Name of participant   Signature   Date 
 
 
 
 
Researcher    Signature   Date 
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Appendix 3: Interviews Cited 
 
Interview 
number 
Capacity of Interviewee Level Time of interview 
1 Elected Official at the Prefecture of 
South Aegean 
Syros May 2014 
2 Official at Devolved Administration  Syros December 2014 
3 Official at the Municiapity of Tinos Tinos December 2014 
4 Official at Devolved Administration Syros July 2013 
5 Official at the Prefecture of South 
Aegean  
Syros May 2014 
6 Official at the Special Secretariat of 
Water  
Athens May 2014 
7 Official at the Prefecture of South 
Aegean 
Syros May 2014 
8 Hotel Owner  Syros May 2014 
9 Representative of the Agricultural 
Association of Syros 
Syros May 2014 
10 Domestic User Tinos May 2014 
11 Domestic User Tinos December 2014 
12 Expert: Hydrologist specialising in the 
Cyclades 
Athens December 2014 
13 Domestic User Syros May 2014 
14 Elected Official in the Municipality of 
Tinos 
Tinos May 2014 
15 Official at the Ministry of Agriculture Athens May 2014 
16 Official at the Municipal Company of 
Water and Drainage, Syros 
Syros December 2014 
17 Official at the Municiaplity of Tinos Tinos May 2014 
18 Official at the Prefecture of South 
Aegean 
Syros December 2014 
19 Elected Official at the Municipality of 
Tinos 
Tinos December 2014 
20 Citizens‘ Initiative Tinos Tinos December 2014 
Source: compiled by author 
